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ABSTRACT
Connections between George Eliot and Immanuel Kant have been, for the most part,
neglected. However, we have good reason to believe that Eliot not only read Kant (as well as
many who were directly influenced by Kant), but substantially agreed with him on critical and
moral issues. This thesis investigates one of the issues on which Kant and Eliot were most
closely aligned, the need for duty in morality. Both the English novelist and the German
philosopher upheld a vision of duty that could command absolutely while remaining consonant
with human freedom and grounding a sense of moral dignity. This vision runs throughout the
works of both writers, but is first developed and takes on a particular urgency in the works
examined in this thesis, ranging from some of their early publications to Kant‟s Critique of
Practical Reason and Eliot‟s Romola.
The first chapter discusses duty in the wider context of debates about Divine Command
Morality, in which the good is defined by its accord with the will or command of God, and which
both Kant and Eliot resisted in formulating their own moral visions (while maintaining the
language of law and command). This chapter also discusses evidence we have for Eliot‟s
familiarity with Kant and establishes critical context for this paper. The second chapter
discusses religion – in particular, religious enthusiasm – as a necessary background for duty,
which exists in the absence of theological certitude, even as it seeks to preserve something of
religion‟s capacity to command and its popular scope. Kant‟s path to the first Critique led
through works foundational for, but also sometimes at odds with, the priorities and conclusions
of critical science, and Eliot‟s first novel was preceded by a critical career that paints a quite
different picture of religion than the sympathetic portrait of Dinah Morris. The third chapter
deals with three dimensions of duty in Kant and Eliot, autonomy, reflection and respect,
primarily through the second Critique and The Mill on the Floss. In the conclusion, I turn to
Romola to illustrate the conflict and indeterminative power inherent in this conception of duty.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter I: Command and Context ...................................................................................... 1
Chapter II: Religion and Criticism.................................................................................... 28
Chapter III: Autonomy, Reflection and Respect............................................................... 79
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 115
Works Cited .................................................................................................................... 121
Vita.................................................................................................................................. 129

vi

Chapter 1: Command and Context
Duty and Divine Command Morality
Late into the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant declares “All of my reason‟s
interest (speculative as well as practical) is united the following three questions: 1. What can I
know? 2. What ought I to do? 3. What may I hope?” (735). The focus of this thesis falls
primarily on the second question, which is as much a statement about duty as a question
concerning duty; i.e., both George Eliot and Kant presume that we do possess compelling moral
obligations (there is something which I ought to do). The mentality which seeks after what one
ought to do, knowing that such responsibility exists, already manifests a consciousness of duty,
provided such a mentality neither submerges choice in submission to inclination, nor assumes the
answer to be given in an arbitrary and external code. Kant‟s interrogative formulation and union
of his three questions in a common interest should not be overlooked – duty, for both Eliot and
Kant, is something requiring investigation (philosophical and literary), and questions about duty
cannot be wholly separated from questions of knowledge and expectation. As Kant‟s Critique of
Practical Reason explores the nature and implications of moral duty, Eliot‟s novels frequently
take on duty as a central thematic and site for conflict and drama. These philosophical and
literary investigations arise, in part, from the conclusions and developments of critical works
preceding them, which destabilize prior religious certitudes even as they seek to maintain a space
for meaningful morality.
In an aphorism entitled “George Eliot” in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche writes “In
England, one must rehabilitate oneself after every little emancipation from theology by showing
in a veritably awe-inspiring manner what a moral fanatic one is” (The Portable Nietzsche 515,
qtd. in Anger 92). In the same work, Nietzsche parenthetically identifies Kant as “a crafty
1

Christian, when all‟s said and done” (The Nietzsche Reader 464). Despite the apparent
opposition between fanaticism and craft, one registers a similar sort of complaint being brought
against both the English novelist and German philosopher: that the promise of liberation from
theology incurs only a greater subjection to Christian morality. Nietzsche is anything but alone
in this complaint – Kant had already been attacked on this account by Goethe, and Eliot‟s fall
from favor in the early twentieth century was due in no small part to a moral seriousness that
could come off as didacticism (Levine, “Introduction,” 1). Yet Nietzsche is indebted to a critical
legacy running from Kant, through figures like Strauss and Feuerbach, to Eliot, their English
translator – a legacy which surely played no small part in generating the intellectual climate in
which Zarathustra could be surprised that the saint in the forest had not yet heard that God is
dead.
Distancing ourselves somewhat from Nietzsche‟s hostility, we can nonetheless affirm
that religion forms a necessary background for understanding duty in George Eliot and Kant, and
a background with which each writer has a complex relationship. Moreover, the terms Nietzsche
employs get directly at the complexity of this relationship: both Eliot and Kant write in
opposition to enthusiasm or fanaticism, yet both hold that there is something in morality which
should inspire our awe. Likewise, rationality (satirized by Nietzsche as craft, and thus more the
craft of Socrates than that of Odysseus) seems like a necessary component of morality – Eliot
insists on the need for “intellect” to regulate “feeling,” as a means of correcting the evangelical
excesses of Dr. Cumming, and Kant identifies practical reason and morality. Yet the prospect of
a morality only accessible to (or practicable by) those with highly developed rationality seems at
odds with the scope of moral imperatives, and both writers defend the rights of a sort of popular
interest in formulating duty: Kant argues that practical reason is grounded in an immediate and
2

universal moral awareness, and Eliot famously articulates her defense of sympathetic realism in
Adam Bede with reference to common English country folk. Finally, moral duty does command,
oblige or burden us, but it also offers emancipation, both for ourselves as (at least partially) selfdeterminative agents and for the field of morality itself from other concerns.
One of the primary fields from which morality must be separated or disengaged is
theology as a dogmatic field. Having established the faith or assent (carefully distinguished from
speculative knowledge) we may give to the existence of God as a postulate of practical reason
from the prior fact of freedom, Kant concludes the first part of the second Critique with a
meditation on the “proportion of the human being‟s cognitive powers to his practical vocation.”
In this section, Kant justifies our lack of knowledge of the creator on moral grounds. Imagining
a world in which we possessed immediate knowledge of God, Kant declares:
Instead of the conflict that the moral attitude now has to carry on with the
inclinations, in which – after some defeats – moral fortitude of soul yet gradually to be
acquired, God and eternity with their dreadful majesty would lie unceasingly before our
eyes … Transgression of the law would indeed be avoided; what is commanded would be
done. However, the attitude from which actions ought to be done cannot likewise be
instilled by any command, and the spur to activity is in this [case] immediately at hand
and external, and thus reason does not first need to work itself up in order to gather
strength to resist inclinations by vividly presenting the dignity of the law. Therefore most
lawful actions would be done from fear, only a few from hope, and none at all from duty;
and a moral worth of actions – on which alone, after all, the worth of the person and even
that of the world hinges in the eyes of the highest wisdom – would not exist at all. The
conduct of human beings … would thus be converted into a mere mechanism, where, as
3

in a puppet show, everything would gesticulate well but there would be no life in the
figures. (185-6)
The prospect of complete divine revelation threatens to annihilate genuine morality. Morality
relies on an internal conflict and a capacity to decide apart from the considerations of feared
punishment or anticipated reward. A world in which choice is effectively eliminated by these
considerations threatens at once our capacity to develop morally, the moral worth of our actions,
and the moral meaning, dignity and drama of human life. Kant‟s belief that fear subverts moral
motivation (expressed elsewhere in the second Critique as well as in Religion within the bounds
of bare Reason) is echoed by Eliot‟s mistrust of apocalyptic preaching: to cite one example, “So
long as a belief in propositions is regarded as indispensable to salvation, the pursuit of truth as
such is not possible … the sense of alarm and haste, the anxiety for personal safety, which Dr.
Cumming insists upon as the proper religious attitude, unmans the nature, and allows no
thorough, calm-thinking, no truly noble, disinterested feeling” (Essays 167-8).1 Likewise, Kant‟s
belief that expectation of reward is incompatible with moral motivation seems echoed by Eliot
formulation that a “more perfect” religion “must express less care for personal consolation, and a
more deeply-awing sense of responsibility to man” (GEL v 29-31).2
In the remainder of this chapter, I will contextualize this moral position defended by both
Kant and Eliot, that morality must be constituted and developed in a sphere separate from a

This “noble, disinterested feeling” seems to be a more particular type of feeling regulated by the intellect discussed
by Eliot in the previous paragraph. As Eliot has just been arguing for the connection of truth-seeking intellect and
morality, the impairment of truth is no less a moral obstruction.
2
This sentiment is expressed in a letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe in 1869, but Eliot also wrote to Sara Hennell that
“the test of a higher religion might be, that it should enable the believer to do without the consolations which his
egoism would demand” (GEL v 69). Peter Hodgson reads Eliot‟s developed or higher religion in line with Ricoeur‟s
quotation that “atheism clears the ground for a faith beyond accusation and consolation,” claiming that Eliot herself
ultimately came to seek such a truthful faith (5, 16).
1
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calculus of divine punishment or reward, relating it to Divine Command Morality, before
moving on to discuss some of the critical context and motivation for this project and what
evidence we have for Eliot‟s familiarity with Kant. The second chapter will focus on the
complex presence and multivalent portrayal of religion (particularly enthusiastic Protestantism)
in the early works of Eliot and Kant as a necessary background to their conception of duty,
which proceeds in the absence of theological certitude, but possesses a religious-like capacity to
inspire awe or command absolutely. The texts covered in this chapter run from Kant‟s precritical works and Eliot‟s translations of Feuerbach and Strauss to Kant‟s first Critique and
Eliot‟s Adam Bede. The third chapter focuses primarily on the second Critique and The Mill on
the Floss, elaborating on the sketch of duty introduced here and relating it to the concepts of
autonomy, reflection and respect. Duty must open a possible space of self-determination, free
from the influence of inclinations and external sanctions or commands, it must both permit and
sustain critical self-reflection, and it must ground a moral dignity we can appreciate in others and
experience in ourselves. The conclusion will take up Romola as a novel which illustrates both
the dramatic content of duty and its necessary indeterminations. Duty, as discussed in this paper,
is certainly present in Kant and Eliot‟s work after the second Critique and Romola – Deronda is
no less concerned with the demands of duty than Dinah and the Metaphysics of Morals offers an
extensive account of applied morality and types of duty. Nonetheless, Kant and Eliot‟s early
pre-critical and critical works offer essentially important background to this concept, and duty in
Eliot‟s early novels and Kant‟s second Critique takes on a particularly clear and urgent quality.3

I also draw on some of Eliot‟s less public writings (letters and journals) to elucidate her moral conceptions in her
fictional and critical writings. In this, I partially follow an argument in Rosemarie Bodenheimer‟s The Real Life of
Mary Ann Evans, which makes the case for Eliot‟s letters themselves as (semi)public texts calling for close reading
drawing off of literary techniques
3
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Part of this urgency derives, no doubt, from the energetic conflict both writers engaged in with
enthusiastic and dogmatic religion.
Eliot and Kant‟s distrust of a morality motivated by fear of divine wrath or hope for
divine reward taps in to a debate dating back at least to Plato. In one way or another, Divine
Command theories relate God (or some fundamental aspect of God) to morality, often in the
form of arguing that statements like “one ought to x” or “it is morally right to x” ultimately
equate to “x is commanded by God.” In Plato‟s Euthyphro, Socrates poses the question as to
whether the pious or holy (to hosion) is so because it is loved by the gods, or whether it is loved
by the gods because it is pious. Either alternative seems problematic – if the pious is only pious
because it is loved by the gods, then the piety seems to be an arbitrary quality; if the pious is
loved by the gods because it is pious, then a principle seems to exist above and independent of
the gods, to which their judgments appeal. This latter possibility is already troubling for the
polytheistic Euthyphro, and only becomes more so in a monotheistic frame which grounds reality
and the good in an absolute Being. Divine Command Morality seems to possess an intuitive
accord with traditional understandings of biblical texts and grounds moral judgments and
imperatives in an omnipresent and eternal entity, granting them objective validity. Yet the threat
of rendering the morally good effectively arbitrary has troubled theistic and secular thinkers
alike. This tension (among others) has ensured the endurance of Divine Command Morality as a
problem to this day. Philip Quinn and Robert Adams have developed prominent recent Divine
Command theories, while objections run the gamut from the problem of the arbitrary (the
problem of an apparent lack of grounding for the good if it reduces to a will that could have
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equally easily willed otherwise) to a need for virtue ethics in the place of legal obligation, to the
simple refutation of theism.4
Divine Command Morality is also sometimes referred to as Theological Voluntarism due
to its tendency to emphasize the absolute will of God in the place of, for example, God‟s nature
or character. This emphasis establishes an intuitive connection between this moral position and
theological orientations that stress the divine will, such as Lutheran or Calvinistic thought and
their echoes in State and dissenting Protestantisms in Eliot‟s Britain and Kant‟s Prussia. The
debate over Divine Command Morality seemed to draw particular attention in the seventeenth
and eighteenth century Britian. In Essays on the Law of Nature (written in the early 1660s), John
Locke divides moral obligation to natural laws (being equivalent to the laws of nature‟s creator)
into two liabilities: “First, a liability to pay dutiful obedience, namely what anyone is bound to
do or not to do at the command of a superior power” and “secondly, a liability to punishment,
which arises from a failure to pay dutiful obedience” (qtd in Idziak 180). God‟s authority
derives “partly from the divine wisdom of the law-maker, and partly from the right which the
Creator has over His creation” – and it is clear that God needs no further justification, and that
morality proceeds under a mode of command and punishment. Likewise, in the first book of An
Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke speaks of “the true ground of morality”

Quinn‟s and Adam‟s theories have been developed through a number of works, spanning the 1970s, 80s and 90s
(and more recently) – I cite them as they seem to be the most frequently referenced recent theories, although writers
like William Wainwright, Mark Murphy and Edward Wierenga (among others) have also advocated versions of
Divine Command Theories. Virtue Ethics objections have been made in both G.E.M. Anscombe‟s pivotal “Modern
Moral Philosophy” (Philosophy 33.124 (1958): 1-19) and Linda Trinkaus Zebzebski‟s Divine Motivation Theory
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For more information about and more objections to Divine
Command theories, see Wierenga‟s “A Defensible Divine Command Theory” (Noûs 17.3 (Sept 1983): 387-407) and
Quinn‟s “Divine Command Theory” (The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. Hugh Lafollette. Oxford:
Blackwell, 1999. 53-73)
4
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as “the will and law of a God, who sees men in the dark, has his hand in rewards and
punishments, and power to call to account the proudest offender” (Works i 14).
Locke‟s position, however, was far from universal. One of Locke‟s contemporaries, the
Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth attacked a will-based Divine Command theory in his
Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, written in the seventeenth century but not
published until well after Cudworth‟s death in 1731. Drawing on a Platonic notion of immutable
and independently-existent ideas (in part to combat Hobbes‟s state-centered conception of
morality), Cudworth argued that “moral good and evil … cannot possibly be arbitrary things,
made by will without nature” (qtd in Idziak 160). God‟s apparent incapacity to unfix the
determinations of good and evil through an indifferent will no more impaired divine power than
his inability to make a square a circle (168). In Cudworth‟s view, God does of course command
the good, but a full account of God‟s relation to the good also requires accounting for God‟s
wisdom and nature as well as his will. A similar objection to Divine Command theory was
voiced by Leibniz in his Discourse on Metaphysics (written in 1686, but not published until the
nineteenth century – although some of its ideas appeared in his Theodicy and Monadology):
In saying, therefore, that things are not good according to any standard of goodness, but
simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing it, all the
love of God and his glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if he would be
equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary? Where will be his justice and wisdom if he
has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness, and
if, in accord with the definitions of tyrants, justice consists in that which is pleasing to the
most powerful? (4-5).

8

Both Cudworth and Leibniz advocate essentially rationalist objections and are troubled less by
Eliot and Kant‟s concerns with reward and punishment than the arbitrary and destabilizing force
of will left to itself. However, Leibniz‟s argument by right and reasonable government against
the threat of despotism is a familiar enough trope in Kant‟s critical philosophy – for example, as
in Kant‟s claim that the Critique of Pure Reason will “assure to reason its lawful claims, and
dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by despotic decrees, but in accordance with reason‟s own
eternal and unalterable laws” (Preface to the first edition, xi-xii).5 As Desmond Hogan argues,
Kant‟s explicit break with dogmatic rationalism should cause us to overlook neither continuities
between Kant and rationalists like Leibniz, nor “the persistently rationalist orientation of Kant‟s
mature thought” (40).
While Locke‟s empiricism and Cudworth‟s rational Intuitionism6 may not have had much
direct influence on Eliot,7 the British empirical intuitionist moral sense philosophy, or more
particularly its reflection in the literary-philosophical phenomenon of Sentimentalism certainly
did – both as target of attack for its excesses, but also as a source of inspiration (together with
German influences) for Eliot‟s famous advocacy for a novelistic aesthetic grounded in sympathy.
One of moral sense philosophy‟s primary advocates (and an important figure of the Scottish
Enlightenment), Francis Hutcheson, attacked Divine Command Morality less because it threatens
an arbitrary will than because it threatens logical triviality. According to Hutcheson, calling the
laws of God good must, ultimately, “be an insignificant tautology, amounting to no more than
this, „that God wills what he wills.‟” In place of this tautology, Hutcheson defines the

I here use Guyer and Wood‟s 1998 translation, rather than Pluhar‟s 1996 (which I use elsewhere in this text).
Particularly, his defense of the objective reality and epistemic accessibility of moral ideas.
7
Although, as I discuss in the third section of this chapter, Eliot may have possessed an early desire to reconcile the
philosophies of Locke and Kant and entries on both Locke and Kant appear in a notebook Valerie Dodd makes note
of in the George Eliot Collection of the Nuneaton library.
5
6
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“absolutely good” as “benevolence, or the desire of the public natural happiness of rational
agents.” This benevolence is perceived by our “moral sense … [as] excellence” and is effectively
what we refer to when we call God morally good (An Inquiry concerning the Original of our
Ideas of Virtue or Moral Good, qtd in Idziak, 199). Hutcheson preserves theism, but, unlike
Leibniz and Cudworth, does not appeal to other faculties of God (e.g., wisdom, understanding or
nature), instead refocusing the morally good on “rational agents” – presumably humans.8
Hutcheson was a significant influence on Kant earlier in his career, primarily for his theory of
the moral sense (see Kuehn 107-8, 131, 176, 185), although Kant‟s moral interest in rational
agents would lead him away from Hutcheson‟s empirical approach and the principle of
happiness as a moral foundation.9 Although Eliot certainly had more sympathy for an empirical
account of morality than Kant, it is hard to imagine her being any more satisfied with happiness
as the ultimate criteria of moral judgment and action.
While Hutcheson‟s moral sense was still a faculty owed to a divine creator, Hume
attempted to develop a naturalistic account of moral psychology. In An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding (1740), Hume complains of philosophers “not content with the principle,
that nothing exists but by [God‟s] will, that … rob nature, and all created beings, of every power,
in order to render their dependence on the Deity still more sensible and immediate” (47). Like
Leibniz and Cudworth, Hume sees a diminishment of the Deity in this reduction to will, but

Although not excluding heavenly beings or extra-terrestrials, as in Kant‟s assertion that moral freedom must be a
property of all rational being in the Grounding.
9
Kant seems closest to Hutcheson in his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), which
also employs an empirical method of investigation. Although Kant rejects happiness as an adequate moral
motivation, he does frame it as a major moral concern, being part of the concept of the Highest Good, in second
book of the first part of the Critique of Practical Reason.
8
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Hume‟s protest here is on behalf of nature and its inhabitants.10 The term “God” does not even
appear in Hume‟s An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), “Gods” appearing
only in a quotation from Cicero, lords being of the earthly variety, and “divine” referring to
churchmen. Instead, the operations of human sympathy or moral sentiment provide a sufficient
basis for moral judgment and action – besides providing moral motivation where reason cannot.
Sympathy is a key term in Hume‟s moral philosophy as a means of explaining how a morality
grounded in sentiment does not collapse into pure self-love. Hume even declares that “the end of
all moral speculations is to teach us our duty,” such education inculcating agreeable, admirable
or useful habits “by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue” (5).
Hume anticipates both Kant and Eliot in his construction of morality starting from human
principles and his emphasis on a morality centered on duty that does not begin from fear or selfinterested anticipation of a deity – and particularly anticipates Eliot with his focus on sympathy.
Although Hume was a major and acknowledged influence on Kant, Kant found Hume‟s
epistemic skepticism and his moral philosophy ultimately inadequate to the needs of critical
philosophy.11 Eliot‟s sympathy, though certainly indebted (directly or indirectly) to Hume,
undermines the dichotomy Hume establishes here between deformed vice and beautiful virtue:
In her defenses of sympathetic realism in “A Natural History of German Life” and the

Hume goes on to argue that “this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme being, is too bold to
ever carry conviction with it to a man, sufficiently apprized of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits,
to which it is confined in all its operations.” This theory carries us “quite beyond the reach of our faculties … we
are got into fairy land, long ere we have reached [its] last steps” (47-8).
11
In particular, Kant was suspicious of Hume‟s skepticism that moral rationality can provide motivation for moral
action, but, more generally, he seems to have believed that Hume‟s positive moral concepts – for example,
benevolence, utility, virtue and vice, the agreeable – were inadequate to ground a rigorous morality.
10
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seventeenth chapter of Adam Bede, Eliot argues for a sympathy that acts where our usual sense
of the agreeable or beautiful is absent or even repelled.12
Hume‟s application of the terms “utility” and “useful” as morally relevant suggests
another British philosophical movement in the wake of Locke‟s empiricism, Utilitarianism.
Utilitarianism did not necessarily mandate a Humean rejection of Divine Command Morality. In
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (1785), William Paley defined virtue according to
three terms, in which “„the good of mankind,‟ is the subject, the „will of God‟ the rule, and
„everlasting happiness‟ the motive of human virtue” (qtd in Idziak 214). Although this appears
to be a modification of Divine Command theory, supplemented the theory with utilitarian benefit
and emotional motive, Paley retains the theory‟s primary foci: a “violent motive” of reward or
punishment, obligation to the command of God and a morality in which “Right … signifies, the
being consistent with the will of God” (214-5).13 Nonetheless, Utilitarianism certainly gave one
the capacity to remove the divine from moral calculation. Well into the second chapter of An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), Jeremy Bentham stops to note
“It may be wondered, perhaps, that in all this while no mention has been made of the theological
principle; meaning the principle which professes to recur for the standard of right and wrong to
the will of God” (qtd in Idziak 221). Bentham cavalierly concedes “whatever is right is
conformable to the will of God,” but argues that we possess no sufficiently distinct
understanding of this will on which to build an understanding of the right. In a footnote to this

For a discussion of sympathy in Eliot in relation to another Scottish moral sense philosopher, see Rae Greiner‟s
“Sympathy Time: Adam Smith, George Eliot and the Realist Novel” (Narrative 17.3 (Oct 2009): 291-311).
13
Paley, I should note, is also discussed in Gillian Beer’s Darwin’s Plots: Evolutionary Narrative in Darwin,
George Eliot and Nineteenth Century Fiction, primarily in opposition to Darwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000). In contrast to Paley, Beer seems to suggest a potential alignment between Kant and Darwin with
Kant‟s concept of Purposiveness without purpose (81).
12
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argument, Bentham takes issues with theological focus on God‟s pleasure, claiming that “what is
called the pleasure of god, is and must necessarily be (revelation apart) neither more nor less
than the good pleasure of the person, whoever he be, who is pronouncing what he believes, or
pretends, to be God‟s pleasure” (222).
Although Kant‟s Critique of Practical Reason was published between these two works,
in 1788, at this time Kant at most implicitly and indirectly engaged with Utilitarian thought, in
discussing counsels of Prudence. Despite this (and quite reasonably), Kant‟s moral theory is
often taught in opposition to Utilitarianism, the pair forming two alternatives of a rational moral
vision not reliant on Divine Command theory. By the time Eliot came to be writing novels,
Utilitarianism had become an established philosophy, and Eliot‟s familiarity with it likely came
most strongly through John Stuart Mill.14 Utilitarian calculation is ultimately inadequate to the
reckoning of the sort of moral duty, as I shall argue, that Eliot defended within and beyond her
fiction. Yet Bentham‟s concern with the capacity of religious pronouncement to mask personal
desire is a concern very much shared by both Eliot and Kant, principally under the problem of
Enthusiasm.15 Moral Sense Philosophy and Utilitarianism cannot ultimately account for either
Kant or Eliot‟s notions of duty, but both are essential grounds for the development of moral
conceptions that go beyond Divine Command Morality. More particularly, they facilitate
productive epistemic skepticism and more complex accounts of human psychology and moral
motivation.

Eliot‟s intellectual engagements with Mill can be found in Gordon Haight and Avrom Fleishman‟s biographies of
Eliot (among others). Valerie Dodd frames her George Eliot: An Intellectual Life between the figures of J.S. Mill
and Carlyle as competing forces in British thought, but also writers who were powerfully influential on Eliot.
15
Although neither Eliot nor Kant were slow to identify egoistic hypocrisy in more staid words and actions of less
enthusiastic state clerics – Gascoigne in Daniel Deronda and some of the clerical discussion in “What is
Enlightenment?” jump immediately to mind.
14

13

The issue of motivation also differentiates Eliot and Kant‟s notions of duty from the
moral theories of two movements and Divine Command Morality. Cudworth and Leibniz seem
to approach more closely to Kant‟s moral view, Cudworth emphasizing the objective validity of
morality and Leibniz stressing the need for a rational approach and essence to morality – but
even given the objective existence of a rational Good, the question remains as to what would
motivate one to pursue the morally Good.16 Divine Command Morality provides an answer of
sorts – simplistically, the desire to be rewarded and avoid punishment, although more complex
motivations on possible (see, for example, motivations relating to a Deity defined by love or
benevolence in Adams or Quinn). Utilitarianism is also not wanting for an answer (i.e., usevalue or benefit), but the conception of morality as something that could be reduced to
calculation or the greatest benefit for the greatest number introduces problems both on the level
of common-sense understandings of morality and individual motivation.17 Moral Sense
philosophy, particularly as developed by Hume, seems to offer an account of moral motivation
most closely aligned with Eliot‟s – and Kant‟s early sympathy with Hutcheson and Hume should
not be overlooked. Sympathy is undoubtedly a major force in Eliot‟s moral thought and Kant
does not discount the positive value of beneficial or sympathetic inclination. Nonetheless, Kant
held that inclinations were inadequate to ground a rigorous and universally applicable morality
and sympathy cannot explain the whole of Eliot‟s moral thought. Eliot and Kant saw something
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One might of course follow the strains of the Neoplatonic thought on which Cudworth draws and speak of a
teleological drive in things towards the Good – moral motivation in Leibniz I will take as a topic of sufficient
density to be beyond the scope of this paper.
17
I am, of course, oversimplifying Utilitarian moral theory here. Nonetheless, it seems that Hume‟s objection to
moral rationalism might be brought against certain formulations of Utilitarianism – e.g., it seems entirely possible
that a subject might know that the moral good to consist in the greatest benefit or utility to the greatest number
without this knowledge decisively influencing the subject‟s action.
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valuable in a morality that could meaningfully speak of law, command and obligation (and not
just influence, the pleasant or utility) without relying on arbitrary external force.

Critical Contexts
As of May 2011, There is only one article specifically on George Eliot and Kant: Andrew
Lynn‟s “„Mr. Gilfil‟s Love Story‟ and the Critique of Kantianism.” In this article, Lynn reads
said story from Scenes of Clerical Life as an attack on Kant‟s Critique of Judgment. The term
Kantianism is entirely apt, as Lynn seems to be working with a mixture of work by and received
understanding about Kant. Thus, no distinction is made between Kant‟s moral and aesthetic
philosophy, and Sir Christopher can stand in as a paradigm of Kantian Autonomy – apparently in
complete disregard of the necessary role the that Moral Law plays in Kant‟s positive conception
of Autonomy. Lynn‟s article does make the case for Eliot‟s story as a critique of empty
formalism – and draws our attention to what I argue is a common concern between Eliot and
Kant, a concern with the capacity of humans to obscure egoistic or narrowly subjective motives
behind religious or moral pronouncements. In any event, Lynn‟s article certainly goes beyond
most critical work done on Eliot (even on Eliot in relation to philosophy), which is content not to
posit any relationship between Eliot and Kant, beyond that of Eliot perhaps having read some
Kant.18
However, Lynn is not alone in supposing that there may be a more robust relationship
between the two writers. In “Daniel Deronda: A New Epistemology,” George Levine proposes a

See, for instance, Suzy Anger‟s article “George Eliot and philosophy,” 77. Anger does mention Kant several
times in this article, but more as a means of contextualizing Eliot‟s views - although she does suggest Eliot‟s
awareness of and limited accord with elements of Kant‟s epistemology (83).
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connection between Eliot and Kant that is unfortunately not elaborated beyond the following
quotation: “the imagination” in Daniel Deronda acts as “a literary reworking of Kant‟s theory of
judgment, [and] is thus understood to make the connection between the realm of the morally
necessary and transcendent and the realm of the empirical and practical understanding” (57). In
“G.H. Lewes Revised: George Eliot and the Moral Sense,” K.K. Collins makes the case for
Eliot‟s intuitionist (as opposed to utilitarian) moral commitments, explicitly aligning her thought,
at least at this late point in her career, with Kant (I discuss this article in more detail in the third
chapter). In The Ethics of Reading, J. Hillis Miller reads George Eliot‟s narrative technique in
the famous seventeenth chapter of Adam Bede in opposition to a theological “Kantism.” Miller
deals with Kant‟s idea of respect in an earlier chapter, but here the primary text is the Critique of
Judgment, which, Miller alleges, is grounded in a notion of a genius that brings a logos
analogous to the divine logos to bear on the material of nature (66-7).19 Specifically, Miller
claims that George Eliot breaks the analogy between the two logoi, sending the work of the ideal
genius into the realm of the “simply unreal” or the “fictive” without possible return (67). Miller
also notes “It was by no means necessary to know Kant‟s works in order to be a Kantian or an
anti-Kantian in the nineteenth century” – implicitly gesturing towards the cultural impact and
currency of Kant‟s thought (67). As I argue in the next section, Eliot did have indirect
knowledge of Kant‟s philosophy, but we also have reason to believe that she engaged with his
philosophy directly. In the course of this paper, I will be making the case that some of the
alignments with Kant that Collins detects in Eliot‟s late completion and revision of Problems can

For reasons not immediately relevant to this paper concerning morality, I cannot agree with Miller‟s reading of the
Critique of Judgment (admittedly, Miller does not seem to propose this explains all of the aesthetic theory third
Critique, as he distinguishes the Kantian sublime from this Kantism (70)). In any event, how we understand Kant in
relation to theological concerns is certainly an open question in both his moral and aesthetic philosophy.
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be detected much earlier in her work, both critical and fictional. Miller‟s reading is useful for
appreciating subversive complexities in Eliot‟s defense of sympathetic realism, but left on its
own seems to underrate both constructive elements of Eliot‟s moral vision and theologically
subversive elements of Kant‟s philosophy.20
Writing in 1999, Jonathan Loesberg noted that, although “George Eliot … quite evidently
was deeply read in German idealism, … yet there is little treatment of the influence of any of
those writers on the actual shape of her novels (the exception here is Feuerbach, who is,
however, read as if he were a Victorian Comtean rather than a Young Hegelian)” (“Cultural
Studies” 541). Loesberg‟s assertion that Eliot‟s engagement with German idealism does not
seem adequately reflected in the criticism (relative to other concerns) is, I think, still valid, but
that is not to say her engagement has been ignored in Eliot criticism. Lynn‟s article also came
out in 1999, and Loesberg released an article reading Eliot in light of Hegel and Feuerbach,
“Aesthetics, Ethics and Unreadable Acts in George Eliot,” in 2001.21 Hegel in relation to Eliot
seems to have garnered significant attention even before Loesberg‟s article, from Darrell Mansell
Jr.‟s brief “A Note on Hegel and George Eliot” in 1965 to Sara M. Puzzell-Korab‟s The Evolving
Consciousness: An Hegelian Reading of the Novels of George Eliot in 1982 to Gerhard Joseph‟s
“Hegel, Derrida, George Eliot, and the Novel” in 1985.22 Another German idealist whose

I am here thinking primarily of Kant‟s critical epistemic and moral philosophy, but even Miller‟s avenue of attack
– the Kantian notion of Genius – is grounded in freedom from the pre-determination of prior rules (and, implicitly,
commitment to the theological significance of works of art).
21
I discuss this article in the third section of this paper. Loesberg‟s emphasis on unreadability as a morally relevant
category potentially accords with my focus on Kantian incalculability in moral decisions, although the stakes of the
arguments are notably different.
22
Joseph also published “The Antigone as Cultural Touchstone: Matthew Arnold, Hegel, George Eliot, Virginia
Woolf and Margaret Drabble” (PMLA 96.1 (Jan 1981): 22-35). Discussions of Hegel and Eliot also appear in
Avrom Fleishman‟s George Eliot's Intellectual Life (2010), Valerie Dodd‟s George Eliot: An Intellectual Life
(1990) and Rosemary Ashton‟s The German Idea: Four English writers and the reception of German Thought 18001860 (1980) – most substantially in Dodd.
20
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philosophy was developed (in part) in reaction to Kant, Schopenhauer, has also received some
attention in relation to Eliot. Two notable articles on this head are E.A. McCobb‟s “Daniel
Deronda as Will and Representation: George Eliot and Schopenhauer” (1985) and Peter
Capuano‟s “An Objective Aural-Relative in Middlemarch” (2007) – the latter of which uses
Schopenhauer‟s philosophy of music as an alternative to imagistic realism in reading Eliot.23
Finally, Friedrich Schiller, a German philosopher, poet and playwright who, like Hegel or
Schopenhauer, owed a great debt to Kant, has also been discussed in relation to Eliot: Robert E.
Norton‟s “The Aesthetic Education of Humanity: George Eliot‟s Romola and Schiller‟s Theory
of Tragedy” appeared in 1991, while Deborah Guth authored a series of articles on Eliot and
Schiller in the late 90s, culminating in George Eliot and Schiller: Intertextuality and crosscultural discourse in 2003.24
Like these critics, I believe that (as Suzy Anger puts it), “George Eliot‟s novels do
philosophical work and enrich ethical discussion” (92) – and more particularly that this
philosophical work can be brought into greater clarity and productively elaborated in
conversation with German idealism. I do not, of course, wish to argue that Eliot was an idealist,
but the critical developments, aesthetic speculations and moral engagements that characterize
German idealism form an important background to Eliot‟s thought and writing.25 More

McCobb had also written on Schopenhauer, Eliot and Music in “The Morality of the Musical Genius:
Schopenhauerian views in Daniel Deronda” (Forum for Modern Language Studies 19.4 (1983): 321-330). There is
also a book on Schopenhauer and Eliot (among others) by Penelope LeFew-Blake: Schopenhauer, Women’s
Literature and the Legacy of Pessimism in the Novels of George Eliot, Olive Schreiner, Virginia Woolf and Doris
Lessing (Edwin Mellen Press, 2001).
24
I will briefly return to Schiller in the conclusion.
25
Although I agree with Deborah Guth and Robert Norton that Romola in particular incorporates idealism and I do
think idealist strains thus far identified in Daniel Deronda can and should be productively elaborated and developed
(on this latter point, see and Graham Handley‟s introduction to the Oxford World Classics edition of Daniel
Deronda (1998/2009)). See also Fleishman‟s reading of the “idealistic vision” of Eliot‟s “A Minor Prophet” as a
central credo of her thought and works (7-8).
23
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particularly, Kant‟s philosophy can help us to appreciate some of the critical complexity of and
moral motivation for Eliot‟s works.
It is a commonplace of Eliot criticism that Eliot‟s morality as manifest in her novels is
grounded in combating “egoism” and, in Anger‟s words, “desires for one‟s own welfare must
invariably be conquered” (93). Kant is also often thought of as advancing a morality that calls
for the conquest of inclination (selfish and otherwise), and there is certainly a basis to these
characterizations. Moreover, causal accounts may reduce Eliot‟s moral thought to a call for
sympathy and Kant‟s moral philosophy to the demand that we follow the categorical imperative.
In framing my discussion around the multivalent issue of duty – a concept given particular
attention in Kant‟s moral philosophy and a site of conflict throughout Eliot‟s novels – I hope to
suggest that we cannot write off Kant or Eliot‟s moral thought as mere masochism or self-denial,
nor can we reduce this thought to one simple term or priority.
Part of the motivation for this project is to map Kant and Eliot‟s conception of duty as a
connected historical development in the context of strains of thought in running throughout the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries. As I shall argue in the next section, Eliot possessed both
direct and indirect familiarity with Kant‟s philosophy. She also translated the work of Strauss
and Feuerbach, Hegelian Higher critics working off of Kantian priorities in a field energized by
Kantian philosophy. Yet Kant and Eliot are also reacting against a common background of
enthusiastic Protestantism, as well as strains of moral thought at odds with a rational dutycentered conception of morality –Divine Command Morality, versions of moral sense theory,
and Utilitarianism, among others. The relevance that the empirically-minded Eliot found in a
rational, autonomous and absolutely imperative sense of duty speaks to the capacity of this
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notion to persist amidst the demise of other enlightenment (and, arguably, Romantic, as moral
autonomy was foundationally important for both British and German Romantics).
However, duty-centered or deontological ethics is also a current and vibrant strain of
thought. Endorsed by philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Frances Kamm, deontological
ethics have been applied by even those who point out paradoxes in them (for example, Robert
Nozick), are hotly contested by other schools of thought (e.g., Virtue Ethicists) and, I think, are
implicitly present (albeit in radicalized form) in the philosophy of continental thinkers like
Emmanuel Levinas, who insist on the demand or responsibility imposed on us by the Other.
Quite naturally, Kant is an often-referenced and often-contested figure in debates about
deontological ethics. Ethics and literature is an expanding field of sizable contemporary interest
– particularly in nineteenth-century British literature, as suggested by a recent anthology on
Levinas and the same and the work of critics like Andrew H. Miller, Amanda Anderson, Jil
Larson and Adela Pinch, among others.26 By developing an account of a consonant conception
of duty in the respective literary and philosophical works of Eliot and Kant, I hope to offer a
potential connection between particular current interests in deontological ethics and a more
general interest in connecting nineteenth-century British literature and ethical philosophy.
Despite current academic enthusiasm for ethics, it seems like there is something
unfashionable about morality. “Ethics,” with its Hegelian reference to particular communal
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The collection on Levinas is Levinas and nineteenth-century literature: ethics and otherness from Romanticism
through Realism (Newark: University of Deleware Press, 2009), while some recent works of the critics mentioned
above relating ethics and literature include Andrew H. Miller‟s The Burdens of Perfection: on ethics and reading in
nineteenth-century British literature (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), Amanda Anderson‟s The Powers of
Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the cultivation of detachment (Princeton: Princeton University Press (which follows
up previous readings of detachment as a potential ethical perspective)), Jil Larson‟s Ethics and Narrative in the
English Novel 1880-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) and Adela Pinch‟s Thinking about other
people in nineteenth-century British writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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forms of life or its Aristotelian reference to human flourishing, is widely adaptable and can
permit anything on the spectrum from moral commitment to developed tolerance, and can be
equally appropriated by the most straightforward political reading to the most elusive Derridean
deconstruction. If there is to be morality, let it be resolved into “moral philosophy” or “moral
life” (to the point that it becomes indistinguishable from ethics). Morality on its own seems alltoo-eager to plunge into absolutes, to dissolve or ignore particularities and to bind us by
inflexible rules or commands. Kant and Eliot, I believe, are inescapably moral thinkers, and
some of our leeriness concerning Eliot‟s didacticism or Kant‟s distrust of inclinations is probably
warranted. Yet they are also writers that have shaped our understanding of what philosophical
critique and realist novel (respectively) can do, and thinkers that continue to challenge us to
develop critically rigorous and morally satisfying understandings, both in the wider ranges of
thought and politics and in our particular and practical lives. Eliot explicitly sought to widen the
“ethics of art,”27 and Kant persistently emphasized the practical nature of morality – neither of
which positions led them to abandon a duty-centered morality that could command while also
grounding meaningful freedom and dignity.

George Eliot and Kant
George Eliot was particularly well suited to possess indirect knowledge of Kant‟s
philosophy. Eliot‟s familiarity with Hegel and Schiller no doubt assisted in this regard, as both
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This being in a reply to Bulwer-Lytton on the subject of Maggie in The Mill on the Floss, quoted in George Eliot:
The Critical Heritage 111, which is in turn quoted in Jonathan Loesberg‟s “Aesthetics, Ethics and Unreadable
Acts.”
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engaged quite thoroughly with Kant‟s philosophy, moral, theoretical and aesthetic.28 Schiller in
particular maintained Kant‟s insistence on the root of morality in freedom and stressed the role
of this moral freedom in grounding human dignity. Besides Schopenhauer, Eliot may have even
gained some familiarity with Kant through her thorough readings of the sometimes-antagonistic
Goethe.29 As I argue in the next chapter, Eliot‟s translations of Strauss and Feuerbach would
also have afforded engagements with Kant‟s critical philosophy. But Eliot also read two of the
best-known disseminators of Kant‟s philosophy in England: Coleridge and Carlyle.30 Eliot also
appears to have read J. G. K. C. Kiesewetter‟s Grundriß einer allgemeinen Logik nach
Kantischen Grundsätzen (loosely translated, Outline of a universal Logic according to Kantian
Principles).31 This logic textbook contained an “effusive dedication to Kant” and, as the title
suggests, seeks to derive its system of logic from Kant‟s philosophy. Keisewetter had been a

Exactly how much Eliot may have read from Hegel and Schiller is uncertain – Lectures on the Philosophy of
History and Aesthetics seem probable for Hegel (and possibly the Phenomenology, according to Sara M. PuzzellKorab), while for Schiller all of the plays and much of the poetry are certain, while the aesthetic treatises (on which
Kant had the most direct influence) is “likely” (Norton 5, Guth 25 – both draw from a mixture of Eliot‟s letters,
Anthony McCobb‟s George Eliot’s Knowledge of German Life and Letters and other sources). For more
information on these Eliot‟s knowledge and reading of these two figures, see the sources listed in the previous
section.
29
In his Life of Goethe, G. H. Lewes claims that Schiller “hampered his genius by fixing on his pegasus the leaden
wings of Kant‟s philosophy” (116) and complains that Schiller‟s influence made Goethe, “in contradiction to his
native tendency, speculative and theoretical,” having the “noxious” effect of leading Goethe to be occupied with
“Kant and scientific theories” (402).
30
Dodd probably has the most extensive account of Eliot‟s readings of and engagements with Coleridge, but see
also Diana Postlethwaite‟s comparison of Coleridge and Eliot at the opening of Making it Whole: A Victorian Circle
and the Shape of their World (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1984) (Fleishman seems to take Eliot‟s familiarity
with Coleridge for granted, but is ambiguous about to what extent her thinking aligned with his (perhaps in reaction
against claims regarding Eliot‟s organicism). As mentioned previously, Carlyle is one of the two main figures Dodd
uses to frame Eliot‟s intellectual developments, and Eliot wrote on Carlyle (including a review of The Life of
Sterling) for the Westminster Review. Carlyle is often brought up as relevant context for Eliot‟s conservatism or
(her sometimes ironic takes on) heroes and heroines (see, for instance, Brian Rosenberg‟s “George Eliot and the
Victorian 'Historical Imagination' (Victorian Newsletter, 61 (Spring 1982): 1-5) and Joseph Wiesenfarth‟s “Carlyle
and the Prelude to Middlemarch” (George Eliot-George Henry Lewes Studies 50-51 (Sept 2006):143-54)). Both
Coleridge and Carlyle are also, of course, relevant figures for discussing humanism and the importance of culture for
Eliot.
31
Eliot thanks Francis Watt for lending her this work in a letter (GEL ii 78).
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copyist for Kant and worked to popularize Kant; the Grundriß itself was apparently sufficiently
close to Kant‟s philosophy that Kant himself believed the author to have plagiarized.32
Probably the strongest claim for Eliot‟s engagement with Kant comes from Edith
Simcox‟s article on Eliot for The Nineteenth Century:
It was in this early period [at Foleshill] that in the course of a walk with a friend she
paused and clasped her hands with a wild aspiration that she might live “to reconcile the
philosophies of Locke and Kant!” Years afterwards she remembered the very turn of the
road where she had spoken it (780).33
Given its second-hand conveyance and distance from the event in time, this account should be
taken with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, we shouldn‟t discount the possibility of this
philosophical ambition for a young Eliot who would go on to translate Strauss, Feuerbach and
Spinoza. One reading of this ambition would be that it seeks to square Locke‟s insistence that we
start from a blank slate and derive knowledge empirically with Kant‟s insistence that we possess
knowledge prior to experience. Another possible reading would be that Eliot may have sought to
reconcile Locke‟s empirical epistemology with Kant‟s moral philosophy, and more particularly
its emphasis on the priority of practical to speculative reason.34 Unfortunately, Cross‟s

This information comes from the J.G.K.C. Keisewetter article in the biographical section of Manchester College‟s
Kant site (http://www.manchester.edu/kant/Bio/FullBio/KiesewetterJGKC.html), which will be in the forthcoming
The Dictionary of Eighteenth Century German Philosophers, ed. Manfred Kuehn and Heiner Klemme (Thoemmes
Press).
33
Haldane quotes this passage from Simcox in George Eliot and Her Times (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1927),
p52. Valerie Dodd, in turn, quotes Haldane in George Eliot: An Intellectual Life, p.97. Although this idea of
George Eliot desiring to reconcile the philosophies of Kant and Locke appears elsewhere (e.g., Cooke‟s George
Eliot: a critical study of her life, writings and philosophy), in each case it seems to trace back to Simcox.
34
It should be noted that Kant‟s moral philosophy actually preceded his epistemological philosophy in translation in
England, as John Richardson released an anonymous translation of the Grounding in 1798 (for more on Kant‟s
reception and translation in England, see Giuseppe Micheli‟s The Early Reception of Kant’s Thought in England
1785-1805 (1990) in the series Kant’s Thought in England (Thoemmes Press, 6 Vols) and Rene Welleck‟s
Immanuel Kant in England 1790-1838 (Princeton University Press, 1931).
32
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destruction of Eliot‟s journals before 1854 from knowing much about her thought during the
time Simcox describes, or “Eliot‟s first „German Period,‟ as Sara Hennell called it” (Anthony
McCobb 85).
In July of 1855, she published a review of Gruppe‟s Gegenwart und Zukunft der
Philosophie in Deutschland ([the] Present and Future of Philosophy in Germany) entitled “The
Future of German Philosophy” in the Leader. In this review, Eliot takes up Gruppe‟s attack on
the Kantian à priori and shows a greater awareness of Kant‟s first Critique than might have been
expected from her reading of either Kiesewetter or Strauss, going into some detail concerning
Kant‟s distinction between synthetic and analytic judgments (which Eliot rejects). Eliot seconds
Gruppe‟s demand that philosophy abandon “the high priori road” but follow instead the “uphill à
posteriori path” (Essays 153) and this suspicion of the à priori is maintained throughout Eliot‟s
writings. Eliot approvingly relays Gruppe‟s demand that philosophy “renounce metaphysics”
and instead focus on “Psychology … Aesthetics … Ethics; and … the principles of
Jurisprudence” (153). Although Kant certainly never renounced metaphysics, the resemblance
of these latter fields to Kant‟s own work is remarkable. Psychology is a major concern of the first
Critique, ethics and morality are central issues of the second (and other works), aesthetics
constitutes the first half of the third and jurisprudence is treated in Kant‟s Metaphysics of Morals
(Metaphysik der Sitten). Although Eliot is clearly dissatisfied with Kant‟s attempt to establish a
ground for metaphysics here, the scope of his overall critical project might not have met with the
same disapproval.
Other references to Kant in the 1850s paint a more nuanced picture of Eliot‟s attitude
towards Kant. In a letter to Sara Hennell in 1854, Eliot makes a fleeting reference to “the great
Kant” in relation to Herbert Spencer (GEL ii 165). In another letter to Hennell in 1856, she
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corrects a presumption of Hennell‟s, noting “Kant and everyone else who rejects the design
argument would deny that „to say the eye was designed to see is a safe affirmation‟” (GEL ii
268). This could refer to either the first or the third Critique, as both deal with teleology and
issues of design. Eliot appears to think Kant‟s position instructive. In October of 1855, Eliot
releases a piece entitled “Translations and Translators” in the Leader, in which she commends
Meiklejohn‟s translation of Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason. Although Eliot refrains from
commenting on Kant‟s philosophy here, she does imply familiarity with the original text (Essays
208). Most strangely for someone who attacked à priori methods in July 1855, George Eliot
explicitly uses such a method herself in her essay “Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming” in
October of the same year. Abstracting her objections from the truth or falsity of the Dr.‟s claims,
Eliot declares that “his use of prophecy must be a priori condemned in the judgment of rightminded persons” due to the faulty moral and cognitive frame Cumming brings to bear in creating
these claims (Essays 181).
Kantian terminology also appears in “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists,” published in the
Westminster Review in October of 1856: “Lady novelists, it appears, can see something else
besides matter; they are not limited to phenomena, but can relieve their eyesight by occasional
glimpses of the noumenon” (Essays 310). Andrew Lynn‟s assertion that this line constitutes an
“attack on Kantianism” (25) either neglects Kant‟s actual definition of the noumenon or makes
the critical error of assuming that Kant‟s later Critiques simply negated the first: Kant defines the
noumenon as the thing-in-itself that lies beyond any possible experience and never becomes
theoretically knowable, let alone visible (CPure 317-19). Instead of criticizing Kant here, Eliot
is making use of a distinction picked up from Kant to ridicule the pretensions of lady novelists.
A similar though gentler sort of parody seems to be going on in “Amos Barton,” when the
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narrator remarks that twenty five years ago “the human animal of the male sex was understood to
be perpetually athirst, and „something to drink‟ was as necessary a „condition of thought‟ as
Time and Space” (Scenes 12). Again, the humor derives in part from the disparity between the
pretensions of popular understanding and Kant‟s philosophy.35
Eliot also likely benefited from G.H. Lewes‟s continuing engagements with Kant for his
revisions of his Biographical History of Philosophy and his incomplete Problems of Life and
Mind.36 In the former text, and amidst a fairly critical entry, Lewes speaks of “the à priori idea
of justice – the moral law from which no conscience can be free” (Vol. 2, 118 (1845-6); 520
(1871)). Although Lewes elsewhere violently attacks the very notion of an à priori idea, here
Lewes defends the idea that, though individual notions of justice may vary, the idea of justice
itself is omnipresent in human culture. In 1846, Lewes even speaks of Kant‟s “noble vindication
of the great idea of duty” (Vol. 2, 119), although this remark was cut from the 1871 edition.
Lewes‟s take on Kant‟s moral philosophy is somewhat more combative in Problems of Life
Mind. Eliot, however, appears to be more closely aligned to Kant than Lewes on this count, as
discussed in the third chapter (in particular with reference to her Eliot‟s revision and completion
of Lewes‟s Problems, as discussed by K. K. Collins). Probably sometime around the time that
Lewes was working on Problems of Life and Mind in the later 1870s, Eliot wrote a notebook

Though here, unlike in the quotation from “Lady Novelists,” Eliot leaves open the possibility that Kant‟s
understanding, now thought necessary, is also inadequate. Hans Seeber‟s article on Kant for the Oxford Reader’s
Companion to George Eliot (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000) makes note of this passage.
36
Lewes‟s entry on Kant in his History grew from thirty to ninety pages in his revision and Problems of Life and
Mind make reference to a variety of sources from Kant‟s metaphysical philosophy, with less attention to his moral
and aesthetic philosophy (although Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (Anthropology from a practical
perspective) and Kant‟s discussion of Life in relation to teleology in the third Critique do make fleeting
appearances). Lewes read several works by Kant besides his Critiques, as well as commentaries on Kant by Kuno
Fischer and Julius H. Kirchmann (McCobb, 112, 119-20). Items from George Henry Lewes and George Eliot that
ended up at Dr. William's library include a translation of Kant in French and Borowski's biography of Kant, both
with Lewes's linings and references, and secondary works on Kant in English, French and German (Baker 222, 108
and 33, 37, 45, 80, 105, 135, 137, respectively).
35
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focused on Greek Philosophy, Locke and Comte, but containing four pages of quotations from
Kant (Dodd “A George Eliot Notebook” 261).
Eliot‟s most explicit expression of her regard for Kant came in “A Word for the
Germans” (1865), in which she defended the philosopher, declaring that “the most eminent of
German metaphysicians, KANT, is cloudy in no other sense than that in which a mathematician
is cloudy to one ignorant of mathematics … KANT was a rigorous thinker, who … felt the need
of terms undefaced by a long currency, free from confusing associations” (Essays 387). This
praise is particularly appropriate, given the fact that Eliot herself was criticized for the use of
specialized terminology in her novels.37 Eliot‟s positive use of the term “rigorous” here, as even
her statements that might be read as anti-Kantian (the attack in Gruppe or her declaration in The
Mill on the Floss against “men of maxims” (discussed in chapter three)) make demands for more,
not less critical rigor. The problem of duty is partially a problem of how to conceptualize (or
discover) a critical or rigorous inwardness, which can speak to and motivate the subject while
standing the test of intersubjective necessity. To address this problem, to philosophically
conceptualize duty or to make it compellingly manifest in a literary space, requires that we first
seek to free ourselves from “confusing associations.”

37

In particular, she was criticized for the use of scientific terminology in Daniel Deronda by George Saintsbury
(possibly among others) – apparently her use of the term “dynamic” (among other terms) outside of a scientific
contexts was one of the first (Bonaparte 42 n1).
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Chapter Two: Religion and Criticism
On December 6th, 1859, George Eliot wrote to François D‟Albert-Durade, an old friend
from Geneva whom she had recently informed that she had authored Adam Bede. Writing that
she could understand that Durade might well not recognize her hand in certain pages of that
novel, Eliot explained:
I think I hardly ever spoke to you of the strong hold Evangelical Christianity had on me
from the age of fifteen to two and twenty and of the abundant intercourse I had with
earnest people of various religious sects. When I was at Geneva, I had not yet lost the
attitude of antagonism which belongs to the renunciation of any belief – also, I was very
unhappy, and in a state of discord and rebellion towards my own lot. Ten years of
experience have wrought great changes in that inward self: I have no longer any
antagonism towards any faith in which human sorrow and human longing for purity have
expressed themselves; on the contrary, I have a sympathy with it that predominates over
all argumentative tendencies. (GEL iii 230-1).
Haight identifies this letter as “one of the most illuminating statements of her religious belief”
(331) – yet this letter exploits an equivocation between sympathetic-emotional and
argumentative-doctrinal agreement that opens her letter to multiple readings:
I have not returned to dogmatic Christianity – to the acceptance of any set of doctrines as
a creed, and a superhuman revelation of the Unseen – but I see in it the highest
expression of the religious sentiment that has yet found its place in the history of
mankind, and I have the profoundest interest in the inward life of sincere Christians in all
ages. Many things that I should have argued against ten years ago, I now feel myself too
ignorant and too limited in moral sensibility to speak of with confident disapprobation:
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on many points where I used to delight in expressing intellectual difference, I now delight
in feeling an emotional agreement. On that question of our future existence, to which
you allude, I have undergone the sort of change I have just indicated, although my most
rooted conviction is, that the immediate object and the proper sphere of all our highest
emotions are our struggling fellow-men and this earthly existence (GEL iii 230-1).
In writing about George Eliot and religion, biographers and critics have generally fallen
between two extremes. One extreme can be characterized by Avrom Fleishman‟s approach in
George Eliot’s Intellectual Life, which seeks to cast doubt on Eliot‟s being anything other than a
“typical Anglican churchgoer of the middling classes in early Victorian England” who became
passionate only in rejecting Christianity (23). If we follow Fleishman‟s argument that Eliot was
not, in fact, an Evangelical, and his tendency to downplay the extent and passion of her religious
commitments, then we must consider the “strong hold” spoken of above to be fiction – and her
account of sympathetic agreement a feint to excuse argumentative disagreement. An example of
the opposite extreme appears in Peter Hodgson‟s Theology in the Fiction of George Eliot, which
traces religious themes, sympathies and concerns throughout Eliot‟s novels, concluding with a
chapter relating her work and thought to postmodern theology. Characterizing Eliot as
“awakening [to] an intensely evangelical form of Christianity” at boarding school (vii), Hodgson
claims that Eliot‟s abandonment of Christian doctrine did not result in a loss of religious interest,
passion, or even faith (accepting modifications to these terms necessary to square them with her
rejection of doctrine).38 By this reading, sympathy does indeed predominate over argument and

The first chapter of Theology in the Fiction of George Eliot lays out a sketch of Eliot‟s religious biography and,
from p13-29, particulars of what Hodgson reads as Eliot‟s agreements and sympathies with religious thought and
concerns with more detail and subtlety than the above terms admit. Nonetheless, as Hodgson makes strong claims
for continuities in Eliot‟s religious thinking and the value religion held for her, I think the terms appropriate.
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her rejection of dogma merely conditions, instead of eliminating or radically challenging, her
religious sentiment and thought. While Hodgson‟s affirmation of Eliot‟s earlier evangelical
phase falls in line with the mainstream of critical commentary, the extent to which he seeks to
establish the continued value and validity of religion to her does not.
Although Fleishman‟s and Hodgson‟s books have both been published after 2000, the
split they embody has been a part of George Eliot criticism for some time. In less extreme
forms, it was present in articles by Martin Svalgic and Bernard Paris in 1954 and 1962,
respectively. In “Religion in the Novels of George Eliot,” Svalgic ultimately concedes Eliot‟s
rejection of the Christian religion and faith, but insists that Christianity “retained a strong hold on
her ideals, her affections, and her imagination” (158). Svalgic‟s article focuses on Scenes of a
Clerical Life, Adam Bede and Middlemarch, excluding Romola and Daniel Deronda, whose
intensely religious Catholic and Jewish registers, respectively, seem to trouble the idea of Eliot‟s
evangelical protestant Christianity as her chief religious influence and interest. Although Paris
deals with Eliot‟s novels in “George Eliot‟s Religion of Humanity,” he centers his discussion
primarily on Eliot‟s philosophy, drawing from her letters, criticism and translations as well as
literary works.39 Paris admits Eliot‟s earlier Evangelical phase, but argues that “the real crisis”
of her life came with her transition from pantheism (á la Spinoza and the Romantics) to atheism,
generating an “essential tragic” worldview and leading Eliot towards a “new religion” without
God (418-9). The religion of humanity described by Paris comes about as a kind of collision
between scientific and Feuerbachian thought and rests on a fundamental rejection of Christian

See Knoepflmacher‟s commentary in 1965 on George Eliot criticism in the wake of Haight‟s publication of The
George Eliot Letters and its tendency to focus on “formal aspects of her art” or her philosophy and its ideological
implications and commitments, but not both (Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel 24-7).
39
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religion. Moderately phrased, the two positions seem unassailable: George Eliot‟s continuing
interest in religion seems evident from her concern with religious characters and themes from
Scenes of a Clerical Life (her first major literary publication) to Daniel Deronda (her last novel).
Conversely, her rejection of religious doctrine is testified to by her translations of Strauss and
Feuerbach, her personal life, and the way even her novels maintain distance and/or impose
conditions on their religious characters and content.
Rather than attempting yet another argument about whether Eliot was or was not
fundamentally religious, I want to shift the discussion away from both what Eliot herself really
believed and what her novels as a totality show. Eliot‟s personal experience and belief and her
literary production alike show flux, development, contradiction and complexity that should give
us pause in attributing static positions to her self and her work. Rather than attempting to resolve
the sorts of equivocations made in the letter to D‟Albert-Durade, I will argue that they are
intentional and necessary – and of particular critical interest in the context of Eliot‟s concept of
duty. Instead of giving priority to either Eliot‟s sympathetic agreement or her argumentative
disagreement with Christianity, I will show both are present and significant in her early work and
the moral thought developed therein. This framework of complex affirmation will also help to
elucidate the early work of Kant, whose famous critical destruction of theological proofs are
preceded by an apparent interest in enthusiasm and coexist with a desire to preserve some form
of faith. Moral duty, as understood by Eliot and Kant, exists in the wake of theological
skepticism, but borrows from the reserves of religion.
As Eliot‟s and Kant‟s educations were both intensely evangelical, these reserves included
a sense of absolute imperative, moral vocation and an inward and emotional spiritual focus. I am
here using the distinction by which “evangelical” refers to enthusiastic, individually-concerned
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and gospel-centric protestant Christianity, while “Evangelical” refers to a movement influenced
by Methodism but internal to the Anglican church.40 The evangelical Pietism that made its way
to Kant‟s Collegium Fridericianum was a major influence on Wesley‟s Methodism and thereby
the Evangelicalism Eliot was taught and embraced.41 Abstracted from their context, Eliot‟s
focus on inward self and life, her insistence on emotional truth that overcomes discursive
rationality and her sympathy with “human suffering and human longing for purity” in her letter
quoted at the beginning of this chapter could fit equally well into a Pietistic, Methodistical or
Evangelical frame.
Of course, Eliot‟s careful and ambiguous rhetoric, her focus on “earthly existence” and
her rejection of “superhuman revelation” require a quite different genealogy. Kant is an
important part of this genealogy, as his critical reaction against enthusiastic and dogmatic
religion informed the work of higher critics like Strauss and Feuerbach, whose writings Eliot
would turn to and translate in her own rationalist-humanist rejection of Evangelicalism. That
Kant and Hegel were important influences on nineteenth century Higher criticism in general is
accepted widely enough; but Hegel‟s immediate influence on figures like Strauss and Feuerbach
has, I suspect, overshadowed the ways in which these figures are still carrying on a Kantian
project. From both current and nineteenth century perspectives, Hegel and Kant may come off

I adopt this distinction in capitalization from Ian Bradley‟s The Call to Seriousness: The Evangelical Impact on
the Victorians, while the definition of “evangelical” collects the common traits in definitions offered by Bradley,
Boyd Hilton in The Age of Atonement (7-14), David Hempton in Evangelical Disenchantment (4-7) and Herbert
Schlossberg in The Silent Revolution and the Making of Victorian England (29), the last of which in turn draws on
David Bebbington‟s Evangelicalism in Modern Britain. I use the term individually-concerned as opposed to
individualistic to suggest that, while evangelicalism was fundamentally concerned with inward spiritual life,
individual conversion and individual behavior, it was not individualistic in the ways that, for example, nineteenthcentury Quaker or Unitarian Christianities were.
41
John Wesley‟s religious awakening among Moravian Pietists, which would eventually lead to the founding of
Methodism, is frequently cited (for two brief examples among many, see W.R. Ward‟s The Protestant Evangelical
Awakening 310-3 and Schlossberg‟s The Silent Revolution 31-4).
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as critical hypocrites, alleging dedication to the free operation of reason while ultimately
returning thought to the familiar paths of theology and State interests.42 Whatever the balance of
truth and error in such a conception (both being certainly present), it is important to remember
that Hegel is both inspired by and writing against Kant‟s philosophy. Although Feuerbach was a
young Hegelian and Strauss clearly drew on Hegel in his conception of myth, both writers owed
at least as much to Kant‟s critical and destructive reason, and its more conditional reparations, as
to Hegel‟s reconciliations.
For both Kant and Eliot, the concept of duty exists and becomes compelling against a
background of epistemic concerns explored particularly in their early works. Naturally, for the
famed English atheist and the philosopher declared a danger to religion across Europe, one of
these concerns is the question of theism and how one is to understand or construct an imperative
morality when the existence of a deity is either negated or unknowable. Another concern is
enthusiasm, which might be broadly characterized as thought that goes beyond the limits of
reason and understanding –thought that is usually, but not necessarily, religious. For both Eliot
and Kant, this threat calls for critical activity, correction and destruction – for Kant, in the form
of critical science, and for Eliot in higher criticism, but also in the criticism of a public press.
Nonetheless, both Eliot and Kant make manifest a need for a morality that survives the limits of
speculative knowledge – for Kant, with the idea of a moral faith, and, for Eliot, with the concerns
of sympathy and vocation. Duty poses a general problem, approximately, the question of what I
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Although I personally find it interesting to follow the reception of Kant by Foucault and Deleuze, two inheritors
of of the arch anti-Kantian Nietzsche. Foucault‟s essay on Kant‟s “What is Enlightenment?” attests to an interest in
possible reconfigurations of the enlightenment project, and, although Deleuze claimed to have written his
monograph on Kant to “an enemy,” the concern Deleuze shows with Kant‟s philosophy, together his description of
his philosophical project as “transcendental empiricism” suggests an appreciation for the critical potentials and
immanent constructions of Kant‟s philosophy. The current resurgence in critical interest in Hegel attests, I think, to
power his thought continues to have to uproot prior certitudes and found new paths.
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ought to do, but also poses problems more specific to the fields in which the two writers worked
– to what duties are attendant upon the practice of critical science, and what obligations does the
vocation of the novelist entail?

Enthusiasm, Critique and Faith
Unlike Eliot, Kant never had any period of intense dedication to the evangelical
Christianity that informed his education. Attending the the Collegium Fridericianum, Kant
reacted against its religiously-informed discipline, later complaining that its type of coercion
“often robs people of all the courage to think for themselves” (Kuehn 45, 48). Kant‟s later
criticisms of the “spirit of narrow sectarianism” and religious zealotry of Pietism seem to have
their roots in his experiences at the Collegium (Wood, “Life” in A Companion to Kant 11, Kuehn
52-4). Allen Wood claims that attempts “to identify Pietist influences in Kant‟s moral and
religious thought” ignore the fact that “virtually all explicit references to Pietism in his writings
or lectures are openly hostile” (11), while Kuehn declares “Kant‟s moral and religious views
betray a definite anti-Pietistic bias” (54). One might certainly read this rejection itself as a kind
of influence, leading Kant to denounce the outward practice of Pietism while maintaining
something of its discipline and severity in other spheres. Nonetheless, we should be wary of
reading into every explicit rejection an implicit sympathy – and thereby missing the ways in
which Kant‟s moral philosophy vastly exceeded the narrow bounds of the brand of Pietism
inculcated at the Collegium.
By all accounts, Kant‟s parents were devout Pietists – and, given Kant‟s frequent praise
for his parents, this fact seems to complicate Kant‟s often hostile remarks about Pietism.
Manfred Kuehn quotes Kant‟s claim that his mother possessed “genuine religiosity that was not
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in the least enthusiastic” and proposes that what is often read as Pietistic influence in Kant‟s
admiration of his parents is more reflective of the moral code of Königsberg tradesmen (31, 3944). Ernst Cassirer acknowledges superficial contradiction in Kant‟s later statements about
Pietism, but contrasts the respect Kant held for his parent‟s religious serenity with his disdain for
the public display and fanaticism Kant saw in other forms of Pietism (17-8). Kant‟s desire to
contrast an ideal of “genuine religiosity” with enthusiasm seems to accord with Cassirer‟s
division and seems further supported by reports of Kant‟s discussion of his mother‟s religious
behavior alongside his attribution of the early development of his moral character to her (Kuehn
31, 429 n23, 24). Kant‟s distinction between genuine religion and enthusiasm may accord with a
division within Pietism – between an earlier model of Pietism, centered on inward will and
devotion, practical faith and a rejection of outward ceremony or form and the model apparently
taught at the Collegium, centered on obedience, repetitive discipline and torturous selfexamination.43 Despite his later declamations against what he saw as religious superstition and
hypocrisy, it seems that there were some elements of religion Kant found “genuine” and morally
significant.
Kant began his university career studying Latin literature and ended it studying natural
science, engaged in contemporary debates about Leibniz and Newton – throughout avoiding the
theological conflicts between orthodoxy, Pietism and Wolffian rationalism that plagued Prussia‟s
universities. As tempting as it is to read Kant‟s choice of research as an attempt to side-step
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For this characterization of the Pietism taught at the Collegium, I draw on Cassirer 15-8 and Kuehn 50-5. My
dichotomy certainly oversimplifies a complex religious movement (e.g., the focus on inward devotion was part of
the motivation for mandated self-examination, obedience and the subduing of the natural will were necessary to the
development of the true will) – yet the development of evangelical movements from radical, inward-focused origins
to more disciplinary and apocalyptic modes has been argued for in a number of works by W. R. Ward and appears
now to be widely recognized in histories of evangelicalism.
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religious issues altogether, his early publications do not support this reading. The decision to
write on and develop Leibnizian physics in his first published paper, Thoughts on the True
Estimation of Living Forces, would have carried a kind of political religious content – this being
due to Leibniz‟s rationalism and its association with Wolff, whose philosophy and followers
were currently being persecuted or expelled from Prussian universities by Pietists (Kuehn 68-9,
91-2). But there are three pre-critical works by Kant in particular I would like to draw attention
to for their religious content: Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755), The
Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1762), and Dreams of a SpiritSeer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics (1766).44 In the first two of these essays, Kant
expresses and advocates theism while defending positions whose religious implications
complicate that theism, while the last engages directly with enthusiasm in the figure of Emanuel
Swedenborg.
If mentioned at all, Kant‟s Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens is
mentioned for its expression of the nebular hypothesis well before Laplace‟s more famous
formulation (Kant‟s work being published but withheld from circulation due to the publisher‟s
bankruptcy (Cassirer 40)). Although Kant was less thorough in the mathematical development
of the hypothesis than Laplace, Kant‟s formulation, reasoning from empirical findings at the
time, has in some ways better modeled current understandings of our solar system‟s development
than Laplace‟s. This hypothesis led Kant to correctly predict the discovery of new planets, and
has even helped to predict the location of the Oort belt (Hastie, “New” xxxv, Schönfeld in A

44

Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels and Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer
Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, respectively. Although the translation I employ here uses “The One Possible
Basis,” “Only” is a more literal rendering of einzig (“sole” could also work). Beweisgrund does not render well in
english (literally Reason/Ground of/for Proof), but basis conveys the structural intent in its use.
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Companion to Kant 47). The majority of this work is a sustained scientific attempt, working and
expanding off of Newton, to build a satisfying mechanical account of the genesis and structure of
the Solar System.
Yet viewed in relation to Kant‟s later prose, it is remarkable how this natural scientific
pursuit is presented. Kant‟s declaration in the Critique of Practical Reason listing “the starry sky
[Himmel] above me” as one of “two things fill [that] the mind with ever new and increasing
admiration and reverence” (203) seems reflected here as the physical system of the heavens leads
Kant to far-ranging speculation and the domain of poetry. For example, after giving a
mathematically-driven account of the formation of Saturn‟s rings, Kant speculates on the
possibility of Earth having once had a ring, and such a ring being the original foundation for the
water above the firmament in Genesis (130). In the concluding part of this work, Kant moves
from his mechanistic account of the universe to “a comparison of the inhabitants of the Heavenly
Bodies,”45 finishing with speculation about “the conditions of the existence of man in the Future
Life.” Delving into poetry, Kant quotes from Pope, Addison and Albrecht von Haller throughout
this work (particularly Pope), often for beginning chapters and/or standing in when the eternity,
infinity or vast system of the universe demands further account than prose can manage.
In this work, the vast mechanism of the Universe that drives Kant to poetry also serves to
attest to a divine intelligence behind itself – and the poetry serves to underscore this attestation
with its own praise for God. In the preface, Kant takes pains to defend his mechanical account of
the cosmos from charges of atheism that might arise with the account‟s apparent similarity to
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It should be noted that Kant does not assume the existence of extra-terrestrials. Nonetheless, his curiosity here
extends to the thinking or rational nature in such beings – which invites comparison with his insistence in the
Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals that freedom of the will is a necessary condition of any rational being, and
not just humans (50).
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ancient atomic theory. Against these accusations, Kant stages his argument as a means of
defending religion against the claims of Naturalism: mechanism and the operations of matter are
given full scope (thus avoiding facile or over-simplified religious accounts of the universe which
Naturalists can easily take apart), but the necessary laws at work behind matter presume and
evidence a first cause. In fact, in an argument Kant explicitly borrows from Englishmen
borrowing from Descartes, the construction of the universe from “rude matter” and “a few
simple and general laws” testifies all the more to the wisdom and capacity of God (27). The
eighth chapter resumes this argument (God having been a frequent reference in the meantime),
also suggesting an internal tendency to order in things as another proof of God‟s existence.
Nevertheless, Kant had reason to anticipate accusations of Naturalism. Although
working off of Newtonian principles, Kant broke with Newton with his nebular hypothesis. For
Newton, explaining the existence and movement of the solar system along an apparently
consistent plane required falling back on the direct action of God. Kant‟s idea that the solar
system – and the universe more generally – might have formed from matter in a gaseous state
condensing over time allowed for a material explanation of the same phenomenon (Cassirer 489, Hastie xxi). Although Kant insists that this material explanation only magnifies the glory and
wisdom of the Creator, his defensive maneuvers clearly indicate his awareness that the
explanation might be put to other uses. This text is complicated by an interest in Nature that sits
uneasily with its theistic satisfactions. Led to contemplate the eventual decay of the earth, Kant
assures us:
But we ought not to lament the perishing of a world as a real loss of Nature. She
proves her riches by a sort of prodigality which, while certain parts pay their tribute to
mortality, maintains itself unimpaired by numberless new generations in the whole range
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of its perfection. What an innumerable multitude of flowers and insects are destroyed by
a single cold day! And how little are they missed, although they are glorious products of
the art of nature and demonstrations of the Divine Omnipotence! (150)
The divine becomes almost an afterthought amidst the staggering material operations of Nature.
Kant‟s prodigal and homicidal Nature seems to differ only in choice of emphasis from
Nietzsche‟s “nature, prodigal beyond measure … with no compassion or fairness, fertile and
desolate and uncertain all at once; imagine Indifference itself as a power” (315)?46 Against this
infinitely creatively and infinitely destructive Nature, Kant invokes a “Revelation [that] teaches
us to hope” for the persistence of the soul in union with the Deity (155). Yet this is a hope that
“Reason of herself could not be bold enough even to aspire to” (155) – and, despite the fact that
Kant concludes in considerations of a “Future Life,” both Kant‟s reason and his sense of wonder
are squarely focused on the physical system of the universe.
If Universal Natural History evinces a near-enthusiasm in Kant‟s sense of wonder and
range of speculation with respect to the heavens, the same cannot be said for The Only Possible
Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God.47 Although Kant‟s cosmogony does receive
a brief mention in this latter text, The Only Possible Basis shows a tighter scope and more
careful and technical development and organization.48 Kant‟s foray into the well-plowed fields
of theological proofs makes use of Leibnizian terminology and concepts while pressing beyond
Kant goes on from considering the extinction of insects and flowers to consider “The injurious influences of
infected air, earthquakes, and inundations [that] sweep whole peoples from the earth,” noting that “it does not appear
that nature has thereby suffered any damage” (150).
47
Obviously, the term enthusiasm is used here in a broader sense than above in the definition of evangelicalism.
Nonetheless, the sense of an emotional excess of entirely rational expression is present in Kant‟s wonder, with and
beyond his use of poetry, and Kant‟s own complaints about the religious enthusiast‟s inappropriate expansion of
speculation and assertion might be brought to bear on this earlier work.
48
Part of the shift in style between these two works likely has to do with different intended audiences – Universal
Natural Theory was intended for (relatively) popular release, while The Only Possible Basis was intended to
establish Kant‟s academic reputation (at which it was somewhat successful (Kuehn 141-2)).
46
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the limitations of Leibniz‟s theological arguments (Cassirer 61-3). The argument of The Only
Possible Basis turns on the second proposition of its second observation, that “the internal
possibility of all things presupposes some existence.” From this perspective of what is necessary
for the internal possibility of all things to hold, the argument is eventually able to conclude the
existence of an absolutely necessary being. Having arrived at this latter position, the proof of
which “may be adduced completely a priori” (95), Kant arrives at different necessary aspects of
this being (such as unity, eternity and ultimate reality) and concludes that it must be God.
Despite an opening quotation from Lucretius, Kant understandably sees no need to defend this
work from charges of atheistic Naturalism.
As the title suggests, this work has both constructive and destructive aims; it offers the
basis for a demonstration of the existence of God, but it is also argues that this is the “only”
possible basis. In the second part of this work, after the proof has been demonstrated, Kant goes
on to elucidate the utility of this proof (this being where cosmogony becomes relevant). In doing
so, he attacks physico-theological proofs of God‟s existence, which move from observations of
nature to knowledge of God. Nor are these proofs alone, as suggested by the title of part three,
“In which it is shown that no argument for a demonstration of the existence of God is possible
save that which has been cited.” In this last section, Cartesian and Wolffian proofs join their
physico-theological and cosmological brethren, the latter two failing in precision and necessity,
while the former two run against an assertion made here and recurrent in the first Critique,
namely that existence is not a predicate. Despite the fact that Kant ultimately abandons his
ontological argument, this work anticipates the arguments of the Ideals of Pure Reason chapter
of the first Critique – both its systematic and negative engagement with proofs of the existence
of God and, in a much less developed way, its particular arguments. If the Universal Natural
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History concludes with an expansive movement towards other planets and future lives, The Only
Possible Basis concludes with a culling movement, limiting the scope of how knowledge may be
justified.
The dangerous potential of Kant‟s attack on popular and traditional proofs of the
existence of God is partially counteracted by his own proof, but also by a note on which Kant
begins and ends his study: that our knowledge of God does not rest on metaphysical proofs. The
Only Possible Basis concludes with a turn away from its proof and the assertion that “It is
thoroughly necessary that one be convinced of God‟s existence; but it is not nearly so necessary
that it be demonstrated” (239). As revelation offered truths beyond reason in Universal Natural
History, personal conviction of what Kant at the beginning of this work calls “the most important
of all our knowledge” does not need proceed through the methods of formal proof (43).
“Providence has not intended that the insights most necessary for human blessedness should rest
upon the subtlety of refined inferences, but rather has immediately provided such insights to
natural common sense which, if it is not confused by false artifice, does not fail to lead directly
to the true and the useful insofar as we most urgently require them” (43). Kant‟s turn from
“refined inferences” to the practically necessary anticipates Kant‟s turn from theoretical to
practical knowledge in the second Critique – yet the conditions here are troubling. How is one to
recognize when “false artifice” is at work (especially in dealing with matters as complex and
abstract as the divine) and what does “insofar as we most urgently require them” exclude? The
priority of human blessedness (suggesting inward purity and outward benevolent action) carries
Pietistic connotations here – as does the sense of religious urgency trumping theoretical
concerns. Yet Kant‟s interest in this work resides not in the sunny realm of the blessed, but
rather in “the fathomless abyss of metaphysics … [which] is a dark ocean without coasts and
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without lighthouses where one must begin like a mariner on a deserted ocean who, as soon as he
steps on land somewhere, must test his passage” (45).
Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics opens with a decidedly
less heroic (though similarly dark and borderless) image, “The realm of shades … the paradise of
fanatical visionaries … a country without frontiers which they [the visionaries] can cultivate at
their pleasure” (305). The German for “fanatical visionaries” is “Phantasten,” suggesting a
dreamer, but also one given to fantasy; in this sense, “fanatical” might be equally rendered
“enthusiastic,” as both English terms render the same German term (Schwärmerei). The problem
of fanaticism or enthusiasm for Kant is the problem of what happens when we overstep the
bounds of understanding and reason. Although this text was occasioned by an investigation into
the enthusiastic visions of Swedenborg, Kant reads the dangers of enthusiasm no less into the
visions of rationalist philosophers, affirming that “there is a certain affinity between the
dreamers of reason and the dreamers of sense” (329). Drawing from a quotation from Heraclitus
(misattributed to Aristotle) concerning the community of the waking world and the isolation of
dream worlds, Kant speaks of the dream “world known as The Order of Things … tinkered
together by Wolff … [and] the world which was conjured out of nothing by Crusius using the
magical power of a few formulae concerning what can and what cannot be thought” (329). The
religious enthusiast and the unconsciously enthusiastic philosopher happily inhabit “imaginary
worlds,” removing themselves alike from the demands of rigorous reason and epistemic
responsibility to human community. Freed from the constraints of rational testing and
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consensus, these figures wander the abyss, shaping its unreal material with no guidance save
arbitrary and unfixed pleasure.49
Nonetheless, this text is not a straightforward condemnation of metaphysics (or even,
arguably, of enthusiasm). The “elucidation” promised in the title is at least partially facetious, as
is the “Preamble, which promises very little for the execution of the project” – and yet parts of
this text seem to be constructing and defending genuine philosophical positions. Moreover,
Kant‟s inspiration for this project appears to derive from a genuine interest in and curiosity about
Swedenborg. In the text, Kant complains of “the wild figments of the imagination of this worst
of all enthusiasts,” but in a letter to Charlotte von Knobloch written before this text, Kant seems
to give much more credence to the possible veracity of the reports about Swedenborg (352, 45155 n43-49). The text manifests something of this ambiguity, opening with the “unimaginable
foolishness” of enthusiastic accounts, but also cautioning that “To believe none of the many
things which are recounted with some semblance of truth, and to do so without any reason, is as
much a foolish prejudice as to believe anything which is spread by popular rumour … without
examination” (305-6). Despite its protests, the text does seem to seriously consider the
possibility of a spirit world, and manages to come to a productive “practical conclusion.” But
both tentative speculations and complaints are complicated by a strange tone running throughout
this text, starting from the preamble, which hopes “to leave the reader completely satisfied: for

Although this realm is not the sole province of individuals – in the Preface, Kant speaks of Holy Rome‟s
“lucrative provinces in that realm” and speaks of its “exploitation-rights to that spirit realm, having been legitimized
by considerations of state-interest” (305). In context Kant speaks ironically of Rome‟s autonomy from “futile
objections raised by pedantic scholars” and this is clearly an anti-Catholic maneuver (sure to be an intelligent move
in the Lutheran Prussian state of the time). However, one might well wonder about further implications of Kant‟s
connection between religious and state interest in the regulation of “the invisible realm” (or, for that matter, the
capacity of state-interest to fix and secure territory in a space inherently given to indeterminative flux and whether
the “pedantic scholars” would in turn (and no less arbitrarily, although under the alleged aegis of right governance)
reterritorialize the space unfixed from Catholic determinations in the interests of another state).
49
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the bulk of [this work] he will not understand, parts of it he will not believe, and as for the rest –
he will dismiss it with scornful laughter” (306). Kant varies between what seems like sincere
argumentation and moments meant to occasion this scornful laughter. Kant explicitly grants the
reader a kind of freedom, declaring the first chapter of the first part to present “a tangled
metaphysical knot, which can be either untied or cut as one pleases” and recommending the truth
of Swedenborg‟s story “to the reader‟s own free examination” (307, 340). Against the
structured, directive motions of the Critiques, this freedom can come off as disorienting – not
unlike moving from the guiding narration of Adam Bede to the chaotic activity of the doubly
pseudonymous Theophrastus Such.50
As David Walford and Ralf Meerbote point out, Dreams is the first publication in which
Kant truly comes to examine “the limits and possibility of metaphysical cognition” (xvli). The
structure seems to anticipate a Kantian antimony, moving from two incompatible and incomplete
viewpoints in the first part (a revealed “community with the spirit-world” and the cancellation of
this community) to a conclusion that does not so much resolve the situation as enter upon a new
awareness of limitation, but also balancing a “dogmatic” first part with a “historical” and
empirical second part, concluding with a movement beyond both parts. Kant even comes to
define a fundamental function of metaphysics as being “a science of the limits of human reason”
(354). The particular conclusions of such a science in the immediate context appear to be our

The freedom Kant gives the reader is itself indeterminate, seeming to direct the reader‟s reading of Swedenborg‟s
visions, while calling his own voice (or at least motivation) as critic into question – an alternation quite like that of
the narrator of The Impressions of Theophrastus Such, who presents a series of character sketches that critique
others and problems in English thought and culture even as they problematize the speaker (see Nancy Henry‟s
discussion of the “serious and playful exploration” of Eliot‟s last (living) major publication in her introduction to the
work (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1994 vii-xxxxvii))
50
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“necessary ignorance” concerning the existence of spirits, for such spirits “can never be
positively thought,” but at most supposed (339).
Yet Kant does seem at least temporarily attracted by the explanatory potentials of a spirit
world. Drawing on a mixture of Hutcheson and Rousseau, Kant speaks of a constraining “moral
feeling” in which we sense “the rule of the general will … [which] confers upon the world of all
thinking beings its moral unity” (322). The spiritual world would provide a plane of efficacy for
morality beyond its meager appearance in this physical world. The awareness we have of “the
strong law of obligation and the weaker law of benevolence” would reflect forces at work
beyond physical nature, but not out of accord with the “order of nature” (322-3). Kant sees this
latter feature to be of great advantage, avoiding the “necessity of having to resort to an
extraordinary Divine Will in order to resolve a difficulty arising from the imperfect harmony
between morality and its consequences in the world,” which would amount “to a serious
difficulty” (324). Kant does not believe this theory negates an obligation to believe in God, but
does hold that it can evade an improper human tendency to “imagine new and arbitrary
arrangements in the present or the future world, employing some scheme originated by [one‟s]
own wisdom, which [one] then promptly converts into a rule for the Divine Will” (324). Here
the general objection to Divine Command Morality of arbitrariness is complemented with the
threat of personal or egoistic inclination (in a manner that anticipates Bentham‟s similar
objection in 1789). Kant ultimately places even the moral dimension of the spirit world beyond
the realm of the knowable, but his “Practical Conclusion” stresses that such knowledge is not
necessary. Good action motivated only by epistemically secured reward is inherently suspect,
while “the heart of man contain[s] within itself immediate moral prescriptions” that do not
require knowledge of a future life to function (358). This does not rule out such a future state,
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but “it seems more consonant with human nature and moral purity to base the expectation of a
future world on the sentiments of a nobly constituted soul than, conversely, to base its noble
conduct on the hope of another world” (359). This “moral faith,” which does not rely on
speculative knowledge for action, but finds motivation and hope beyond such knowledge,
anticipates both the first and second Critiques.
Unlike the Only Possible Basis, the anonymously published Dreams did not help Kant‟s
academic reputation (Mendelssohn, for one, chided Kant for his choice of subject (lxviii)), and,
in writing the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant adopted the critical science he had gently satirized
in Dreams (speaking of “Science in its vanity” (358)). Speaking as a practitioner of critical
science in this work, Kant abandoned the satiric voice of Dreams, but also the more casual and
literary voice of Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764) and the
wide-ranging and sometimes nigh-enthusiastic voice of Universal Natural History. Kant does
maintain some of the scientific language of this last work, as well as the sense of the pathless
space of metaphysics in The Only Possible Basis: in the first Critique, the secure path that
metaphysics seeks might well be impossible, and, even if it is not, the reason by which we seek it
threatens at every turn to betray us (20). In this space, one can proceed only by experiment
(Versuche – “attempt” is another meaning), as explicitly stated and as suggested by various
references to scientists such as Francis Bacon, Galileo, and most famously, Copernicus. Yet
Kant is careful to insist that his Copernican Revolution will not affect the social order – or, to
phrase it more sympathetically, he seeks to maintain popular concerns against the abstractions of
speculative reason. Despite famously destroying proofs of God, the immortality of the soul and
the freedom of the will, Kant insists that the first Critique “in no way … affect[s] the interests of
the people” (32). Their common sense views about the soul, freedom and God arose from
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natural predisposition, the consciousness of duties and the manifest order of nature, and are thus
unaffected by Kant‟s assaults on “the arrogant claims of the schools” (33). Critical science is
destructive in its ventures, but it is also careful in method and limited in scope.
Moreover, Kant consistently emphasizes that his critical method avoids both dogmatic
and skeptical extremes. In the preface to the first edition, this involves his self-positioning
between the despotic dogmatists and the anarchic skeptics, the former threatening a state of
decay in their “obsolete, worm-eaten dogmatism” and the latter razing the cultivation of others in
a chaotic nomadism (7). In both editions, this mutual distancing is the note on which Kant
concludes, splitting his “critical path” from the dogmatic road of Wolff and the skeptical course
of Hume, and inviting the reader to accompany him in the still unfinished project of bringing
“human reason to complete satisfaction in what has always … engaged its desire to know” (774).
To proceed along this path requires belief both in the possibility of progressively advancing
knowledge and in the current inadequacies in the method and content of our knowledge. As a
mechanistic account of the universe was supposed to defend religion against irrational claims,
Kant‟s critical method can avoid extremes that would endanger science (in the above sense) and
religion alike: “Solely by means of critique can we cut off, at the very root, materialism,
fatalism, atheism, freethinking lack of faith, fanaticism, and superstition, which can become
harmful universally” (34). Again, the term “fanaticism” (Schwärmerei) above might also be
rendered “enthusiasm” – and the effective equation made above between negative religious and
skeptical terms rests on their mutual neglect of what Kant sees as a necessary systematic and
rational foundation. Without this foundation, arbitrary inclination will either gather tyrannical
force about itself in dogma, or lay waste to itself and all else with it in skeptical dissolution.
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After the examination of transcendental aesthetics, transcendental logic, concepts of the
pure understanding and the principles of judgment and at the end of the first book, the pure
reason of the title of this work finally emerges.51 Beyond its merely formal use, reason “itself
contains the origins of certain concepts and principles that it borrows from neither the senses nor
from understanding” (351). Transcendental ideas are “pure concepts of reason” and fall under
three classes of psychology, cosmology and theology, or the soul as subject, the world as series
and God as the condition of possibility (376-9). Kant‟s destruction of the proofs concerning
these three ideas, under the Paralogisms of Pure Reason for the Soul, the Antinomy of Pure
Reason for the world and The Ideal of Pure Reason for God, are of sufficient fame and
complexity that a summary here would not serve our purposes. Yet something that, while wellknown enough among Kant scholars, seems to get lost in more casual discussions of the first
Critique, is Kant‟s emphasis that the contradictions that arise in these sections are not, properly
speaking, mistakes that people have come up with on their own. What Kant refers to as
Transcendental Illusion arises from Pure Reason itself: “transcendental ideas are just as natural
to human reason as the categories are to the understanding … [but] whereas the categories lead
to truth … the transcendental ideas bring about a mere illusion – although an irresistible one”
(617). The means by which we come to the conclusion that freedom of the will does and does
not exist, by which we are led to regard God as a necessary being and the proofs of God‟s
existence as impossible, are the operations of reason itself. “Hence the supreme being remains

This progression being in line with Kant‟s assertion that “All our cognition starts from the sense, proceeds from
there to understanding, and ends with reason” (351). A critique necessarily involves proceeding to the root and
foundation of its matter, and thus a critique of pure reason would need to make account of the cognitive processes
that precede the activity of pure reason proper.
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for the merely speculative use of reason a mere ideal - but yet a faultless ideal, a concept that
concludes and crowns the whole of human cognition” (616).
And yet Kant does not end on this note. Despite the merely regulative function of the
ideas of reason, they nonetheless evince the interest of reason in systematic unity. Although this
interest in the “purposive unity of things” cannot ground existence or knowledge (the attempts to
do so lead to contradiction), it does lead us to regard “all arrangement in the world as if it had
sprung from the intention of a most supreme reason” (650). This tentative principle, which
proceeds as far as speculative reason can without contradiction, is reinforced by practical reason.
Here, as in the second Critique, practical reason concerns freedom, action and moral purpose.
Practical freedom offers the possibility of the unity of the moral or intelligible world (as opposed
to the sensible world) and the ideal of the highest good, in which happiness and moral worthiness
are reconciled. This ideal in turn leads to the concept of an absolutely necessary “single original
being” behind the moral and natural worlds. Yet “moral theology is only of immanent use … it
serves us, viz., to fulfill our vocation here in the world by fitting ourselves into a system of
purposes” and to attempt to use it to expand speculative knowledge would return to
transcendental illusion (745-6).
In the second preface, Kant claims “I had to annul knowledge in order to make room for
faith” (31) and drawing towards his conclusion, Kant repeats this language and distinguishes
faith from opinion and knowledge as subjectively but not objectively sufficient assent to a
judgment and moral faith from doctrinal faith (692, 748-52). This latter faith derives from an
awareness of the binding nature of moral law, which gives us an inescapable sense of purpose.
As the harmonizing of this purpose “with the entirety of all purposes, [having] thereby …
practical validity” is conceivable only with the existence of “a God and a future world,” we have
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a subjective warrant for believing in the latter (752-3). This moral faith can lead us only to
subjective assent, but so long as we are aware of the moral law as binding for us, this assent
holds. As in Dreams, moral faith cannot lead us to knowledge, but it can ground action and
suggest hope.
Kant‟s discussion of the moral law and freedom in this text anticipate his turn to practical
reason in the second Critique, but in itself, the first Critique does not seem to need any sequel.
Indeed, between Kant‟s conditioned moral faith and his prefatory assurance of the
imperviousness of popular religious belief, it seems unclear what more Kant could have to say.
Throughout his pre-critical phase, Kant showed interest in a non-dogmatic theism consonant
with a perspective in which discovery and moral vocation take precedence over submission. The
ultimate position of the first Critique, affirming a subjective warrant for a rationally
indemonstrable but purposively suggestive theism, strikes an even balance between this interest
and what Kant came to see as the demands of critical rigor. This critical rigor is ultimately
supposed to promote morality and carry social benefits by clarifying thought, but it does so
through the destruction of insupportable positions and by excluding the contingent and empirical.
By taking the necessary and rationally articulate as the subject for his Critique, Kant could avoid
the equally pernicious incertitude of skepticism and ungrounded enthusiasm of dogmatism. This
method also involved culling earlier interests of Kant from the critical project, including the
starry heavens and reflections (however satirical) on the spirit-world. Yet Kant‟s critical reason
leads us necessarily to contradiction and thus indeterminacy, and if we cannot venture into the
horizons of freedom, self and God by proof, they remain before us as compelling problems. That
Kant concludes his work in certainty of theoretical incertitude is arguably entirely proper to the
ends of a critique committed at once to construction, destruction and an awareness of limits.
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Evangelicalism, Higher Criticism and the Novel
Like Kant, Eliot started to write in the genre for which she would be known later in life
and after publishing other types of writing. In what most critics refer to as her evangelical phase
(starting sometime after she started attending her Nuneaton boarding school in 1828 and
concluding outwardly with her refusal to attend church with her father in 1842), Eliot did not
refrain from novel reading, taking in Scott, Bulwer-Lytton, Goldsmith and Dickens, among
others (Haight 15, Fleishman 18). However, as Fleishman notes, judging from her letters, she
was “particularly severe on fiction,” distrusting its fanciful method, social consequences and
spiritual relevance (15). Fleishman connects this with Eliot‟s asceticism – a term seemingly
unavoidable in Eliot scholarship, critics differing only on when (if not always), and to what
degree to the term applies. The asceticism did not prevent Eliot from writing poetry and her first
published work is a poem of melancholy religious contemplation published in the Christian
Observer in 1840, although the poem‟s content, bidding farewell to the things and inhabitants of
the material world is of a decidedly ascetic turn (Haight 25-6). The poem concludes with the
comfort that the speaker does not have to abandon the Bible, who she will “meet in heaven.”
Neither Haight nor the editor of the journal could “resist a note” on this point – as presumably a
Bible would not be needed in the afterlife – and Eliot‟s interest here in the perseverance of this
text here does seem to call for comment.52 Although, as Redinger notes, Eliot‟s asceticism,
combined with her “Evangelical framework … left her only a … narrow scope for ambition”

Ruby Redinger (80-1) stands among others that have noted this poem and editor‟s note after Haight – though her
reading of the Bible line expands off of a stanza quoted but not analyzed by Haight, concerning “Books that have
been to me as chests of gold.” Eliot‟s comfort at the maintenance of the bible and despair at the loss of her other
books (placing their loss on par with the loss of the “the earth and all that breathe earth‟s air” indicates “the intensity
with which she had read” her books (81).
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(81-2), this same framework afforded her a sense of a supremely important text of continuing
relevance and a venue for initial publication (albeit a venue not subsequently exploited).53
Eliot sent the poem to the Christian Observer on the prompting of Maria Lewis, principal
governess at Mrs. Wallington‟s Boarding School, where Eliot studied from 1828 until 1832. By
all accounts, Maria Lewis was a close friend and mentor to Eliot during and after her stay at Mrs.
Wallington‟s and a strong Evangelical influence on Eliot‟s life. Moving to Misses Mary and
Rebecca Franklin‟s school in Coventry in 1832 exposed her to another type of Christian
influence. The School‟s girls attended the Baptist church where the Franklins‟ father preached
and organized prayer meetings on their own (Haight 19). Although Evangelicalism was defined
by a tendency towards enthusiasm and seriousness (among other things) within the Anglican
church, Eliot‟s experience with Miss Lewis would not have readied her for the style and severity
of Baptist Christianity. The difference between the two may be suggested by Miss Lewis‟s own
conviction that “her erstwhile pupil‟s „fall into infidelity was due to the overexcitement, fostered
by the Methodist Franklins … and the Aunt [Mrs. Samuel Evans, for a while a Methodist
preacher], leading to a reaction‟” (Redinger 77). Lewis‟s mistaking Baptists for Methodists no
doubt reflects an Anglican tendency to lump Dissenters, but also indicates a common tendency in
the two denominations towards enthusiasm and rhetoric that did not avoid the use of terror.54
Experience with this form of Christianity does not seem to lessened Eliot‟s religious interest –
especially as she dates the “strong hold” of Evangelicalism starting at fifteen, shortly after she
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Of course, the Bible functions both to offer a field for contemplation and writing (as evangelical publications of
the times evince) and to potentially trivialize the importance of any other text. Yet this latter inadequacy could and
did itself become a source of literary creativity.
54
Naturally this characterization should not be seen as completely accurate to the complex and internally
differentiated movements of Methodism and Baptism in England in the nineteenth century. The above „rhetoric‟
refers to discourse shaped around the torments of hell and the needful redemption of sinner on the one hand and
apocalypticism on the other.
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would have entered the Franklins‟ school. Apparently, Eliot was active in this environment,
leading some of the aforementioned prayer meetings and, according the Franklins, “sure to get
up something very soon in the way of a clothing club or some other charitable activity” (Haight
19, Redinger 71).55 Although Eliot wrote verse at school, it was only after leaving that she
turned to publication with the Christian Observer and an abortive attempt at a Chart of
Ecclesiastical History, intended for sale.
Her first major publication, a translation of Strauss‟s Das Leben Jesu (The Life of Jesus)
would come after she had rejected Christianity. As Fleishman notes, “Eliot‟s demystification
was astonishingly abrupt” (24), and most Eliot biographers see it as related to, but not entirely
determined by her new acquaintance with the Unitarian Brays and Coventry and her subsequent
reading of Charles Christian Hennell‟s An Inquiry into the Origins of Christianity (Hennell was
the elder brother of Mrs. Bray and wrote the text in response to his sister‟s disturbance by her
husband‟s free-thinking necessitarianism (Haight 37-8)). It was by means of this group that the
project of translating Strauss came to Eliot, after several others deferred or abandoned it.
Regardless of how she came by it, Eliot‟s decision to translate Strauss‟s work shows definite
signs of the “antagonism” she spoke of to D‟Albert-Durade (Eliot‟s extended stay in Geneva
took place in 1849, only one year after the publication of her translation).
The Life of Jesus pushed trends in biblical higher criticism to a radical breaking point,
and, in doing so, ignited debate and, more often, censure across Germany.56 The basic project of
the work is to read through the gospels in painstaking detail in order to investigate their origins.

Haight also mentions that “we are told” that she taught Sunday School near Griff before going to Coventry, the
source apparently being Maria Lewis (19). The clothing club is also mentioned in Eliot‟s letters, Vol I, 43 (cited in
Fleishman 17)
56
For more about German reaction to Strauss‟s work, see the second chapter of Richard S. Cromwell‟s David
Friedrich Strauss and His Place in Modern Thought (Fair Lawn, NJ: R.E. Burdick, Inc., 1974).
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So far, this does not differentiate Strauss‟s work from that of any number of other theological
scholars across Germany, including Strauss‟s teacher, F.C. Baur, who read competing Peterine
(Jewish) and Pauline (Hellenic) forces at work in the composition of the New Testament.
Strauss‟s decision to include Naturalism – in this case, disbelief in the supernatural, at least as
manifest in miracles or other matter at odds with a rational understanding of nature – in his work
would put him in a much more limited company; but this position is not unprecedented in
biblical argument: Heinrich Paulus and an anonymous fragmentist were both prior critical
advocates of Naturalism whom Strauss cites (13-21). But while the Wolfenbüttel fragmentist
remained anonymous and Paulus carefully stressed the historical accuracy of the gospels,
Strauss‟s project was intentionally more public and more inflammatory. Continuing the
historical project of traditional higher criticism and the demystifying project of Naturalism,
Strauss added the mythic as the central term of his analysis.
Myth, for Strauss, must be distinguished from intentional fabrications, being as “the
necessary vehicle for the first expressions of the human mind,” deriving primarily from a
community rather than any one individual (25). Strauss‟s method throughout most of The Life of
Jesus (excepting its introduction and conclusion) is to take an event in the Gospels, to posit a
supernatural reading, oppose to that a naturalist reading, and conclude with a mythic reading of
the event. This method straddles the line between Kantian and Hegelian dialectic: as in the
Kantian dialectic, the contradiction of the two views indicates a mutual insufficiency or
incapacity and necessitates abandoning them. As in the Hegelian dialectic, this mythic is meant
to be a third term that reconciles or resolves the two earlier views; the symbolic and communal

54

myth maintaining the significance of the event while avoiding irrational claims.57 Likewise,
Strauss‟s method is not entirely consistent, sometimes delving in to the historical and symbolic
significance of the event, at other times contenting himself with the discovery of inconsistencies
and the improbabilities in a gospel event and abridging or neglecting his synthetic conclusion.
Critics of Eliot have quite rightly drawn attention to Strauss‟s conclusion, in which he
sets out to “re-establish dogmatically what has been destroyed critically” (397). Fleishman cites
Strauss‟s turn to the human significance of the Gospel, in which “It is Humanity that dies, rises
and ascends to heaven” (Strauss 438) as decisively important to Eliot‟s humanism.58 Near the
conclusion of Das Leben Strauss says “the History [of Jesus] is not enough; it is not the whole
truth; it must be transmuted from a past fact into a present one; from an external event to you, it
must become your own intimate experience” (Strauss 445). Barry Qualls reads this quotation
(and the sentiment behind it) as important for “understanding George Eliot‟s lifelong need for the
Bible, its language and typologies” (121). Both Fleishman and Qualls stress the importance of
positive Hegelian content to Strauss‟s project. Strauss‟s argument about the human significance
of the gospels draws on Hegel‟s assertion that Christianity figures philosophical truth and, as
Fleishman recognizes, Young Hegelian beliefs. Strauss contrasts his reading with Kant‟s moral
symbolism, arguing for the need for “actual historical consciousness” and aligning himself with a
Hegelian insistence on the particular.59

This is meant as a popular characterization of the two dialectics as relevant to Strauss‟s project. Obviously, the
role of the negative in the Hegelian dialectic complicates how we understand its reconciling or preservative
functions and Kant‟s dialectic does not simply abandon the opposing positions generated by transcendental illusion.
58
More generally, he discusses the relevance of Strauss‟s mythic method to Eliot‟s interest in anthropology (read
widely) and myth‟s meaning in human experience, calling Eliot‟s translation of Strauss “a turning point and the
grounding of an orientation” (40).
59
The primary text of Kant‟s that Strauss here engages with is Religion within the bounds of Bare Reason.
Although the Christological content of Kant‟s work is more particular to that work, Strauss‟s engagement also deals
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Yet Kant is an important presence in this work. The movement from the critical to the
dogmatic suggests influence from Kant‟s turn to the dogmatic and speculative uses of pure
reason after the destructive activity of the transcendental dialectic. Moreover, despite Strauss‟s
claims about the importance of historical particularity, most of the work of the conclusion is
engaging with other academics and philosophers and/or seeking humanly universal moral and/or
theological significance, as in Kant‟s antinomies and Critique of Practical Reason (or its
anticipation in the conclusion of the first Critique), respectively. As Rosemary Ashton points
out, Eliot emphasized the subtitle of Das Leben, which she rendered “Critically Examined,”60
and this likely shows her awareness of the similarity between the philosophical method here at
work and that in Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason (George Eliot 51, German Idea 151). In the
Preface to first edition of Das Leben, Strauss stresses the need to subject the gospels to a rigorous
“critical examination,” insisting that “Science cannot rest satisfied with” the “half-measure[s]” of
either supernatural or rationalist presuppositions. Strauss‟s use of the term “science”
(Wissenschaft) here clearly indicates his debt to Hegel, yet his method bears more similarity to
the destructive tendencies of the Critique than the reconciliation of the dialectic.61 As Kant‟s
method‟s is not really a reconciliation of dogmatic idealism and skeptical empiricism, but a
venture beyond and destructive of both, Strauss‟s critical science is meant to tear down the

with themes that appear in many of Kant‟s works (e.g., concerning what Strauss calls “the moral imperative,”
concern with (subjectively) universal human experience and morality, an interest in the intelligible extracted from
the empirical).
60
The full title of the work is Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet. “bearbeitet” might be literally rendered “worked
(on)” or “dealt with,” but “examined” conveys the idea well and sounds much better.
61
Of course, negation plays a central role in Hegel‟s dialectic, but this is a negation necessarily tied to preservation
(both being inherent in the term Aufhebung)
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pretensions and assumptions of dogmatic supernaturalism and incautious rationalism,62 and,
theoretically, move beyond them with a scientific mythic account of the gospels.63
Strauss‟s Das Leben presents us with a tension, in which the beginning and the
conclusion of the work stress the positive or constructive nature of the mythic method and the
moral significance of the Gospels, while the bulk of the work seems dedicated primarily to
destruction. Likewise, readers who came to Kant‟s first Critique under the guidance of
Reinhold, looking for a resolution to the Pantheismusstreit, may have been somewhat mystified
in trying to square some of Kant‟s positive statements towards the opening and close of his work
with the radical and ungrounding activity of the work itself. Many critics cite Cara Bray‟s
account of Eliot coming before her and her husband “Strauss-sick…ill [from] dissecting the
beautiful story of the crucifixion” as proof of Eliot‟s distaste for the destructive aspects of
Strauss‟s project – or even as coming to a reconsideration of the project itself (GEL i 206). Yet,
as Redinger and Fleishman note, at the end of Eliot‟s translation, she wrote to Sara Hennell
praising Strauss as “so Klar und Ideenvoll” (clear and full of ideas, or insightful) and apparently
exuberant: “next week and we will be merry and sad, wise and nonsensical, devout and wicked
together!” (GEL i 218, qtd in Redinger 145 and Fleishman 36).64 Cara Bray‟s letter describing
Eliot as “Strauss-sick” also mentions the toll tending to her ill father had taken on her, yet
concedes that “nevertheless she looks very happy and satisfied at times with her work.” Eliot
certainly had differences with Strauss‟s work, yet her decision to translate the work in the first

Rationalism and Naturalism being functionally identical terms in this context – and thus closer to empirical
materialism than Kantian reason
63
The German term Wissenschaft has wider disciplinary implications than the English science, including the
humanities and other knowledge / research ventures besides what we might call sciences. Strauss‟s Hegelian use of
this term would also indicate a self-reflexive nature to this venture.
64
Despite noting this passage, Redinger insists that Eliot‟s experience of translating Das Leben, once underway, was
primarily negative, while Fleishman seems more inclined to emphasize sympathy.
62
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place and her continued labor at and satisfaction in it, even when she is allegedly made sick at it,
speak to the value she saw in it. As this work is predominantly given to destruction or
dissection, we need to account for ways in which Eliot saw value in this devout (or at least
rigorously attentive) and wicked activity. Like Kant, Strauss speaks of the imperviousness of
popular religion: “the author is aware that the essence of the Christian faith is perfectly
independent of his criticism” (xi). Unlike Kant, Strauss concedes that incautious forays of
readers into his critical investigations may “inflict a wound on the faith of individuals.”65
Moreover, Strauss and Eliot were both wagering their time, effort, and potential careers on the
social impact of this work – an impact whose positive developments would depend upon more
immediate rejections and reconsiderations.
If Strauss‟s project embodies the destructive tendencies in Kant‟s critical project,
Feuerbach‟s The Essence of Christianity, which Eliot translated in 1854, seems anticipated by
Kant‟s explanation in the second preface to the first Critique of the popular belief in personal
immortality. In this explanation, Kant posits that, rather than lying in any theologian‟s
abstraction, this belief derives from “the feeling, which exists in the breast of every man, that the
temporal is inadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature” (34). Although Kant‟s
explanation leaves the door for the genuine existence of Immortality open and Feuerbach does
not, this explanation of religious belief by means of universal human psychology and nature
encapsulates the fundamental thesis of Feuerbach‟s Essence. As with Strauss, the more

Although, in a note that may suggest a parallel with a less explicit element of Kant‟s first critique, Strauss claims
that his work is so framed as to turn away the popular laity. Kant does speculate about potential damage to the a
hypothetical reader in Dreams, and, like Strauss, there seems to be some satiric intent in both writers‟ cautions, as
Kant speculates about mooncalves resulting from the ideal conceptions of readers exposed to too much Swedenborg
(535), and Strauss speaks of a sort of just punishment being rendered to the over-ambitious layman reader.
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immediate point of reference is Hegel, and Marx‟s desire to turn Hegelianism around66 has its
origins in Feuerbach‟s materialism. Yet Marx‟s famous break with Feuerbach is based primarily
on what he saw as the inadequacies of this materialism, falling back on intangible essences, even
while tearing down God and religion. Both Feuerbach‟s radicalism and his essentialism can be
found in his claim at the conclusion of the first part of The Essence of Christianity that we have
now accomplished “our most essential task,” namely:
We have reduced the supermundane, supernatural and superhuman nature of God to the
elements of human nature as its fundamental elements. Our process of analysis has
brought us again to the position with which we set out. The beginning, middle and end of
religion is MAN. (184)
As God, immortality, and the whole panoply of Christian symbolism and structure are
systematically reduced to human nature, the figure of man (in his species) rises proportionally to
become a kind of God: in the concept of God, man observes the tendencies of his own longings,
but also the power of his species in aggregate. This latter, positive maneuver is possible because
religion provides a locus for universal human experience, emotion and concepts. While
Feuerbach‟s abstract human essence seems to leave no room for a Marxist awareness of physical
labor and economic activity, Feuerbach never loses sight of emotion. To cite a few examples, in
prayer, “God is the affirmation of human feeling” (123), in the incarnation, god becomes “a
being of the heart” (50) and the trinity spring “out of the feeling of a want” and a need for
community (73).

66

Although often quoted as saying that he sought to turn Hegel on his head, in the afterword to Capital, technically
Marx claims that Hegelianism is already standing on its in head and must be turned right-way up again.
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Indeed, Eliot‟s emphasis on her “emotional agreement” with Christianity lends itself
readily to a kind of Feuerbachian reading in which, whatever may be mistaken about its formulas
or dogma, religion correctly understands and emphasizes the truths of love and suffering. In a
frequently-cited letter, Eliot declares to Sara Hennell that “with the ideas of Feuerbach I
everywhere agree” (GEL ii 153). In “George Eliot‟s Religion of Humanity,” Paris argues that
Eliot‟s religious humanism was highly indebted to the philosophy of Feuerbach. In “George
Eliot, Feuerbach and the Question of Criticism,” U.C. Knoepflmacher reads Adam Bede in light
of Feuerbach‟s interpretive method in Essence, arguing that Eliot adopted and adapted it in
creating her novel‟s structure and symbolism.67 More recently, Feuerbach often appears as a side
note or minor comment, elaborating on Eliot‟s views on sympathy or her complex religious
apostasy. A notable exception appears in Susan E. Hill‟s “Translating Feuerbach, Constructing
Morality: The Theological and Literary Significance of Translation for George Eliot.” In this
essay, Hill argues that Feuerbach‟s theological method informs Eliot‟s ideas of translation, and
that these ideas in turn appear in Eliot‟s fiction, as her literary character must “become good
translators in order to become successful moral agents” (636). Barry Qualls makes note of
Feuerbach‟s elevation of the female, arguing that Feuerbach‟s inversion of “Mother/Nature,
Father/Spirit” dichotomies was influential on Eliot‟s fiction.68

Knoepflmacher‟s essay also makes note of Feuerbach‟s literalizing of the sacraments, especially Baptism and the
Lord‟s supper. In a work that often turns to the abstract qualities, emotions and powers of man, it is interesting (and
perhaps complicates Marx‟s objections) that Feuerbach chooses to conclude his work discussing the need for literal
bread and water as necessary grounds for humanity, consciousness and intellect, declaring “Therefore, let bread be
sacred for us, let wine be sacred, and also let water be sacred! Amen.”
68
Qualls connects Feuerbach‟s thought her with Comtean Positivism – although it would be interesting to compare
and contrast Feuerbachian and Comtean readings of Eliot‟s most explicit Madonna figure (although a Madonna
figure that does not give birth), Romola.
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These readings generally draw off the first part of The Essence of Christianity, which
deals with “the True or Anthropological Essence of Religion,” and seems to ground a positive
and sympathetic religious humanism. They map less well onto the second part of this text, “The
False or Theological Essence of Religion.” This section is more overtly hostile, declaring that
“Darkness is the mother of religion,” and seeking to dispel this darkness by “the discriminating
light of the understanding” (193). Feuerbach attacks what he describes as “contradictions” in
Christian assertions and belief about the existence and nature of God, the trinity, the sacraments
and in the concepts of faith and love. In this view, God ceases to be the alienated essence of man
(in any positive sense) and becomes the negation of nature and material existence, generating
and permitting contradictions in proportion to his abstraction from reality. In this attack,
Feuerbach cites Kant‟s “critique of the proofs of the existence of God” and defends Kant from
“the blame which was cast on him by Hegel” (201). Although Feuerbach‟s materialism,
prioritizing the senses as evidence of existence, is at odds with Kant‟s transcendental idealism,
this does not prevent Feuerbach from agreeing with what he takes to be Kant‟s conclusion (the
impossibility of proving God‟s existence). Moreover, although Feuerbach here claims that “it is
absurd to reproach reason that it does not satisfy a demand which can only address itself to the
senses” (201), seeming to diminish the importance of reason against sense-certainty, he
elsewhere presents a reason more in line with Kant‟s moral philosophy: “Wherever religion
places itself in contradiction with reason, it places itself also in contradiction with the moral
sense” (246). The point here is not so much the opposition of reason and religion (which Kant
frequently complicates) as the alignment of rationality and morality and the concern with what
Kant calls heteronomy in the second Critique (i.e., the contamination of morality by particular,
non-universalizable and irrational principles). Yet the more immediate and obvious similarity
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for this destructive undertaking lies with Kant‟s first Critique. Although Feuerbach‟s incautious
speed and empiricism would have appalled Kant, his method of drawing out contradictions in the
conceptions of abstract religious concepts to demonstrate an impossibility of proof manifests
Feuerbach‟s debt to Hegel‟s predecessor.69
Positive humanism and the desire to find communal human significance in religious
thought, doctrine and narrative are certainly part of Strauss‟s and Feuerbach‟s work.
Furthermore, critical tendencies to emphasize these aspects of their work with respect to Eliot (or
to deemphasize Strauss altogether) accord well with Eliot‟s famous aesthetic concern with
sympathy in chapter seventeen of Adam Bede. However, these works are also decidedly invested
in critical and destructive operations that we must also take into account in understanding Eliot‟s
decision to translate these works for the British public. Eliot‟s desire for antagonism, to use her
later term, seems all the more likely, given the fiery reception both of these works had already
received in Germany – Strauss received condemnations far and wide across Germany and
Feuerbach was “lionized by students and radical intellectuals” and delivered popular lectures in
Heidelberg amidst the revolutions of 1848 (Wartofsky xix). It is also worth noting that it was to
Feuerbach‟s radical text, and to no other text that she published, that Eliot affixed the name of
Marian Evans (Haight 143).
The year after Essence was published, Eliot wrote an article for the Westminster Review,
the journal which she had been editing since 1851, entitled “Evangelical Teaching: Dr.
Cumming.” Eliot was more careful to conceal the identity of the author here, alleging in a letter
sent to Charles Bray that “the strong impression” the essay had produced “would be a little
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Of course, Kant was also interested in leaving open the question of what the proofs sought, whereas Feuerbach
seeks to destroy proofs to demonstrate the impossibility of the same.
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counteracted if the author were known to be a woman” (GEL ii 218, qtd in Byatt 478). The
particularly aggressive tone taken in this article, combined with the fact that this was Eliot
writing, instead of translating, may also have been factors in her desire to conceal the authorship
of this piece. As Fleishman notes, “Dr. Cumming” and Eliot‟s essay on Young (both figures
being evangelicals) “are as close as she ever came to getting angry in print” (50). Fleishman,
Haight and Redinger all agree in reading some note of self-rebuke with a religious content in this
essay, Haight and Redinger focusing on past beliefs, while Fleishman focuses on past texts
(Haight 186, Redinger 102).
Yet Eliot‟s decision to open her essay with a satiric meditation about professional
concerns is suggestive of another possible cause for the vitriol of this essay. Eliot‟s image of a
man of “moderate intellect, a moral standard not higher than average … great glibness of speech
… a smattering of science and learning” passing for profound and instructive as an evangelical
preacher (38) anticipates her recipe in “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” for such a novelist,
beginning “Take a woman‟s head, stuff it with a smattering of philosophy and literature, chopped
small” and leading to similar presumptions of wisdom and grandeur (149).70 But it also recalls
her objection to Hannah More in a letter to John Sibree in 1847, in which she likes “neither her
letters, nor her books, nor her character,” describes her as “a blue stocking – a monster, which
can only exist in a miserably false state of society, in which a woman with but a smattering of
learning or philosophy is classed along with singing mice and card playing pigs” (GEL i 245, qtd
in Haight 63). This comment belies Eliot‟s earlier interest in More‟s letters and biographies of

The commentary in this essay on the “Evangelical substitute for the fashionable novel” (156) (and Eliot‟s
criticism of what she sees as the moral insipidity of these novels) suggests further parallels between these two
essays.
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other female evangelicals like Mrs. Mary Fletcher (Haight 24). This turn against women authors
and evangelicals suggests an awareness of a path not taken by Eliot in light of her first
publication. Eliot‟s turn to the relatively unprofitable translation of Strauss and Feuerbach
(received 20 and 30 pounds, respectively) was also a turn away from a publishing arena in which
women had gained circulation, and, in More‟s case at least, public respect and importance.
While it is difficult to avoid reading anti-feminist themes in “Silly Novels,” Eliot‟s concern with
mediocrity that passes for wisdom across different essays and genders suggests that religious and
professional concerns should also be taken into account. Eliot‟s private satire of More and her
public satire of Dr. Cumming certainly come off as mean-spirited, but they also speak to her
personal and professional desire to engage in public discourse in a manner that will be taken
seriously and avoids what she sees as falsifying handicaps.
Having translated higher critics, Eliot now introduces herself as a critical member of the
public press in “Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming.” Emphasizing the central role of
sympathy in Eliot‟s accusations against Dr. Cumming‟s teachings (i.e., the lack of sympathy or
feeling in his doctrine), Fleishman convincingly discusses this essay as “applied Feuerbachism”
(51). Yet Eliot‟s language in justifying her essay seems aligned with Kant‟s description of the
role of the critic in “What is Enlightenment” (Kant‟s conception of the critic in this essay and his
Critiques likely having reached Eliot through Strauss and/or Feuerbach, if not (also) directly).
Eliot comments on the benefit of publishing sermons, thus laying them “open to the criticism of
any man who has the courage and patience to treat them with thorough freedom of speech and
pen” (40). As in Kant‟s essay, courage to know and to write in a free space of public discourse is
necessary to the critic, and the space of this discourse is distinguished from private realms,
including that of the church. Like Kant, Eliot insists that “criticism of clerical teaching [is]
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desirable for the public good” and to instill greater responsibility, as false guidance in this realm
is particularly pernicious (40). Moreover, Eliot seems to share Kant‟s confidence in the
possibility of enlightenment, Kant holding that, with freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable
and Eliot ends her essay on the hope (slightly complicated by a conditional) that “the tendency
towards good” in humans will ensure “the ultimate triumph … over all dogmatic perversions.”71
Of course, an opposition to dogma does not necessarily indicate a wholesale rejection of
enthusiastic evangelicalism:
Dr. Cumming‟s mind is evidently not of the pietistic order. There is not the slightest
leaning towards mysticism in his Christianity – no indication of religious raptures, of
delight in God, of spiritual communion with the Father. He is most at home in the
forensic view of Justification, and dwells on salvation as a scheme rather than experience.
He insists on good works as the sign of justifying faith…but rarely represents them as the
spontaneous, necessary outflow of a soul filled with Divine love. He is at home in the
external…and is only episodically devout and practical. …But of really spiritual joys and
sorrows, of the life and death of Christ as a manifestation of love that constrains the soul,
of sympathy with that yearning over the last and erring which made Jesus weep over
Jerusalem…of the gentler fruits of the Spirit, and the peace of God which passeth
understanding – of all this, we find little trace in Dr. Cumming‟s discourses. (41)
Eliot is not simply indicating contradictory elements of Cumming‟s preaching, as she does
elsewhere in this essay. Rather, Eliot‟s attack here seems to be of a fundamentally evangelical
(in the sense which includes pietistic) nature. Cumming‟s failure to manifest inward concern,

One might also compare Kant‟s gradualism and conservative belief in the need for the cultivation of the wider
public before granting it wider civic privileges in this essay with some of Eliot‟s later remarks concerning reform.
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awareness, and depth condemns him both religiously and morally. His attention to scheme and
doctrine over mystical experience and practical application duplicate the alleged failings that
motivated the foundation of evangelical organizations throughout Europe. Moreover, Eliot‟s
language concerning spiritual joys and sorrows suggest deep awareness of, and possibly some
sympathy with, evangelical interest in the comforts of the Spirit and the suffering of Christ.
Yet one cannot neglect the fact that Eliot is writing this for a public audience and may be
exploiting a rhetoric that she knows to possess wide currency, nor can one neglect this essay‟s
emphasis on the necessity of reason. Despite Eliot‟s apparent sympathy with enthusiastic
priorities, she insists that, “as religious sects exalt feeling above intellect” and become “removed
from rationalism,” “their sense of truthfulness [becomes] misty and confused” and their moral
beliefs become vulnerable to egotism (44). Eliot‟s designation of the Methodists as “our friends”
seems facetious, given her claim “no one can have talked to the more enthusiastic Methodists …
without perceiving that that they require no other passport to a statement than that it accords with
their wishes and their general conception of God‟s dealings” (44-5). Eliot does distinguish
between the enthusiastic Methodists and Cumming‟s evangelicalism: the former develop “a state
of emotion submerging the intellect,” whereas Cumming exercises “a formula imprisoning the
intellect” (45). Cumming perpetrates falsehoods of which the Methodists cannot be guilty (by
virtue of their emphasis on emotion), yet neither group allows scope for “proper function” of the
intellect “– the free search for truth.”
In this essay, Eliot both participates in and exceeds the legacy of the Kantian rational
critique, as practiced in the first Critique. As with the Kantian critique and its continuance in
Feuerbach‟s work, Eliot‟s criticism of Dr. Cummings seeks out contradictions in abstractions and
stresses the “conviction that the free and diligent exertion of the intellect” is a “responsibility”
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(67). But Eliot‟s criticism also moves in the direction of Kant‟s second Critique, stressing the
rationality of the moral: “There is not a more pernicious fallacy afloat in common parlance, than
the wide distinction made between intellect and morality. Amiable impulses without intellect,
man may have in common with dogs and horses; but morality, which is specifically human, is
dependent on the regulation of feeling by intellect” (44).72 Despite her use of the terms
regulation here, Eliot‟s elsewhere imagines more of a cooperative venture of the faculties, as in
Kant‟s third Critique, than Kant‟s stress on the rule of reason in second Critique: “The
fundamental faith for man is faith in the result of a brave, honest, and steady use of all his
faculties” (67).73 In line with this cooperative model, Eliot supplements her rational religious
criticism with references to literature: she illustrates her call for the above faith with a quotation
from Tennyson‟s In Memoriam, uses Walter Scott‟s character Andrew Fairservice‟s words to
criticize Dr. Cumming‟s preaching, and defends the late Byron from the preacher‟s attacks (68,
43, 47-8). Literature then serves a triple purpose in this essay: an elegant means for the better
expression and illustration of an idea, a means of undercutting satire (the quotation from
Fairservice describes preaching as “clouts o‟ cauld parritch”) and a space requiring defense, in
which the expression of “a high and sympathetic purpose” can be expressed.
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Both Kant and Eliot appear to regard animals as incapable of morality but not, for that reason, undeserving of
moral treatment. Kant justified compassion towards animals as part of a more general injunction towards
compassion. While Eliot was in favor of medical and scientific tests on animals, the treatment of animals in her
novels (e.g., speculating on the quiet tolerance of horses bearing a driver towards the opening of The Mill on the
Floss, or illustrating Grandcourt‟s sadism by his cruelty to a pet dog in Daniel Deronda) suggests a sympathy she
both felt and encouraged with non-human animals.
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Eliot does not seem to have Kant‟s three-fold division of the faculties (between the theoretical, the moral and the
aesthetic/teoleogical), but rather stresses the commonality between first two, while the last seems more like
“feeling” in line with sympathy than aesthetics per se – although Eliot‟s use of literature in this essay may suggest a
wider scope. In any event, her use of the term “faculties,” her emphasis on the growth of knowledge in the
Tennyson quote she employs immediately after this term, and her phrase elsewhere of “a spontaneous exertion of
the faculties” (44, comp w/ Kant‟s emphasis on the spontaneous alignment of the faculties brought about by the
beautiful, discussed in the third chapter) suggests a framework in some way drawing from Kant.
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Eliot‟s search for purpose – high and sympathetic, but also professional – led to her own
entry into literature with Scenes of Clerical Life. Initially published in Blackwood‟s Edinburg
Magazine as three separate installments, starting with “Amos Barton” in 1857, Scenes was
collected into one work in 1858. As a whole, these stories seem to confirm Eliot‟s autonarrative
of conditional reconciliation – turning to her clerical figures with a sympathy and gentle humor
that seems infinitely removed in tone from the translations or her attack on Cumming, and yet
the focus that these stories show on the emotional and professional lives of these clerics implies
an intentional distance from their doctrine. In line with their separate publication, these stories
offer different perspectives on religion with respect to their central figures.
The first scene, “The sad fortunes of the reverend Amos Barton” subverts its doctrinal
religious content through a mix of community satire and the preeminence of its emotional
narrative. “Amos Baron” begins with a lengthy discourse on the Shepperton church building,
leading up to “Evangelicalism and the Catholic Question” as relatively recent events (locally, at
least). However, the title character is no sooner embarked than he is beset with economic
problems (expenses exceeding income) that plague him throughout the story. Although
questions of religious doctrine and affiliation enter into this story, they usually do so in a satiric
vein, through the mouths of Sheppertonians who at best partially understand what they discuss.
The reverend himself hardly stands in any better position: “Now the Rev. Amos Barton was one
of those men who have a decided will and opinion of their own … He would march very
determinedly along the road he thought best; but then it was wonderfully easy to convince him
which was the best road” (26). As Barton fails to effectively ply his trade (the attendance in
church is much declined since the previous preacher), his religious waffling becomes an
undesirable commodity: “He was like an onion that has been rubbed with spices … The Low68

Church onion still offended refined High-Church nostrils, and the new spice was unwelcome to
the palate of the genuine onion-eater” (26). Yet these party concerns provide a minor
background to the narrative of the story, which evolves around the above-mentioned economic
troubles, mistaken social scandal involving the Countess Czerlaski, friend to Barton‟s wife,
Milly, and Milly‟s ultimately fatal illness. Barton redemption (of sorts), comes at the loss of his
wife, “for Milly‟s memory hallowed her husband” and it is only after her death that the “cold
faces” of his parishioners “looked kind again” (61). Religious doctrine is, in the end, entirely
beside the point of the importance and significance of human life, community and sympathy.
Mr. Gilfil was introduced in Barton‟s narrative as a predecessor at a remove, and, like
Barton, he does not seem to be at the center of his nominal narrative. Apart from its first chapter
and the epilogue, “Mr. Gilfil‟s Love-Story” makes no mention of Mr. Gilfil‟s clerical function,
devoting itself instead to romantic narrative, in which a younger Gilfil plays a neglected third
corner of a triangle between himself, Caterina Sarti and Sir Christopher Cheverel. Outside of
this central narrative, Mr. Gilfil possesses the esteem of his congregation by virtue of a mild
good nature and laxity in doctrine. “Mr. Gilfil‟s sermons, as you may imagine, were not of a
highly doctrinal, still less of a polemical, cast. They did not search the conscience very
powerfully…but, on the other hand, they made no unreasonable demand on the Shepperton
intellect – amounting, indeed, to little more than an expansion of the concise thesis, that those
who do wrong will find it the worse for them, and those who do well will find it the better for
them” (72). Gilfil‟s avoidance of doctrine allows him to reach his audience in way Barton could
not, and the definitions of wrong and well-doing that follow this quotation seem fairly
incontestable (lying is wrong, charity is good, etc.). At the same time, there criticism at work
here alongside the author‟s manifest sympathy with the pastor who, we are told, delights in
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giving sugar-plums to children. Mr. Gilfil fits his community a little too well, as his general
thesis and undemanding style allow his parishioners to justify prior inclinations and beliefs. As
the neglect of intellect is clearly damning from Eliot‟s critical perspective in “Dr. Cumming,” so
Mr. Gilfil‟s neglect of conscience and his appeal to consequences for moral motivation are
respectively wrong and inadequate from Eliot‟s moral perspective, as elaborated in her later
works. Eliot‟s concluding metaphor in this story, describing Gilfil as a “poor lopped
oak…sketched out by nature as a noble tree,” withered by the loss of Caterina, suggests the
image of an essentially genial and praiseworthy man who did not quite accomplish what he
might have.
If Barton avoids doctrinal commitment through indecision and Gilfil is genially
indifferent, Tryan‟s Evangelicalism is unequivocal and passionate. After two stories that carry
male characters in their title but conclude with the death of the female figures who define the
narrative, “Janet‟s repentance” is arguably as concerned with the Tryan‟s career and Evangelical
ministering as its titular matter and concludes with the minister‟s death and memory. This
narrative opens with drunken Milbyites complaining about Tryan‟s “demoralizing, methodistical
doctrine,” manifesting in their complaints such anger, quarrelsomeness (among each other, as
well), pretension, and apparent lack of moral concern that one is left with no particularly positive
impression of the minister‟s opposition (169). Eliot emphasizes the divisive nature of Tryan‟s
creed, as the town becomes “divided into two zealous parties, the Tryanites and anti-Tryanites”
(182) and insists that Evangelicalism, “like all other religious „revivals,‟ had a mixed effect”
(227). Members of Tryan‟s congregation, no less than those of Mr. Gilfil‟s curacy, are apt to
“gain a religious vocabulary rather than religious experience” and mistake and misinterpret
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religion through ignorance or selfishness (227). Yet Eliot takes the positive effects of this
movement to be undeniable:
Nevertheless, Evangelicalism had brought into palpable existence and operation
in Milby society that idea of duty, that recognition of something to be lived for beyond
the mere satisfaction of the self, which is to the moral life what the addition of a great
central ganglion is to animal life…Whatever might be the weaknesses of the ladies who
pruned the luxuriance of their lace and ribbons…they had learned this – that there was a
divine work to be done in life, a rule of goodness higher than the opinion of their
neighbors; and if the notion of heaven in reserve for themselves was a little too
prominent, yet the theory of fitness for that heaven consisted in purity of heart, in Christlike compassion, in the subduing of selfish desires…The first condition of human
goodness is something to love; the second, something to reverence. And this latter
precious gift was brought to Milby by Mr Tryan and Evangelicalism. (228)
Here, as in Eliot‟s letter to D‟Albert-Durade, divine work is meant to be done in this earthly
existence – and among our fellows, as Eliot‟s repeated emphasis on the charitable engagements
of Tryan‟s Evangelicals suggests. Eliot has not abandoned the notion that enthusiasm can
encourage egotism, but Tryan‟s Evangelicalism at least contains the idea that such egotism ought
to be avoided.
Equally important to this story is Eliot‟s explicit abandonment of the role of the critic.
“Any one looking at [Mr. Tryan] with the bird‟s-eye glance of a critic might perhaps say that he
made the mistake of identifying Christianity with a too narrow doctrinal system; that he saw
God‟s work too exclusively in antagonism to the world, the flesh and the devil” (229). Yet Eliot
refuses this mode: “But I am not poised at that lofty height … I am on the level and in the press
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with him” (229). Eliot is not here posing two equal views against one another, as the critic
neglects the fact that “The blessed work of helping the world forward, happily does not wait to
be done by perfect men” and Tryan‟s doctrinal antagonism to the world does not prevent his
actual and positive engagement with its people (228). The critic would make Tryan into “the
text for a wide discourse on the characteristics of the Evangelical school in his day” and thus
miss Tryan‟s humanity and the way in which he, and other Evangelicals, espoused more than
doctrine and schools (229). In each of these three Scenes, the narrator explicitly insists on the
need for a sympathetic interest in the interiority and suffering of a flawed male cleric. In “Amos
Barton,” this is accomplished through a demand made of the reader (“Depend on it, you would
gain unspeakably” (37)) and “Mr. Gilfil” employs a mix of communal approval and narratorial
intervention against a skeptical reader in its first chapter. The narrator of “Janet‟s Repentance,”
however, reflects on and takes ownership of his own relationship to Tryan, and only then moves
on to address and subsume the reader in a plural first-person, “enabl[ing] us to feel with” the
cleric (229).
It is with a similar kind of self-reflection that the narrator of Adam Bede proceeds in the
famous seventeenth chapter, “In which the story pauses a little,” synthesizing a moral interest in
sympathy with a critical interest in truth. Eliot‟s rejection of the critic‟s birds-eye perspective
should not – and, in any wide view of her fiction, cannot – be read as an abandonment of critical
interests and methods. Rather, it is a call for an approach to fiction that goes beyond doctrine in
its criticism and remains searching and articulate in its sympathy. Eliot‟s defense of sympathetic
realism in the seventeenth chapter of Adam Bede is widely regarded as her definitive statement
of novelistic aesthetics and an important text in understanding Victorian realism more generally.
Eliot‟s decision to articulate her aesthetic theory in relation to the somewhat lax reverend Irwine,
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whose actions seem questionable,74 rather than the morally unimpeachable Methodist Dinah
Morris (who has also gained far more critical attention), maintains the essential need for
sympathy for flawed characters already present in Scenes. To present a flawless preacher would
violate the very aim of Eliot‟s novelistic project:
Certainly I could [have improved Irwine‟s moral discourse] if I held it the highest
vocation of the novelist to represent things as they never have been and never will be.
Then, of course, I might refashion life and character entirely after my own liking; I might
select the most unexceptionable type of clergyman, and put my own admirable opinions
into his mouth on all occasions. But it happens, on the contrary, that my strongest effort
is to avoid such an arbitrary picture, and to give a faithful account of men and things as
they have mirrored themselves in my mind. (159)
This faithful account serves a double purpose, setting a proper scope to the exercise of one‟s
imagination and sympathy (returning these faculties to the world in which one lives) and
maintaining a difficult commitment to true representation against falsity. Eliot‟s previous
abandonment of the role of critic is here supplanted by a question of the positive role of the
novelist – and phrasing this question in terms of the “highest vocation” of this novelist makes
clear its moral weight.
Yet the choice of Mr. Irwine for the staging ground of this short manifesto also permits
the narrator to evade Dinah‟s doctrinal passion, even as the same passion is sympathetically
portrayed elsewhere in the text. What was previously a discussion between the reader and the

On this point, see John Sutherland‟s “Why doesn‟t the Reverend Irwine speak up for Hetty?” in Can Jane Eyre be
Happy? More puzzles in Classic Fiction (Oxford UP 1997, cited in Oxford Reader’s Companion to George Eliot).
For a more sympathetic take on Irwine that still acknowledges Irwine‟s failing in regards to Arthur, see Christopher
Herbert‟s “Preachers and Schemes of Nature in Adam Bede” (Nineteenth Century Fiction 29.4 Mar 1975).
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narrator becomes a conversation between the narrator and Adam himself, as the conversation
shifts from aesthetic and moral theory to a comparison of Mr. Irwine and Mr. Ryde (the preacher
who succeeded Irwine) and a discussion about religion. Having defended Mr. Irwine on his own,
the narrator lets the role fall to Adam, who enthusiastically sets Irwine‟s “short moral sermons”
and genial attitude against the severe, doctrinal and domineering Ryde. “I‟ve seen pretty clear
ever since I was a young un, as religion‟s something else besides doctrines and notions,” Adam
insists, giving a brief narrative of his own experience in doctrinal argument and textual criticism
as proof (156).75 Adam‟s speech is complicated by the fact that earlier in this chapter Eliot has
spoken against putting the author‟s opinions into the mouths of his characters, reinforced by the
narrator‟s comment that “Adam, you perceive, was a warm admirer, perhaps a partial judge, of
Mr Irwine” (166). And yet it is precisely this kind of sympathetic partiality that the narrator is
seeking to occasion in us. By presenting an anti-doctrinal stance in the words of Adam, Eliot
invites us to imaginatively engage with the position while avoiding the potentially dogmatic
approach of demanding the reader adopt this stance herself. Both the position and its
presentation are meant to inform us about what following “the highest vocation of the novelist”
entails.
It is perhaps strange that the text in which Eliot was perhaps most clearly defining the
vocation of the novelist ends with Dinah‟s abandonment of her vocation. Bruce K. Martin‟s
comment in 1972 that, starting with Henry James, critics have often objected to the seemingly
forced happy ending, with Hetty‟s rescue and the marriage (745-6), still holds true today –

Adam‟s ability “to pike a hole or two” in religious enthusiasts‟ notions, his joy in disputing and “weighing and
sifting” texts, together with his self-narrated turn from this mode to an emotional interest in real religion and
communing with his “fellow-men” in his local church suggest a few parallels with Eliot‟s own experience.
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although more attention has since then been given to the price paid by Dinah. In “Dinah and the
Debate over Vocation in Adam Bede,” Jennifer M. Stolpa argues that Eliot‟s sympathetic and
positive portrayal of Dinah as a female preacher, together with her insistent attention to Dinah‟s
“calling” and “vocation,” give this text a radical leaning in nineteenth century debates about
women preaching. Stolpa negotiates a variety of critical perspectives, from critics insisting that
Dinah is a fundamentally disempowered figure in this text (limited by her voice, iconic status,
and/or marriage) to those who insist Dinah is part of a “new religious or moral model [which is
simultaneously] a harsh critique of a patriarchal Christianity” (42, 33). Stolpa herself claims
that “the restrictions on Dinah‟s pursuit of her ministerial vocation at the end of the novel can be
viewed as intentionally disappointing to readers, thus spurring them to rethink a patriarchal
gendered ministry” (32). Although the emphasized “can” reflects the fact that Stolpa does not
entirely commit to this reading, we should at least pause before assuming that Eliot could not
have built disappointment into her ostensibly happy ending (which does, after all, follow
infanticide and transportation).
Dinah‟s vocation, somewhat like duty in Kant and Eliot more generally, strikes an
uneven balance between autonomous self-determination and submission. As Stolpa argues,
Dinah‟s vocation does grant her a social function beyond limits of Anglican patriarchy and a
profession beyond marriage. Moreover, the inward turn of calling grants Dinah a kind of
liberation from determination by human authorities, both secular and religious – and allows her
to draw upon appeals to conscience as legitimate and ultimately determining moral motivation –
as Adam acknowledges, “I‟ll never be the man t‟urge you against your conscience” (455). What
from one perspective is a turn away from happiness and personal satisfaction (the marriage
proposal by Adam in chapter fifty two) is, from another perspective, an assertion of the rights of
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self-determination and an insistence that a woman can rightly have a “calling … not towards
marriage” (457). Yet, if this is self-determination, the form of its expression is submissive:
refusing Adam‟s proposal, Dinah commands, “I must go from you, and we must submit
ourselves entirely to the Divine Will. We are sometimes required to lay our natural, lawful
affections on the altar” (456). Even when Dinah comes to affirm these affections, she can only
marry Adam under the warrant that “it is the Divine Will” (475). The apparently arbitrary nature
of a will that could resist and encourage the same action takes on a more troubling aspect with
Dinah‟s decision to abandon open preaching. We hear of this decision not from the much-noted
voice of Dinah, but through the approving voice of Adam. Despite Adam‟s assurance that
Dinah‟s decision to follow the mandates of the Methodist Conference banning women‟s
preaching was her own, one cannot help but wonder what Dinah herself would have said – and to
what extent she would claim this decision to follow an institutional will followed the dictates of a
divine will.
We should not be too eager to collapse Dinah‟s vocation into being really another form
of submission. Dinah‟s accomplishments in this text, and the social good she does even after
abandoning preaching should not be trivialized. Nor should we neglect the moral force of duty
and vocation in this novel more generally. Adam draws our readerly approval not in the least for
his intense consciousness of familial duties, and characters without a sufficiently imperative
sense of duties, Hetty and Arthur in particular, are at the mercy of their inclinations. Arthur is
even described as possessing “a loving nature … Deeds of kindness were as easy to him as a bad
habit: they were the common issue of his weakness and his good qualities, of his egoism and his
sympathy” (280). And yet such sympathy is powerless to stand against unconsidered egoism,
lacking any foundation in an obligation that outlives the feelings of a moment. Arthur‟s moral
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sense may engender a sense of unease following an offence, but cannot prevent that offence‟s
commission: “No man can escape [the] vitiating effect of an offence against his own sentiment
of right, and the effect was the stronger in Arthur because of that very need of self-respect,
which, while his conscience was still at ease, was one of his best safeguards” (283). In this state,
Arthur feels himself subject to the “terrible coercion in our deeds” and resolves the genuine task
of decision and resolution before him into foregone conclusions. Dinah‟s duty and vocation, by
contrast, are a space of intense moral and personal deliberation, in which self-respect is secured
by a conscience that wins, rather than assumes its peace.
As critics, we would do poor service to ourselves and to the texts we read by ignoring the
disappointments and senses of unease that we encounter – and the frequent coalescence of these
emotions around the ending of Adam Bede surely tells us something. Dinah‟s compromise is not
necessarily a complete self-betrayal – refusing Adam, she claims her “peace and joy have come
from having no life of my own, no wants, no wishes for myself,” while her acceptance of Adam
signals the potential reconciliation of positive inclination and personal affection with the calling
of divine command (454). In this sense, we might even read the ending as stopping too short in a
conversion away from submission to an arbitrarily voluntarist religion towards a more
emotionally healthy and humanly grounded mode of life. Yet the value of Dinah‟s vocation
derived at least in part from the dignity it gave to the determinations of conscience, to a will that
can be affirmed as morally worthy in its desire to perform its duty.
The question of vocation and its attendant duty is as important to Maggie and Romola as
it is to Dinah and the narrator of Adam Bede, and we would do Eliot and Kant a disservice to
miss the questions and conditions in their negotiations of religious and moral concerns, or the
ways that questions and conditions can become answers and assertions. Like Kant‟s moral
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subject, Adam Bede‟s narrator seems to possess an immediate awareness of moral vocation,
rationally explicable (one may give reasons for it) but prior to rational articulation. But Eliot‟s
narrative presentation, doubly filtering the anti-doctrinal, pro-sympathetic message through the
narrator and the figure of Adam, makes manifest the complexities of the communication of a real
moral obligation through imagined characters and a fiction that insists on truth. Likewise, for
Kant, moral faith arises as a conditioned development in the productions of reason and the
immediacy of moral consciousness does not prevent morality itself from becoming a site for
problems and critique. Both Kant and Eliot possess a complex relationship with religion,
refusing unfounded or insupportable content (and reading this quite widely), yet finding
something essentially important in the emotional significance, motive force or imperative claims
of religion. Kant‟s insistence on the subjective conditions of moral faith is no more a failing of
his system than Eliot‟s presentation of novelistic morality through Adam (and upon the imperfect
occasion of Irwine). Instead, the reference of the moral law to the subject constitutes the strength
(and interest) of its obligation, and Eliot‟s novels allow scope for both the compelling and the
problematic natures of duty and vocation.
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Chapter 3 Autonomy, Reflection and Respect
[Eliot], stirred somewhat beyond her wont, and taking as her text the three words
which have been used so often as the inspiring trumpet-calls of men, – the words God,
Immorality, Duty, – pronounced, with terrible earnestness, how inconceivable the first,
how unbelievable the second, and yet how preemptory and absolute the third. Never,
perhaps, have sterner accents affirmed the sovereignty of impersonal and
unrecompensing Law. (Haight 464)
This quotation comes originally from F.W.H. Myers‟s account of Eliot in Century Magazine
(Nov 1881), and, by the time that Haight cited it in 1968, had already become “often quoted.”
Haight notes the “over-dramatized” nature of the account (Myers later describes Eliot as a
“sibyl,” speaks of the scrolls of fate and “twilight and starless skies”), but seeks to counteract this
tone not by denying Eliot‟s melancholy utterance, instead insisting that even Myers
acknowledged a gentler side to Eliot‟s teaching (465). Despite Myers‟s melodramatic
presentation, critics generally appear to take the content of the speech attributed to Eliot as
authentic. This is doubtless due in part to the widely spread image of Eliot in later life as a sort
of sage or sibyl, but the concerns and pronouncements of this quotation also seem to map well
onto concerns that guided her writings, literary and otherwise: the inconceivability of God
aligning with her critical translations; immortality being the subject of a book conceived though
never published76, but also, conceived more generally, as futurity or posterity – a concern present
and problematized throughout her fiction and perhaps most famously developed in Middlemarch;

The book‟s title being The Idea of a Future Life, announced by Chapman as a book that would come out along
with The Essence of Christianity (Haight 141). Although this work is frequently mentioned, and despite Chapman‟s
announcement and discussion about the work in Eliot‟s letters, no manuscript of this work has apparently yet been
found.
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and duty, a concern that is central to any of Eliot‟s novels, but, as will be discussed in this
chapter, is particularly important in understanding The Mill on the Floss.
As far as I have been able to determine, the only critic to detect Kant in this quotation is
Fleishman, who notes that “the terms partially echo Kant‟s triad of God, freedom and
immortality – presuppositions rationally necessary for morality – and deny at least two-thirds of
it” (279 n10). There are a number of problems with this statement. First of all, although in the
second Critique, Kant does define God and Immortality as postulates (Postulate) of pure
practical reason, these are postulates only arrived at after the fact of freedom and the law of
morality have been established, or, as Kant phrases, “these postulates commence from the
principle of morality, which is not a postulate but a law” (167). The German here begins Sie
gehen alle von Grundsatze der Moralität aus (132) – the verb ausgehen (von) clearly indicating
that the principle of morality is prior to the postulates that commence, emanate or issue from it.77
Secondly, Fleishman ignores the fact that immortality of the soul, the possibility of freedom in
nature and the existence God were also the subjects of the transcendental ideas of the first
Critique. Taking Eliot‟s objections to immortality and God to refer to what Kant would class as
theoretical knowledge – taking them to be essentially epistemological, concerning the limits of
intellectual concepts (inconceivable) and warranted or justified belief (unbelievable) – it appears
that Eliot is actually in line with Kant. Technically, Kant never controverted his proofs in the
first Critique that to attempt to conceive of the soul and God through theoretical knowledge and
reason would lead to contradiction. In the second Critique, Kant continues to insist on the
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These postulates do possess a rational necessity for Kant, but this is a necessity that hinges on the possibility of
perfection (for immortality) and the reconciliation of happiness and morality (for God). Morality itself has an
immediate bearing on us and practical (and rational) reality that precedes these determinations, both in the course of
the second critique and logically.
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incapacity of theoretical reason to deal with these concepts; the discussion of immorality and
God in this work proceeding under the aegis of practical reason, which can ground what Kant
refers to as a “rational faith” (Vernunftglaube), but not knowledge or cognition (Wissen or
Kentniss) in the sense of the first Critique.78 But, perhaps most importantly, Eliot‟s terms more
than partially echo Kant‟s triad, as duty and freedom were integrally connected in Kant‟s moral
philosophy and, as Fleishman concedes, “on duty, [Eliot] and Kant were closely aligned” (279).
If we are to avoid the extremes of Dinah‟s theological voluntarism and Arthur‟s sensitive
moral indirection (or, to put it in Kantian terms, the extremes of despotic dogmatism and
anarchic inclination), then a connection between duty and freedom must be both present and
robust. Duty must incorporate human freedom and reflect the dignity of the autonomous will
(lest it become arbitrary or despotic), and human freedom must be grounded in a sense of duty
and obligation (lest it become arbitrary or anarchic). This connection must be robust – that is, it
must not be exhausted by the tautology that duty is freedom and vice versa, because such an
abstract tautology would lend itself to arbitrary appropriation, as in Kant‟s concern about the
attribution of personal rules to divine will in Dreams.79 One element of Eliot and Kant‟s more
robust account of duty is autonomy – encompassing at once a freedom from theological concerns
(as hitherto elaborated), freedom from the determination of inclinations, and self-determination
with reference to the moral law. Equally important (and entwined with this concept) are the
elements of reflection and respect – duty should permit critical self-reflection and survive the
tests of such reflection and duty should ground a sense moral dignity and occasion the feeling of
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This distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical faith recurs towards the end of the Methodology of
Teleological Judgment in the third critique.
79
And Bentham‟s similar point in 1789, as well as Eliot‟s description of the power of egoistic wishes in the visions
and exclamations of enthusiasts in “Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming.”
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respect. The imperative and sovereign nature of duty affirmed by both Kant and Eliot rests
primarily on the basis of these elements – although for both writers, there remains an aspect of
duty and the moral law that is not entirely articulable, but relies on a fact or awareness
antecedent to critique and novel-writing (or reading). In this Chapter, I will trace these
dimensions of duty in Kant‟s Critique of Practical Reason and Grounding for the Metaphysics of
Morals and Eliot‟s The Mill on the Floss, as well as three pieces outside of her fiction. In these
works, both writers still carry on the projects of earlier works – Kant is still engaged in critical
science, Eliot is still formulating and experimenting with the realist novel and sympathy – but
duty and practical morality take on a priority that exceeds the limits of speculative knowledge
and sympathy.80
It is not often that one encounters the trope of apostrophe in Kant‟s critical works.
Therefore, it is surprising when, in the third chapter of the first book of the Critique of Practical
Reason, Kant exclaims:
Duty! You sublime, grand name which encompasses nothing that is favored yet
involves ingratiation, but which demands submission, yet also does not seek to move the
will by threatening anything that would arouse natural aversion in the mind and terrify,
but merely puts forth a law that on its own finds entry into the mind and yet gains
grudging veneration (even if not always compliance), a law before which all inclinations
fall silent even if they secretly work against it: what origin is worthy of you, and where
does one find the root of your noble descent that proudly rejects all kinship with
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As indicated in the last chapter, these developments are anticipated in the Critique of Pure Reason and Adam
Bede. But while moral faith and practical knowledge exist as concluding forces existing on the periphery (or beyond
the bounds) of critique in the first Critique, these forces are central to the second Critique. Likewise, Dinah seems
to possess a moral vocation that goes beyond sympathy, but Maggie brings questions of sympathy and duty into
focus as problems that the conciliatory ending of Adam Bede moves away from.
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inclinations, the root from which to be descended is the irremissible condition of that
worth which human beings alone can give themselves? (111)
This passage appears in the chapter “Incentives of Pure Practical Reason,” which tackles the
problem of how the moral law can determine the will directly. Kant‟s answer is, more or less,
respect (which I will return to later), but here Kant seems to almost revel in the mystery of moral
motivation. Duty‟s sublimity appears to reside precisely in its ability to attract without
“ingratiation” and command without threatening or inducing fear. Without resorting to reward
or punishment, duty nonetheless provides us with a kind of practical knowledge and cause for
action. In light of this, the more immediate question of duty‟s origin is likewise a question about
its power or efficacy. Kant‟s immediate answer is “personality” (more on this shortly), but both
question and answer point to issues of human worth, respect and vocation, which in turn rely on
a conception of a moral law which grants the rational subject autonomy from inclinations.
Kant famously begins the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals declaring that the
only unconditionally good thing is a good will, proceeding then to include the good will under
the concept of duty and thereby connecting it with the moral law, for “Duty is the necessity of
action done out of respect for the law” (7, 9, 13).81 The Critique of Practical Reason virtually
begins with the moral law, distinguishing individually-valid maxims from universally valid
practical laws.82 In both works, this moral law is emphatically distinguished from inclination

Duty and respect might be thought of as two aspects of what motivates moral action and fidelity – Duty
(primarily) indicating the necessary condition of moral actions, while respect designates the psychological
intervention or effect of the moral law – although this is an approximate division.
82
Kant uses the terms subjectiv (subjective) and objectiv (objective) to distinguish maxims and law, but I use the
above terms as Kant‟s definitions turn on whether the principle is valid for one or all rational subjects and, given
other meanings of the terms, Kant‟s terms may be confusing: maxims do not hold for all subjects and laws do;
practical laws not exist objectively as a common-sense naturalism would hold material objects to exist. Kant does
81
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(Neigung) and empirical or prudential questions of happiness. Critics and philosophers differ as
to how we should read this distinction, ranging from Lacan and Žižeck‟s connection of Kant and
De Sade, reading a kind of Sadistic logic into Kant‟s moral logic, to analytic arguments that Kant
is not voicing an opposition to inclination, but is only clarifying what can be classified as
unconditionally moral.83 By any reading, the moral law is universally binding, and thus must be
separated from the contingency of (only) subjective maxims and personal inclinations. As the
empirical is almost by definition a space of flux and contingency, the empirical determination of
inclinations disqualifies them for the formal rigor of a moral law.84 Kant does not completely
discount beneficent inclinations, but their alignment with the right or good can be, at most,
coincidental, for there is no formal guarantee of their consistency or fidelity.85 “Inclination,
whether it be good-natured or not, is blind and servile” (CPract 150): Blind because, in
following her inclination, the subject loses a kind of self-reflective awareness (and, arguably,
modal actuality)86 and servile because, in the same state, the subject lacks self-determination.

hold that the moral law exists objectively, but what exactly that means, and how it relates to the law‟s validity for all
rational subjects, is up for debate.
83
More specifically, Lacan and Žižeck read a kind illicit pleasure into the very severity of the moral law, whereas
more moderate readings often argue that, in excluding the inclinations from the purely moral will, Kant is not
advocating a course of life (such as that for which Schiller satirized Kant, in which one would have to hate one‟s
friends and be just towards them only from a sense of duty), but only seeking to illuminate the conditions under
which we can attribute a moral action to purely rational and necessary grounds.
84
The empirical determination of inclinations rests on a fairly intuitive basis – i.e., that when we speak of most
feelings, we are speaking at the same time of mental states and tendencies which vary depending on external
conditions: if I am feeling happy and am then caught outside in a cold thunderstorm without protection, I will likely
not continue to be happy; if I am feeling jealous and then experience a sudden rise in station, the jealousy may
subside. But, furthermore, it seems as though these initial emotions are themselves the product of external
conditions more or less remote (from an event just happened to chemical structure of a medicine to a long-distant
event still present in memory (and still capable of occasioning emotion and action) or learned behavior).
85
On this point, I am approximately echoing Barbara Herman in The Practice of Moral Judgment.
86
I.e., in abandoning rational deliberation and simply following inclination, the subject abandons other possible
modes of being and acting. I personally think Kant‟s commentary on the reality of the “fact of Reason” in the
second critique and his discussion of the sensible and intelligible in the Grounding (e.g., “Regarding himself in this
way as intelligence, man thereby puts himself into another order of things” (57)) commit him to a strong account of
the reality of the rational will and the rational subject.
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By acting from duty, with respect for the moral law, the subject possesses an autonomy
that avoids the determination of contingent inclinations – and Kant‟s German term here,
Autonomie, reflects the same Greek roots of self and law as the English; rendering the term in
light of Kant‟s philosophy, the law of the self, or the law that the self gives to itself (by virtue of
being a rational self). The initial formula Kant gives for the “only” categorical imperative (I here
take the categorical imperative to be an expression of the moral law)87 in the Grounding is “act
only to the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”
(30) and clearly aligns with his subsequent definition of autonomy as “the property that the will
has of being a law to itself” (49). The reflection built into this formula, requiring the subject to
test her subjective maxims against the possibility of consistent universal application, presupposes
the capacity of the subject to will and choose in this manner. Kant‟s definition of autonomy in
the Grounding is also his definition of freedom (Freiheit), and, in the second Critique, Kant
defines freedom (of the will) in terms of negative and positive aspects of autonomy: negatively,
freedom denotes “independence from all matter,” matter indicating both contingent empirical
content and the determination of natural laws, while, positively, freedom indicates “practical
reason‟s own legislation,” or the “determination of the power of choice by the mere universal
legislative form which a maxim must be capable of” (49). A very similar division characterizes
what Kant refers to as “personality” in the second Critique, “the freedom and independence from
the mechanism of all of nature, yet regarded at the same time as a power of a being subject to
pure practical laws that are peculiar to it, viz., are given to it by its own reason” (111-2). Willing

87

This relation does not appear to be controversial in itself, although understandings of the content of this
imperative or law certainly are.
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the moral law allows the subject to be something more than another effect in an infinite chain of
natural causation, capable of self-reflection and self-determination.88
This freedom is inextricably connected with the positive determination of the will by the
law and the universally imperative nature of the law. For Kant, a lawless freedom “would be
something absurd” (Grounding 49), collapsing into determination by external factors
(inclinations being themselves dependent on external factors) or into the random (Willkür).89
The moral law offers us a morally meaningful freedom, not in which any choice is equally valid,
but in which our choices affect our status as praiseworthy or blameworthy agents, and even
determine what extent we can really be said to be acting as rational agents. This law must exist
for us as an imperative, Kant insists, due precisely to our capacity for choice: “in the case
of…finite beings, the moral law has the form of an imperative, because in them, as rational
beings, one can indeed presuppose a pure will, but, as being affected by needs and sensible
motivating causes, not a holy will, i.e., a will that would be not be capable of [drafting] any
maxims conflicting with the moral law” (47). The pure will can determine itself by the moral
law, but the subject possessing it always had the capacity to will otherwise. The moral law rests,
in part, on a self-reflexive basis. In the Grounding, the moral law concerns the capacity of a
rational will to consider “rational nature … as an end in itself” (36) and “the [rational] will … is
subject to the law in such a way that it must be regarded also as legislating for itself and only on
this account as being subject to the law” (38). The necessity and the form of the moral law refer
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For an analysis of Freedom in Kant, particularly as developed in the first critique in relation to natural
determinism, see Andrews Reath‟s “Kant‟s Critical Account of Freedom” in A Companion to Kant.
89
Although to what extent Kant would conceive of randomness in an absolute sense as possible for a human is an
open question – and not something he appears to discuss in detail.
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to one another: the moral law possesses a form that can hold necessarily for all rational subjects,
and because it must hold for all rational subjects, the moral law necessarily possesses this form.
Yet the middle clause, that the moral law must hold for all rational subjects, should not be
regarded as simple tautology. Although our understanding may benefit from formulations, our
capacity to act morally does not rely on our capacity to formulate: As Kant insists in the first
Critique, popular interests are unaffected by abstract philosophical argument, and the moral law
is not something only philosophers understand. In the Grounding, Kant speaks of the “common
idea of duty and of moral laws” (2), and, in the second Critique, he insists that we possess a
direct and immediate consciousness of morality, referring to this consciousness as “a fact of
reason” (Factum der Vernunft) (46). Because the moral law is universally binding, it must be
something of which all rational subjects are aware, even if the extent to which it is followed is
always limited. Kant insists that the fact of reason cannot be an intuition, either empirical or
pure, as this would involve it in theoretical, not practical knowledge; yet this state does not
impair our immediate awareness of the fact, as Kant later illustrates in his discussion of
conscience (124-5). As abstract as Kant‟s argument becomes, its foundation is easily tested: so
long as the reader can attest to an awareness of moral imperative in herself (as conscience, as
restraint, as desire, and, as I will shortly discuss, as respect), and reasonably presuppose this
awareness in others, she has a warrant for granting the fact of reason and its basic law.
This law precedes and grounds our awareness of freedom (CPract 43) and, as Allen
Wood emphatically notes, its initial formulation given above (concerning maxims capable of
becoming universal laws) is not its only formulation given in the Grounding. Wood‟s argument
in “Kant‟s Formulations of the Moral Law,” that the “supreme principle of morality” is
progressively formulated and developed throughout the Grounding, is lent credence by the
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progressive structure of the text (with chapters indicating ascending “transitions”), and also by
the fact that Kant provides multiple formulations in the first place. Appreciating these multiple
formulations, Wood argues, can prevent us from attributing a too-formalistic or tautological basis
to the law, instead recognizing that “the categorical imperative is grounded on the absolute worth
of rational nature as an end in itself, and the dignity of the rational will as self-legislating” (305).
Wood is here referring to two distinct formulations of the imperative, but these formulations are
importantly related.
The first formulation is “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a
means” (36). Early on in the Grounding, Kant speaks of the “idea that existence has another and
much more worthy purpose, for which, and not for happiness, reason is quite properly intended,
and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private purpose of
men must, for the most part, defer” (9) – and this formulation rests on the assertion that this
“much more worthy purpose” is something that inheres in the rational natures of ourselves and
others. Both the Grounding and the second Critique maintain the insistence of the first Critique
that morality does not guarantee happiness, but rather worthiness, or (in the turn that allows Kant
to reintroduce and arguably revise moral theology in the second Critique), the worthiness to be
happy. Humanity in the above formulation signifies what is exceptional and worthy in human
rationality, and its possession and recognition entail unconditional personal worth, but also a
binding awareness of the like worth of others.
In the same chapter of the second Critique in which Kant apostrophizes duty, we are told
that “Respect applies only to persons, never to things” – and, like Kant‟s moral philosophy more
generally, respect is articulated between the moral law, the subject, and the community of other
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subjects. “What is essential in all moral worth of actions is that the moral law must determine
the will directly” (CPract 94) and, in both the Grounding and the second Critique, respect is
what permits this direct determination. Kant is careful to distinguish respect from Hutcheson‟s
moral sense (and Humean sympathy), insisting that respect is, negatively, an awareness of the
restriction of inclination and feelings, and, positively, an awareness of the direct determination of
the moral law.90 Respect in relation to the self is complex: in part, it functions in a way that
anticipates the activity of the sublime in the third Critique, as respect humiliates feeling and selfconceit and elevates the rational moral law (CPract 103-4). Yet Kant also holds out the possible
adaptation of natural self-love (Selbstliebe or Eigenliebe) (as distinguished from self-conceit
(Eigendünkel)) to the moral law, resulting in what Kant calls “rational self-love” (96).91 Rational
self-love is a particularly problematic form of respect due to its proximity to self-conceit, which
is also a regard for the self, but which makes a particular self the basis for morality. Self-conceit
subverts the priority of the moral law and destroy any possibility of universal validity and
necessity. Respect in relation to others does not seem to threaten this kind of subversion:
“Respect is a tribute that, whether we want to or not, we cannot refuse [to pay] to merit; we may
perhaps hold back outwardly, yet we cannot help feeling it inwardly” (101). If we recognize the
rational natures of others as unconditional ends being of supreme worth, then we also cannot
avoid acknowledging dignity in others who manifest this nature.
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In both the Grounding and the second critique, Kant calls respect a feeling that opposes feelings (even referring to
it as something that “cannot be compared with any pathological feeling” (CPract 100)) and has the moral law for its
content – emphasizing these aspects to the extent that what Kant means by calling respect a feeling seems at time
unclear.
91
Kant also calls self-love benevolence toward or liking toward oneself – one might incautiously think of it as
positive feeling towards oneself – while self-conceit is connected with a structural tendency to regard the self as a
determining basis or end of the will. Kant does not explicitly discuss what respect for oneself might be, but the term
rational self-love, combined with the discussion in the Grounding of the rational subject‟s self-regard as intelligence
(53), suggests that respect for oneself is possible.
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If I may be forgiven for dividing what is a common term in Kant, it seems to me that
there are at least four aspects to respect in Kant – respect for the moral law and the more
problematic self-respect as indicated above, but respect for others being divided between what I
am calling universal respect and exemplary respect. Respect may apply to persons, not things,
but the moral law is not, properly speaking, a thing, and “respect for the moral law is … the sole
and also indubitable moral incentive” (102).92 Whatever complexities Kant may introduce to the
concept, respect for oneself is a necessary element of Kantian moral motivation, as without it, it
would be unclear how the individual subject would experience the elevation of the moral law as
a subjectively motivating force. Universal respect results from the inherent dignity we recognize
in rational human nature, or what is particular to the human in a given human‟s humanity.
Although we may or may not effectively manifest this dignity in our actions, we cannot help
feeling or registering it on the level of respect. This respect is occasioned by the recognition of
the capacity of a will or nature to act according to the moral law, and thus applies to all humans
(and rational animals more generally, presuming other such beings to exist). Exemplary respect,
on the other hand, is occasioned by particular manifestations of a moral nature, or merit rendered
recognizable through action. This is the form of respect which Kant argues it is possible not to
feel towards another human (100). Borrowing from Fontanelle, Kant contrasts a prominent (but
presumably morally unimpressive) man with a “lowly, plain common man in whom I perceive
righteousness of character,” arguing that, although physically one might bow before the former
but not the latter, one would involuntarily give respect (bow inwardly) to the latter but no the
former (101). The common man‟s “example holds before me a law that, when I compare it with
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Kant gives as examples of things material objects and animals.
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my conduct, strikes down my self-conceit, and I see compliance with it – and hence the law‟s
practicability – proved before me through the deed” (101). This exemplary respect occurs not
because another human with a moral nature is encountered, but because this other human
presents this nature before us through action – and, as one‟s action might manifest this nature
more or less, this respect appears variable in its possible intensity.93 Kant‟s confidence in the
effective power of stories of morally exemplary figures in moral education (towards the end of
the second Critique, discussed later in this chapter) seems to rest on this differentiation – the
presentation of certain moral examples as particularly effective seems to presume that examples
are capable of occasioning more or less respect in the student.
This differentiation may help to illuminate a difficulty in Eliot‟s fiction. Eliot, as narrator
and critic, famously speaks of a need for sympathy that extends to all as they are, yet one would
be hard-pressed to point to an Eliot novel in which it seems that moral differentiations are not
being drawn and emphasized between the characters of the story. For an example, Adam Bede‟s
portrayals of the egotistical Arthur or Hetty stand in stark contrast to its portrayals of the driven
but other-focused characters of Adam and Dinah, and one might even argue that this narratorial
judgment is translated into narrative punishment for Hetty. And yet the sympathy which we are
told to feel is supposed to extend particularly to the imperfect. Applying Kant‟s framework to
Eliot, we might oppose an idea of exemplary respect in contrast to universal sympathy, rather

In the very least, it can be active or inactive, but Kant‟s comment that “great talents and an activity proportionate
to them can also bring about respect or a feeling analogous thereto” (together with his interest in extreme examples
in this Critique and the Grounding) seems to suggest a respect capable of greater or lesser intensity, while Kant‟s
comment contrasting the respect lost for Voltaire by “the common horde” from the respect maintained “at least from
the viewpoint of the man‟s talent” by the “true scholar” seems to suggest that different subjects might be differently
susceptible to this respect (102).
93
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than universal respect (although the two should be capable of some overlap).94 We might thus
maintain Eliot‟s apparent insistence that sympathy is a universal readerly duty (and presumably a
duty more generally), while acknowledging the fact that we might or might not (involuntarily)
feel a character to be capable of being a moral exemplar. On some level, Adam Bede does not
really give us a choice as to whether we pay respect to Adam and Dinah; we can certainly doubt
their perceptions, maybe even the practical concerns of a choice, but we cannot doubt the moral
value of their intentions. Hetty, on the other hand, does not seem capable of fulfilling the role of
moral exemplar (and thus cannot occasion involuntary respect of that sort), but this does not
prevent the novel from bringing us into proximity with her thoughts and feelings and demanding
we make a sympathetic attempt to understand her. Between these extremes we have the
communally concerned (but given to a sort of plump self-satisfaction) Irwine, whose faults and
virtues the narrator makes equally manifest. Adam intervenes on Irwine‟s behalf, manifesting
sympathetic partiality while arguing for the presence of something admirable within the minister.
However, this intervention makes sense to us because Adam is already an unquestionably
respectable character, and whether or not Irwine calls for our respect seems at least a matter for
debate. None of which negates the intrinsic worth of either Irwine or Hetty as human persons,
however it may cause us to regard them as moral examples. As Adam Bede concludes in a
gesture of communal reconciliation (at least for Arthur), the operations of sympathy should at
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Both respect and sympathy call for an imaginative construction of and emotional (admittedly, with respect, a nonpathological emotion) engagement with a subjectively particular but structurally similar human other according to a
moral logic that asserts a possible and mutually responsible community among human subjects. Although this lies
beyond the scope of the works dealt with in this paper, Kant‟s Metaphysics of Morals does include sympathy under
under the duties of Virtue, holding that sympathy (or, as Allen Wood specifies, “sympathetic participation” (Kantian
Ethics 176) is generally a duty
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least have the potential to ground a community beyond the scope of the novel in which the
mutual recognition of humanity acquires motive and force.95
Kant calls a state in which subjects experience a mutual recognition of rationality (and
thus of mutual worth) and unite in the self-legislation of universal law (in the mutual recognition,
willing, and pursued actualization of the moral law) the “Kingdom of Ends” (Reich der Zwecke).
“End” here, as elsewhere, is the conventional rendering of the German term Zweck in dealing
with Kant‟s moral philosophy, but it also means purpose, as in Zweckmässigkeit, or
Purposiveness. The feature of self-legislation is essential to this kingdom, as each rational
subject belongs to it as legislative member, subject and sovereign (Grounding 40). Here again
the concept of duty returns: “The practical necessity of acting according to…duty, does not rest
at all on the feelings, impulses and inclinations, but only on the relation of rational beings to one
another” and this relation in turn rests on “the idea of the dignity of a rational being who obeys
no law except what he at the same time enacts himself” (40). Kant stresses that this kingdom is
possible through morality, and has its grounding actuality not in external empirical facts, but in
the relation of subjects. Although Kant dubs a kingdom that one might call a kingdom of ends
“only an ideal” (39), a later distinction between teleological and moral conceptions of this
kingdom complicates this ideal condition: in teleology, the kingdom exists as a “theoretical idea”
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Sympathy in Eliot is, at this point, a quite developed critical venture (and one with frequent reference to questions
of psychology and community). For references to much of this venture, see Forest Pyle‟s “A Novel Sympathy: The
Imagination of Community in George Eliot.” Pyle‟s own reading, dealing primarily with Adam Bede and The Mill
on the Floss, situates Eliot in a larger context of Romanticism and opposes the forces of Imagination and Sympathy
(in opposition, for example, to Barbara Hardy) and considers sympathy to function as an always incomplete
reparation of ideological fissures in the fact and idea of community generated or discovered by imagination –
although Pyle emphasizes that Eliot is not a naïve narrator in this regard, knowing “full well that community is
always „at loose ends‟” and “imagined” (in Anderson‟s sense of the term) (22). Pyle‟s insistence that sympathy
seeks a “genuine” and simultaneously fabulated community (presumably grounded on a common and cultivated
faculty) I think opens the door for connections with Kant‟s kingdom of ends – although I would argue that both
concepts have more radical potential than Pyle‟s division of conservative sympathy and subversive imagination
implies.
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for explaining nature, whereas from the practical perspective of morality, the kingdom of ends is
an idea “that can be made actual by our conduct” (42 n28). Both in this kingdom and in the
concept of discussion of respect as described in the second Critique, the moral law is absolutely
necessary, but no reference is made to a law-giver apart from the community of rational
subjects.96
The disappearance of the term “Kingdom of Ends” from Kant‟s second Critique is
somewhat confusing. In this work, Kant does mention a “kingdom of morals” of which “we are
indeed legislating members” (107) and Kant maintains that “in the order of purposes the human
being (and with him every rational being) is a purpose in itself” (167).97 Yet the term used far
more often is the “Kingdom of God,” which arises not from the behavior and self-conception of
rational subjects, but from the harmony of nature and morality (163). This does not indicate, as
some contemporaries of Kant asserted, an uncritical return to religion.98 Kant‟s definition of
rational religion in this work maintains Kant‟s prioritization of immanent and critical selfdetermination: religion is “the cognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions – i.e.,
chosen and by themselves contingent ordinances of another’s will – but as essential laws of
every free will by itself” (164). Moreover, unlike the moral law, moral or rational faith (the
terms being effectively identified) does not command us, but is rather “a voluntary determination
of our judgment” (182).

In the discussion of respect, Kant asserts that “respect for the law cannot be attributed to a supreme being” (100),
and the kingdom of ends shares a common basis with universal respect in the recognition of the dignity of human
rationality.
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I here am using Pluhar‟s translation, which renders Zweck as purpose rather than end.
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An opinion that Allen Wood noted was also prevalent in philosophical discussion of Kant in 1970, when he
published Kant’s Moral Religion, and that has certainly not vanished from academic scenes.
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Earlier I mentioned that Kant ultimately comes to regard the immortality of the soul and
the existence of God as postulates issuing from the prior moral law – more properly, these
postulates issue from the moral law being adapted to subjective conditions and the principle of
the highest good. The former results from squaring the infinite demands of moral perfection that
the law places on us with our mortal and imperfect but gradually perfectible condition. The
concept of the highest good posits the ultimate unity of morality and happiness (as moral virtue
implies a worthiness to be happy) and, together with the moral law, leads us to the conclusion of
the existence of God as the moral cause of the world. Kant insists that the practical assent we
give to these postulates must not be mistaken for theoretical or speculative knowledge, yet Kant
takes the third section of the second chapter of book two to assert “the primacy of pure practical
reason in its linkage with speculative reason,” insisting that practical reason provides motivation
and completion for speculative reason.99 The indeterminacy of speculative reason cannot
override the commands of the moral law; instead, practical reason demands that we follow and
further the moral law and that we seek to align our moral vocation and our natural existence – the
necessity and possibility of which we must grant. The choice of rational faith (after the prior
commitment to practical reason) lies in how we (speculatively) conceive of this possibility.
Kant justifies the priority of practical reason over speculative reason on the basis of the
structural necessities of reason – but there is also an intuitive basis for this priority. Essentially,
when deliberating over a moral dilemma, we may seek what Kant would call empirical
knowledge to get a better understanding of the circumstances of the dilemma, but we do not
seem to seek such knowledge in determining the standards of our moral judgment. For example,

Kant‟s argument here might be connected with the opening of the Grounding, speculating on how we understand
the motivating purpose for the human possession of reason and will.
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one most likely should seek particular knowledge about an event to determine whether or not
murder took place (and possibly what reaction to such an action is called for), but it does not
seem like we need particular knowledge to determine whether or not murder is morally wrong.
Anticipating some of Wittgenstein‟s commentary on philosophical problems of language, Kant
claims that “if one asks, what, then, properly, is pure morality, by which as a touchstone one
must test the moral import of every action, then I must admit that only philosophers can make the
decision of this question doubtful” (CPract 194). We have, it seems, an immediate awareness of
the moral law – which Kant calls the fact of reason – that does not require empirical knowledge
or philosophical speculation. Practical reason, for Kant, must involve this immediate awareness
and its attendant sense of moral vocation and duty to engage with and seek to further this
vocation.
The cultivation and pursuit of moral vocation is both an individual and a social problem,
and in the “doctrine of method,” Kant discusses moral education. In this discussion, Kant makes
room for “preparatory guidance” through inclination and the inculcation of “habitual use” in
moral education – acknowledging the role of this habitual use in “common human reason[„s]”
maintenance of morality and moral understanding (190, 194).100 Yet Kant stresses the that this
guidance is to be exercised only to lead the student to an independent moral motivation, which
“teaches the human being to feel his own dignity – gives to his mind a power” (190). To this
end, he argues for the power of exemplary stories drawn from “the biographies of ancient and

On this point, Kant seems aligned with a moment in Eliot‟s “Evangelical Teaching,” in which Eliot defines the
“highest moral habit” as “the constant preference of truth both theoretically and practically” which “demands the cooperation of the intellect with the impulses” (145), as well as Eliot‟s inclusion of habit in morality in The Mill on the
Floss (mentioned towards the end of this chapter). Kant‟s moral philosophy is often presented as having an
antagonistic, rather than cooperative, model with respect to habit and impulse or inclination.
100

96

modern times,”101 and even makes space for the role of literature, admiring how “Juvenal
presents such an example [of moral elevation] in a climax that lets the reader vividly feel the
force of the incentive hidden in the pure law of duty as duty” (198).102 The quotation Kant uses
from Juvenal emphasizes a philosophical point, yet he seems as interested in Juvenal‟s capacity
to present and powerfully convey this point as its philosophical content.
Kant concludes his work by advocating the role of “science (critically sought and
methodically initiated)” in moral education. Drawing an analogy with human awe at the heavens
and the development of astrology, Kant argues that morality, starting from “human nature‟s
noblest property, whose development and cultivation point to infinite benefit,” has resulted in
“fanaticism, or … superstition” through incautious and irrational ventures. As rational physical
science has lead to progressive and grounded knowledge of our world and universe, rational
moral science can lead us to similar knowledge. Kant stresses the role of this science for
teachers who seek “the path of wisdom,” but insists that, though the public need not interest itself
in philosophical “subtle investigation” (as our basic moral awareness of duty is immediate and
common), it should nonetheless be interested in the results of such investigation (205). Science
is not meant to teach us “what one ought to do” – as the knowledge of duty is already within us
as rational agents – but it can serve to clarify and instill discipline in our moral consciousness

For the role of moral examples in another of Kant‟s moral works, see Marcia Baron‟s “Moral Paragons and the
Metaphysics of Morals” (in A Companion to Kant, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006, 335-49). Baron‟s focus is
on Kant‟s concept of the “morally excellent agent,” and although she does not deal with stories, her focus on
exemplary agents and developing a more ethically robust account of Kant‟s idea of moral excellence could be useful
in motivating and developing an account of exemplary stories in Kant‟s moral philosophy.
102
More specifically, Kant‟s example refers to a contrary feeling, by which an action opposed to inclination but in
line with respect (e.g., the sacrifice of the self for a moral cause) becomes itself an incentive that overpowers other
incentives. As in Kant‟s prior discussion of respect, this incentive is non-pathological, but bears upon the emotions.
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and help to secure us against the dangers of moral fanaticism.103 Back in the “Incentives of Pure
Practical Reason,” Kant speaks of moral fanaticism as “an overstepping of the bounds that pure
practical reason sets for humanity,” and includes “not only novelists and sentimental educators
… but sometimes even philosophers … [among those that] have introduced moral fanaticism in
place of sober but wise moral discipline” (111).
Kant‟s assumption that novelists (Romanschreiber, literally novel-writers) and
sentimentalists would engage in moral fanaticism may reflect some note of condescension, but it
is also grounded in the assumptions of the literary and philosophical movement of
sentimentalism – in German, Empfindsamkeit. Sentimentalism is founded, in part, on moral
sense philosophy and a belief in the positive moral capacity of sensibility. As Kant‟s definition
of moral fanaticism includes anything that posits moral motivation in something besides the
moral law (110), any form of sentimentalism would fall under this heading due to its
commitment to a moral source of morality. The German movement of Empfindsamkeit was
partially inspired by the work of English novelists (particularly Sterne in translation), and Kant
could equally have had Germans, English writers, or both in mind with this comment. Kant‟s
approving quotation of Juvenal (and his admiration for writers like Pope) suggests that this is a
criticism of a particular movement, rather than a wholesale attack on literature.
Although Eliot was indebted to both moral sense philosophy and sentimentalism, this did
not prevent her from attacking the conventions of sentimentalism in her own era – among many

Kant distinguishes the “the doctrine of wisdom” provided by critical science from the more general knowledge of
“what one ought to do” as a doctrine “to serve teachers as a standard for preparing well and recognizably the path to
wisdom that everyone ought to walk, and to secure others against erroneous paths” (205). Exactly what Kant means
by the path of wisdom is not entirely clear, although “well and recognizably” seems to suggest that the moral law
and its applications might be presently with more or less clarity and force, while Kant‟s own work in the
Metaphysics of Morals might be read as a clarification of the different applications of the moral law, and thus a path
of wisdom in itself.
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other places, in her somewhat infamous essay “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” (1856). Eliot‟s
criticism in this essay of sentimentalist novels rests in part on the tendency of the novelists to
imagine they can transverse bounds they either cannot. It is in this context that Eliot remarks on
the Lady novelists able to catch “occasional glimpses of the noumenon” (quoted in the first
chapter) and who form unqualified opinions “on the knottiest moral and speculative questions”
(310). As hitherto indicated, Kant and Eliot shared a concern about religious enthusiasm, but it
seems that Eliot also shared a concern about moral fanaticism or enthusiasm – provided we read
the latter term somewhat more widely than Kant, as that which constructs or alleges morality or
moral motivation beyond the bounds of duty. Eliot clearly and unequivocally attacks
sentimentalist lady novelists for positing speculative knowledge where none exists, but she also
attacks ungrounded assertions of moral knowledge – and in this essay in particular shows
concern with what Kant would identify as self-conceit, or morality without any real basis apart
from an unreflective egoism. This is a concern that one might point to in any number Eliot‟s
novels, from Arthur in Adam Bede to Grandcourt in Daniel Deronda, but is particularly present
and pressing, as I will argue, in The Mill on the Floss.
Before proceeding to Eliot‟s fiction, I want to touch on three points in her writings
outside of her novels that suggest sympathy with a Kantian moral outlook, as characterized by a
notion of duty centered on autonomy, self-reflection, respect/dignity and a morality that
possesses a practical priority over speculative concerns: a letter written in 1874, a notebook
entry, likely from some time in the 1870s, and Eliot‟s completion and revision of the subchapter
“The Moral Sense” in Lewes‟s Problems of Life and Mind from 1878-9. The relatively late date
of these texts, combined with Eliot‟s attack on à priori methodology in her review of Gruppe in
1855, seems to suggest that the Kantian tenor of these texts is a similarly late development.
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Other texts from the 1850s (e.g., “Evangelical Teaching: Dr. Cumming”) suggest more common
ground between Kant and Eliot – and, as I will suggest later in this chapter, The Mill on the Floss
turns on Eliot‟s adaptation of what we might reasonably identify as Kantian moral problems.
Moreover, the central Kantian tenets of these texts, affirming the priority of practical moral
concerns, the unconditional demands of duty, and the connection of morality, dignity and
purpose, are no less present in Eliot‟s earlier writings. Nonetheless, between Lewes‟s revisions
of the Biographical History of Philosophy and Eliot‟s own continuing engagement with German
thought, one wonders if Eliot‟s engagement and agreement with Kant may have grown over
time.
Writing to Mrs. Ponsonby (an attendee at the priory Sundays and devotee of Eliot) in
1874, Eliot stressed the importance of our immediate awareness of practical freedom:
As to the necessary combinations through which life is manifested, and which seem to
present themselves to you as a hideous fatalism which ought logically to petrify your
volition – have they, in fact, any such influence on your ordinary course of action in the
primary affairs of your existence as a human, stoical, domestic creature? And if they
don‟t hinder you from taking a bath…why should they hinder you from a line of resolve
in a higher strain of duty to your ideal, both for yourself and others? (GEL, vi. 98)
Like Kant, Eliot seems to consider quite seriously the possibility of a deterministic universe, but
insists on a practical turn that supersedes theoretical knowledge.104 In “Determinism and
Responsibility in the works of George Eliot,” George Levine argues that Eliot is committed to a
deterministic view of the world, “in which duty becomes primary” (272). However, the

For Kant‟s consideration of the possibility of a deterministic universe, I am referring in particular to his
meditations in the first Critique.
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determinism that Levine attributes to Eliot is founded on parallels with John Stuart Mill‟s
commitment to complex universal causality, rather than, for example, Charles Bray‟s
necessitarianism.105 Levine quotes the letter just cited to argue that Eliot‟s “determinism
reinforced a moral bias,” splitting Eliot‟s felt freedom from her belief in universal causality
(274). Eliot clearly does distinguish between a logical concession to necessity (a conclusion,
Kant would argue, towards which theoretical reason leads us) and the experienced fact of
volition, of which we have an immediate awareness that supersedes theoretical concerns.
Nonetheless, this latter fact seems to carry theoretical weight, enabling resolve towards an ideal
and an effective alternative to the rhetorically rejected “hideous fatalism.”
Eliot seems to advocate a similar position in one of her unpublished notebook pieces
entitled “Moral Freedom,” probably dating from the 1870s.106 In this piece, Eliot begins “At the
opening of the question, „Are we free agents, or are we not?‟ we are met by the fact – as
indisputable as anything that can possibly be urged on the matter – that to occupy the mind in
contemplating human action as a chain of necessary sequences must neutralize practice” (365).
She goes on to argue:
Life & action are prior to theorizing, & have a prior logic in the conditions necessary to
maintain them…when we have once satisfied ourselves that any one point of view is

More specifically, Levine argues that Eliot‟s determinism should be distinguished from necessitarianism (and
other reductive determinisms) by its commitment to complexity, causality as distinct from compulsion, and
character – this last factor being a limited space of personal choice and self-causality within the larger
determinations of one‟s self nature. A stronger version of character than the model that Levine uses could offer
significant parallels with Kant‟s concept of the rational agent as a cause in herself. Charles Bray was an early
acquaintance of Eliot‟s in Coventry, around the time of her rejection of Christianity (mentioned in the first chapter in
connection with Charles Christian Hennell), who advocated a materialist version of determinism, reading the work
of universal necessity in all things and agents – the full title of his best-known work being The Philosophy of
Necessity; or, the Law of Consequences as Applicable to the Mental, Moral, and Social Science (1841).
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As Pinney notes, the date for these notebook entries is uncertain, though Charles Lee Lewes (who published other
pieces from the same notebook), conjectures the notebook as a whole to have been written in the 1870s (“More
Leaves from George Eliot‟s Notebook” 356).
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hostile to practice…it is not the dominance of the intellect, but poverty of judgment that
determines us to allow its interference in guiding our conduct, either in the implicit
conduct which goes on within us, or the explicit which is its completion (365).
Although one might take Eliot‟s logic here to Nietzschean extremes, the core is essentially
Kantian (although also partially in line with British common sense philosophy): Eliot asserts the
primacy of moral practice and the prior logic that grounds such practice over a completely
necessitarian theoretical view of causality. In defending this practice and logic, Eliot insists on
an internal or cognitive space, which we must conceive of as potentially autonomous or free
from external determination.
Some of the strongest evidence for Eliot‟s agreement with Kant‟s moral philosophy
comes from her completion and revision of G.H. Lewes‟s subchapter on “The Moral Sense” in
the fourth volume of his unfinished Problems of Life and Mind. In his article on the subchapter,
“G.H. Lewes Revised: George Eliot and the Moral Sense,” K. K. Collins proposes that Eliot
“shifts the emphasis of Lewes‟s version by counterbalancing it, thereby overcoming the limits of
his naturalism” (480).107 Adding paragraphs and rewriting the subchapter substantially, Eliot
shifts the emphasis of the article from Lewes‟s basically naturalist-historical account to one that
makes room for “binding ethical principles” and “rational moral conceptions” (475, 480). One
of the ways Eliot does this is by exploiting a quotation from Kant, which Lewes mentions in
passing (476). The passage in question talks of “Kant‟s fine phrase – „Man refuses to violate in
his own person the dignity of humanity‟” (490). The closest approximation to this line I have

In the following, I quote and follow Collins‟s reading, but citations from pages 463-483 refer to Collins‟s
argument, whereas citations from pages 484+ refer to Eliot‟s original text, which Collins provides as an appendix to
the article.
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been able to find comes in the Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant does discuss the liar as one
who “violates the dignity of humanity in his own person” (182) – but the concept the dignity of
humanity residing in and demanding respect from one‟s person is present throughout Kant‟s
moral works.108 While Lewes uses Kant almost incidentally to advance his own argument, Eliot,
takes this sentiment in a larger context, making room in Lewes‟s account for an individualist and
rational notion of duty (476-7).
Along with this idea of duty, Eliot adds to Lewes‟s account the idea of a “Moral sense”
that comes to “incorporate itself [in select members] as a protest and resistance, as the
renunciation of immediate sympathy for the sake of a foreseen general good, as moral defiance
of material force, and every form of martyrdom” (486). Those of us accustomed to think of Eliot
as the great advocate of sympathy may find Eliot‟s subordination of sympathy to a more
calculated “general good” surprising, or even threatening utilitarianism. However, the idea of
martyrdom (familiar enough in Eliot‟s fiction), combined with a Kantian opposition of moral
will and material force, suggests an understanding of moral sense that does not proceed along the
lines of any material calculus, instead placing value in a self-determinative human dignity.
Lewes himself talks of “moral conceptions & organized ethical tendencies” to ground “the à
priori [moral] Intuitional doctrine” which is nonetheless “explicable on the principles of
Experience” (490). Eliot takes this opening and runs with it. Within the limits of experience and
history, Eliot holds, as Collins phrases it, “Binding by virtue of its status as a rational, self-

Although the translation I am quoting from is Mary Gregor‟s, the same phrase occurs in John William Semple‟s
Metaphysic of Ethics (Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1836, numerous reprints), which is actually a collection of three
different works by Kant, including the Grounding of the Metaphysics of Moral and parts of the Critique of Practical
Reason and The Metaphysics of Morals. It is entirely possible, of course, that Lewes is working directly from the
German.
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imposed moral conception, the principle of duty…is unconditionally and absolutely imperative”
(480).
There‟s a further similarity between Eliot‟s account and Kant‟s notion that morality gives
us the dignity of a higher purpose. In a section Eliot added to “The Moral Sense,” she notes that
But in the intermediate states [of human moral development] also…at the same time that
the dread is directed to an external vengeance of gods or men, we see the moral education
of our race proceeding, in the more and more rational classification of actions as right or
wrong, towards the final identification of the Divine Will with the highest ascertainable
duty to mankind, and in the continual elevation of public opinion towards the highest
mark of Feeling informed by Knowledge” (489-90).
Eliot‟s idea that a morality based on external commands and dread of an external authority
belongs to an incomplete state of moral education accords with Kant‟s insistence, running from
the Grounding until his last publication, Religion with the Bounds of bare Reason, that true
morality cannot be grounded on fear or external sanction. Moreover, like Kant, Eliot seems to
advocate a vision of morality at once already universal (public and possessed by an immediate
feeling or sense) and improvable (Knowledge or critical science has a role to play in moral
cultivation). Feuerbach is, of course, at work in the equation of the divine and human, but
Eliot‟s equation of divine will with human duty, rather than human power or human desire aligns
this passage more closely with Kant. For both Eliot and Kant, duty indicates a pinnacle of
human potential and vocation, calling for our respect and deserving of the appellation “divine.”
If we were to reduce Kantian morality to the abstract formula of the categorical
imperative, then it might seem like the apparent pro-Kantian stance of Eliot‟s work on Problems
is contradicted in the earlier The Mill on the Floss. The narrator of Mill famously advocates “the
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truth, that moral judgments must remain false and hollow, unless they are checked and
enlightened by a perpetual reference to the special circumstances that mark the individual lot”
(438). The “man of maxims,” who engages in such false judgments, is
the popular representative of the minds that are guided in their moral judgment solely by
general rules, thinking that these will lead them to justice by a ready-made patent method,
without the trouble of exerting patience, discrimination, impartiality – without any care to
assure themselves whether they have the insight that comes from a hardly-earned
estimate of temptation, or from a life vivid and intense enough to have created a wide
fellow-feeling with all that is human (438).
Eliot is clearly attacking abstractions in moral judgment that close off feeling and particularity.109
Yet Kant also argues that, for “common human reason,” the question of morality is not decided
“by abstract general formulas” (194), and that even the philosopher following the moral law
quickly finds herself enmeshed in a series of commitments (for example, commitments to human
dignity and the kingdom of ends) that cannot be exhausted by the formula of the categorical
imperative. Moreover, the way Eliot characterizes necessary moral feeling – impartiality, wide
fellow-feeling with all that is human – demands a kind of abstraction from our own situation, and
the demand for patience and discernment is entirely in keeping with a Kantian moral perspective.
A Kantian moral view is not content with any presentation of general rules, as, for Kant, only
maxims that pass the test of reason qualify as moral; like Eliot, Kant is aware of the dangerous

I also suspect that Eliot‟s economic metaphor of a “ready-made patent method” may be a jab the sometimes
economically-minded philosophy of Utilitarianism (to which Kant‟s rational Intuitionism is often opposed). Eliot
offers a more direct attack on Utilitarianism in Romola, where she speaks of “moments when the vaguely animal
spirits of a crowd are most likely to be … ready to sacrifice a stray individual for the greater happiness of the greater
number” (98). For a discussion of problems of economy and morality for generally (although in relation to Lockean
thought that helped to ground Utilitarianism), see Eric P. Levy‟s “Property Morality in The Mill on the Floss.”
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human tendency to try to turn inclination into general laws. The man of maxims fails to submit
his general rules to any kind of critique or test, and thus passes off his mere inclination or
“temptation” as objective. Unexamined maxims, no less than the dogma of Dr. Cumming or the
dreams of Swedenborg, are a means of avoiding careful and rational thought.110
If, instead of writing off Kantian morality as an all-too-simple formula, we understand
Kant‟s moral philosophy as a complex system of priorities, as I have tried to elaborate in this
chapter, then the connections between Eliot‟s second novel and Kant‟s second Critique become
both evident and pressing. As indicated above, both novelist and philosopher prioritize selfreflection, deliberation and the striving after a morality that can achieve impartiality. This last
term is particularly important, as both Kant and Eliot emphasize the human tendency to mask
subjective inclination as objective law, and both resist the manifestations of this tendency
throughout their respective critical and literary works. Autonomous duty, guiding moral purpose
and human dignity (with its concomitant concept of respect), as hitherto indicated, are important
elements of Kant and Eliot‟s thought and writing, and are no less present concerns in The Mill on
the Floss.
Among many characters in this novel, Tom seems to be an example of what Kant would
call a self-conceited individual, an individual who fails to see the real origin of what he takes to
be duty and morality in the contingency of his own egoism:

For an alternative reading of the men of maxims, see Mary Jacobus‟s “The Question of Language: Men of
Maxims and The Mill on the Floss.” Drawing in part from Nancy Miller‟s reading of Mill, Jacobus reads the men of
maxims as figures of the dominant patriarchal culture whose faith in general rules reflects their assumptions about
other general unities and coherences, particularly in language. In Jacobus‟s reading, Eliot resists these false unities,
both as narrator and through the character of Maggie in a manner that invites comparisons with Irigarayan theory.
While Jacobus‟s reading is more interested in feminist linguisitic strategies than moral deliberation, her insistence
on Eliot‟s linguistic resistance to false unities is far from irreconcilable with the claims of this paper.
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He did not know how much of an old boyish repulsion and of mere personal pride and
animosity was concerned in the bitter severity of the words by which he meant to do the
duty of a son and brother. Tom was not given to inquire subtly into his own motives, any
more than into other matters of an intangible kind; he was quite sure that his own motives
as well as actions were good, else he would have had nothing to do with them (302).
The sort of tautologies Tom implicitly engages in (his motives are good because they are his,
they are his because they are good) disguise the origin of his motives and alleged “duty” in his
personal and petty emotions. But they can do this only because Tom does not subject them to
the examination of a discerning reason. Tom‟s blindness on the point infects his sense of duty
and his morality generally. When he first learns that he and Wakem‟s son will be going to the
same school, he wishes that Philip were not deformed, “for then Tom would have had the
prospect of pitching into him with all that freedom which is derived from a high moral sanction”
(140). A sanction, as we know from Kant‟s definition, is something that comes from without, an
ordinance of another‟s will. Tom‟s morality is constructed around an arbitrary moral code –
arbitrary because unexamined and drawn from without – in which attacking a well-formed son of
someone your father doesn‟t like is fine.
Tom is far from alone in his adherence to an unexamined moral code. The Dodson pride
themselves on their adherence to “traditional duty” and their “faithfulness to admitted rules”
(239). Relying on ideas of faithfulness and tradition, the Dodsons place their morality beyond
their scope of examination.111 But the term “admitted” already informs the reader of the selective

Eliot presents this traditionalism as primitive, describing their religion being “of a simple, semi-pagan kind” but
defending them from the accusation of heresy, “if heresy properly means choice” (239). However, n excusing
themselves from the moral deliberation of choice by appeal to an unquestionable, even apparently involuntary
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function that these traditions and rules serve: as the narrator makes clear, the Dodson‟s steadfast
adherence to their traditional rules serve as a means to gratify personal inclination, be it greed,
pride or simple sloth – one need think only of Mrs. Glegg‟s use of family tradition to appeal to
her pride or the various Dodson deliberations in the chapter “The Family Council” (Book 3,
Chapter 3). Nor are the Dodsons alone in this narrowness, as it is both the Tullivers and the
Dodsons the narrator speaks of in stating, “their moral notions, though held with strong tenacity,
seem to have no standard beyond hereditary custom” (238). As Melissa Ganz notes in “Binding
the Will: George Eliot and the Practice of Promising,” “Like Mr. Tulliver, Tom uses the [family]
Bible to shore up a pledge” (572). For both, a pledge on its own is insufficient and needs the
verification of external authority; both the traditional authority of the bible and fact that it is the
family bible, or, as Tom perhaps unintentionally blends the two, “my father‟s Bible” (Mill, 301).
For both Tom and his earthly father, this appeal to external authority provides the vehicle for
binding others to the mandates of their own personal vindictiveness (Ganz, 572). Precisely
because the authority is arbitrary – it is the physical fact of the bible and its importance in
hereditary custom, not its content that matters – this authority can be put to use by personal
inclination.
Tom‟s appreciation for external and unexamined authority may not be entirely the
product of familial upbringing. In his education at school, Tom is exposed to another whose
appeal to authority masks unexamined inclination: “Because teaching came naturally to Mr
Stelling” he teaches “with that uniformity of method and independence of circumstances, which
distinguish the actions of animals understood to be under the immediate teaching of nature”

tradition, the Dodsons by no means free themselves from the determination of inclination (as the enthusiast does not
avoid the determination of her own wishes by appealing to the Divine Will).
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(121). For Mr Stelling, his method of teaching and the assumptions that ground it (e.g.,
“Aristotle was a great authority”) are completely unquestionable. Although supposedly
imparting a rational education (Euclid and Aristotle, among others), Mr Stelling is in fact a
creature of unexamined inclination. In “The Two Rhetorics: George Eliot‟s Bestiary,” J. Hillis
Miller traces the remarkable complexity and irony at work in Eliot‟s extended examination of Mr
Stelling‟s educational method and metaphor. In problematizing Mr Stelling‟s favorite
agricultural metaphor, that narrator involves the reader in a seemingly inescapable series of
metaphors, including reflection on metaphor itself and the camel as the ship of the desert, which
is “a metaphor of a metaphor” (65). Ultimately, the reader “is as imprisoned as much as Tom,
Mr Stelling or the shrewmouse [to whom Tom is compared] within the linguistic predicament
that the passage both analyses and exemplifies” (68). In context, however, one can read this
passage as an illustration of the danger of taking a metaphor as given, or “literal” in Miller‟s
terminology. Precisely because Stelling substitutes a metaphor in place of a reasoned defense
and construction of an educational strategy, he opens himself to the kind of metaphoric
inversions and destabilization that Eliot exploits. Any abstraction, authority or trope we treat as
unquestionable is already arbitrary and is more likely to excuse sidestepping thought and selfexamination in favor of following inclination than to lead to any tenable educational or moral
position.
This is a lesson even Maggie misses on some level. In discovering Thomas à Kempis‟s
Imitation of Christ, Maggie undergoes a transformation into what seems to her a complete
fulfillment of the ideal of duty. Maggie strives to follow “the path we all like when we set out on
our abandonment of egoism – the path of martyrdom and endurance, where the palm-branches
grow, rather than the steep highway of tolerance, just allowance, and self-blame, where there are
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no leafy honours to be gathered and worn” (256). Maggie‟s conception of herself as martyr
saves her from the threat of self-examination, or even from seeing how her image of herself as a
martyr gratifies a kind of personal inclination and need at great expense to herself.
Yet there is a danger in reading Maggie as simply mistaken. As Jonathan Loesberg notes
in “Aesthetics, Ethics, and Unreadable Acts in George Eliot,” the gossips of St. Oggs construct
two possible stories for Maggie‟s elopement, and conclude from what they know that she must
belong to “melodrama of the fallen woman” (136). However, Maggie‟s story is unreadable in a
way that even critics of Eliot routinely miss in trying to fashion a consistent and “coherent moral
narrative” (137). In response to a criticism by Bulwer-Lytton regarding “Maggie‟s position
towards Stephen,” Eliot replies “If the ethics of art do not admit the truthful presentation of a
character essentially noble but liable to great error – error that is anguish to its own nobleness –
then, it seems to me, the ethics of art are too narrow, and must be widened” (138). Although
Loesberg uses this to insist that Eliot seeks to create “an aesthetics that creates sympathy out of
… moments of unreadability” (138), I want to remain for a moment with the gossips‟ failed
reading and Eliot‟s defense of Maggie.
The interpretation of the gossips is conditioned by narratives their culture has taught them
to expect, but it is also conditioned by their idea of capital “S” Society: “The ladies of St. Oggs
were not beguiled by any wide speculative conceptions; but they had their favourite abstraction,
called Society, which served to make their consciences perfectly easy in doing what satisfied
their own egoism” (445). The abstraction “Society” excuses these ladies from “courage, deep
pity [and] self-knowledge” and functions like Tom‟s “high moral sanction,” giving free reign to
personal inclination. The mind that falls back on this abstraction in place of moral and rational
effort has “cheated itself” into “the belief that life can have any moral end…which excludes the
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striving after perfect truth, justice, and love towards the individual men and women who come
across our own path” (444-5). While the syntax of this passage technically leaves open the
possibility of a life without a moral end, the tone of it does not. This notion of a moral end bears
important resemblances to Kant‟s; for Kant, reason is also concerned with perfection112, and the
pursuit of perfect truth and justice parallel the drives of theoretical and practical reason.
Furthermore, though the love towards others is certainly line with the Christian teaching later
discussed in Eliot‟s chapter, the focus of the moral end on the members of the human community
(as opposed to God, or on the members through God) more closely resembles Kant‟s kingdom of
ends than the Christian kingdom of heaven.113
In pursuing this greater moral end, it is necessary to free oneself, as far as possible, of
“inordinate inclination to thyself” (253). Although Maggie carries “exaggeration and
willfulness, some pride and impetuosity, even into her self-renunciation” (256), she is not wrong
in seeking a duty that exceeds the demands and inclinations of the self. She is right to fear
having “no law but the inclination of the present” (417), for she has seen in her own family what
happens when this law guides people, albeit under other names. “Faithfulness and constancy”
and morality must “mean something else that doing what is easiest and pleasantest to ourselves”
(417). Maggie is “essentially noble” despite whatever errors she may have precisely because she
strives after this greater purpose.

See for instance Grounding, 47, in which “among the rational principles of morality … there is the ontological
concept of perfection” and Critique of Practical Reason, 177. Perfection, although part of reason and morality, is an
“indeterminate concept” and thus does not provide an adequate conception of moral duty on its own. More
generally, however, perfectibility, or at least improvability, seems to be a feature of critical science, whether it
investigates theoretical or practical knowledge.
113
Again, Feuerbach is clearly present here.
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As we know from Eliot‟s remark on “Moral Freedom,” Maggie is wrong to conclude that
“our life is determined for us – and it makes the mind very free when we give up wishing, and
only think of bearing what is laid upon us, and doing what is given us to do” (266). But this is
because in this case she fails the test of duty, not because she dedicates herself to it excessively.
Duty as Maggie conceives it here is not a ground for moral action, but rather an excuse for
avoiding demands of rational and moral deliberation and subjecting the self to an external
“given.” Maggie herself has read and knows well enough that moral consciousness attends to
“the Truth, which teacheth inwardly” (253). She is also not quite the determinist (or, better,
fatalist) implied in these earlier lines, becoming indignant at Stephen‟s attempt “to deprive [her]
of any choice” in their boat ride, or later reflecting in indirect discourse on the “fruit from all her
years of striving after the highest and best – that her soul…could never deliberately consent to a
choice of the lower” (413). A major theme in this book is the tendency for characters to excuse
themselves from the burden of moral deliberation in false commitment to an external and
arbitrary authority that serves to mask the real determination of inclination, and Maggie deserves
credit for her genuine deliberation and her struggle both to free herself from inclination and to
determine and choose her true duty.
Although Maggie‟s purpose is Kantian, she struggles to achieve it in a Lewesian
universe. The moral knowledge Maggie strives after is not something immediately accessible to
her, but requires scientific patience and effort as well as sympathy and rational discernment –
and, more particularly, the patience and effort of a science that contains a greater empirical
component than Kant‟s critical science. Maggie lacks “that knowledge of the irreversible laws
within her and without her, which, governing the habits, becomes morality” (Mill, 252). This
knowledge cannot be approached by the “high priori road,” but rather must be striven for, taking
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account of habits, our historical situations and the empirical laws without us as well as the moral
law within.
None of which lessens Maggie‟s (or our own) imperative duty towards that moral law.
Whatever frustrations we as readers may have with Maggie‟s choices, her awareness of and
attempts to act in accord with this duty do not waver – and thus we owe to Maggie, no less than
Adam or Dinah, the tribute of respect. The title of the sixth book “The Great Temptation”
doubtlessly plays with Maggie‟s self-conception as a martyr – Eliot makes no attempt to hide
satirical intents in her chapter headings, either through ironic distance of diction (as in “A
variation of Protestantism unknown to Bousset”) or alignments of which the characters are
unaware (“How a Hen takes to a stratagem”). Nonetheless, the temptation possesses a
psychological and effective reality for the reader no less than Maggie, and although Maggie‟s
discipline goes to excess in resisting what the narrator calls Maggie‟s vanity, Maggie cannot be
wrong in resisting this vanity (383). The Mill and the Floss ends in a mortal reconciliation, but
the novel consists principally in and gives us cause to respect Maggie‟s struggles – to borrow
terminology from Eliot‟s additions to “The Moral Sense,” her moral defiance of material force,
but also force exerted from familial expectations, social judgment and internal inclination.
Some idea of the distance between the moral worlds of Adam Bede and The Mill on the
Floss might be seen in their primary ministerial figures, Mr. Irwine and Dr. Kenn. Irwine shows
a proper affability and communal concern and receives the praise of Adam. Dr. Kenn at least
ostensibly meets the demands of sympathy, spending years in “devoted service to his fellowmen” and showing great concern and deliberation over Maggie‟s situation. Dr. Kenn assures
Maggie that he is bound to aid her “by the very duties of [his] office” and that he also has “a
deep interest in [her] peace of mind and welfare” – yet despite this external duty (belonging to
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the office rather than the person) and personal interest, the reverend immediately falls into a kind
of theorizing that negates action and useful counsel (437). Dr. Kenn speaks of the necessity of
moral obligation, yet this obligation cannot ultimately lead him to prevail against what he calls
“counteracting circumstances.” Against the current of popular opinion and in consideration of
“the peculiar responsibility attached to his office,” Dr. Kenn lets Maggie go as the governess to
his children. The reverend‟s failure becomes all the more acute viewed in relation to Maggie‟s
actions: his inability to translate his resolve into action suggests a failure in the strength of his
resolve, but also the ways in which, even at his most sympathetic, Dr. Kenn calculates, whereas
Maggie‟s troubles stem, at least in part, from her recognition of the incalculable value of others.
If Irwine can be made into a lesson about the necessity of sympathy, Dr. Kenn indicates the
limits of a sympathy that fails to sufficiently incorporate practical imperatives or recognize the
ways in which subjects place an absolute duty upon us.
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Conclusion
Remembering the demise of Eliot‟s most recent heroine, readers of Romola might well
have expected Romola to follow Maggie in death after lying down in a boat and “gliding
away…on the darkening waters” (admittedly, this time in the sea rather than a river) (474). Eliot
even seems to reference the concluding image of Mill, in which Tom and Maggie, having
embraced after going under the water, are united beneath their tomb: “Presently [Romola] felt
that she was in the grave … she was touching the hands of the beloved dead beside her” (475).114
Moreover, Romola seems to have picked up some of Maggie‟s primary traits, developing an
intense religious severity in the course of the novel without losing a strong sense of sympathy
and feeling torn between competing claims of duty, besides having a dead father. Romola was
serialized in the Cornhill Magazine, and the image of Romola drifting away appears at the end of
a monthly part (June 1863). As Romola does not appear in the next issue (July), the readers may
well have expected that Romola‟s wish “that she might be gliding into death” (475) had been
granted – especially as her husband, Tito, dies in the issue following her departure and the
central and heroic (if not unquestionable) friar Savonarola is clearly heading towards his
execution.
Eliot‟s reincorporation of Romola into the text in the August issue violates both tragic
development and realist priorities. Romola not only survives her drifting in the sea, she happens
across an unidentified village struck by pestilence, ministers to the afflicted villagers with milk
and water, and even becomes a legend as “the blessed Lady who came over the sea” (527).
Romola has already been compared with a Madonna in her ministrations in her home town of
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In The Mill on the Floss, the narrator also imagines Maggie and Tom holding hands after their demise.
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Florence, but this return from death threatens to make the earlier metaphor of divinity (or at least
supernatural character) literal. Romola had drifted off feeling “orphaned in [the] wide spaces of
sea and sky … she read no message of love for her in that far-off symbolic writing of the
heavens” (475) and her improbable preservation (and even reincarnation of sorts) threatens to
destroy this fundamentally realistic awareness of the reality of death and the division of the self
from nature. Romola‟s continued life seems to lack the sort of tragic logic that grants wider
meaning to Maggie‟s death. Both Romola and Maggie suffer from the pull of irreconcilable
duties, both have a strained relationship with their closest living loved one (Tom and Tito,
respectively), and both of their deaths would have pointed to a larger truth of ultimate
irreconcilability: Maggie‟s death is also a statement about her incapacity to square her vocation
with the society in which she lived, and Romola‟s death could resonate on the level of
irreconciliation with the determinations and contingencies of nature. The moral dignity of
martyrdom falls instead to Savonarola, who, the narrator posthumously declares, labored “for the
very highest end – the moral welfare of men – not by vague exhortations, but by striving to turn
beliefs into energies that would work in all the details of life” (538).
Eliot herself conceded that “[t]he various strands of thought I had to work out forced me
into a more ideal treatment of Romola than I had foreseen at present” (GEL iv 103). Both
Deborah Guth and Robert Norton read this ideal quality to Romola as part of Eliot‟s engagement
with the tragic theory and works of Schiller. As Schiller drew quite directly from Kant‟s moral
and aesthetic philosophy (even while parodying the former), these readings are quite amenable to
a Kantian reading of the same text. The praise of Savonarola above centered on moral vocation
and practical engagement, as well as the general focus on imperative moral force, could be
Kantian, Schillerian or both. Savonrola‟s description of his moral-political cause as “the cause
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of freedom” (463) meets both Kant and Schiller‟s equation of morality and freedom. The
narrator‟s discussion of the need for “a moral law restraining desire” (and its apparent absence in
Tito) (112) may sounds slightly more Kantian, but can certainly be squared with Schiller‟s call
for a moral personality to master the senses and their inclinations. Schiller opens up the
possibility of reading non-realistic elements of this text not as literary failures, but as
articulations of a different literary vision from English realism.115 Discussing Schiller in relation
to The Mill on the Floss, Guth quite rightly emphasizes the need “to harmonize warring inner
needs,” as harmony is a larger priority in Schiller‟s moral and aesthetic thought. This prioritized
harmony is arguably derived (in part) from Kant‟s aesthetic theory, but is not in entire accord
with his moral philosophy.
Romola brings before the reader, perhaps more strongly than any other novel by Eliot, the
force, demands and dignity of ideal and practical morality. Romola, who restlessly follows the
dictates of duty, becomes a latter-day Madonna.116 Tito, who lacks a proper respect of the moral
law and speaks of the obligations of duty as “air-woven fetters” easily dispersed with “a little
philosophy” (270), is strangled to death by his betrayed adoptive father. These narratorial
sentences correspond to Romola and Tito‟s respective stories of moral development and
degeneration, and the narrative itself emphasizes and dramatizes moral dilemmas. There is a
sense of balance or coherence in Tito‟s punishment, Romola‟s reward and the dignified fate of
Savonarola, who was at least possessed of some element of hubris. Furthermore, Romola herself
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Schiller also offers advantages for reading Eliot as a playwright and philosopher who wrote both aesthetic works
and theory – Guth reads Eliot as not only borrowing from Schiller‟s aesthetic theory, but even modeling Savonarola,
for instance, on the Schillerian hero Wallenstein.
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See also on this point Felicia Bonaparte‟s discussion of Romola in The Triptych and the Cross: The Central
Myths of George Eliot’s Poetic Imagination (New York: New York University Press, 1979).
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seems capable, at the end, of bringing emotion, personal moral vocation and social existence into
an effective harmony, remaining as a paragon of Florence and reconciling with Tito‟s mistress.
However, as Kant recognizes and illustrates, the ideal is not necessarily a space of
harmony. Reason begets its own internal conflicts, and ideal moral rationality also exists in a
sort of necessary conflict with inclination, in which moral dignity may be won or lost. Romola
herself is caught between “the demands of an outward law which she recognized as a widely
ramifying obligation, and the demands of inner moral facts which were becoming more and more
peremptory” (441). Such a conflict is permissible in Schillerian harmony (and is used in
Schiller‟s dramas), so long as it leads to an ultimate conciliation or a properly tragic and
dramatic conclusion. Romola nearly concludes with the death of Savonarola, but the story
continues into an epilogue, which contains Romola‟s praise of the deceased – but also a note of
doubt indirectly introduced by the artist Piero di Cosimo, who apparently “abuses [Romola] for
dressing the altar, and thinking so much of Fra Girolamo,” i.e., Savonarola (548).
We are not given di Cosimo‟s reasons for the abuse (admittedly moderated by his gift of
flowers), but this story has given us reasons for not worshipping at Romola‟s altar, despite the
narrator‟s praise for Savonarola. Romola first encounters Savonarola fleeing from Florence and
Tito (who, by this point, has made manifest his moral indifference and sold Romola‟s father‟s
library against expressed orders) – at which point the friar seeks to convert Romola and call her
back to her duties as a wife. Given what we know of Tito, this call seems doubtful enough on its
own, but Savonarola further justifies his demand by claiming that “The higher life begins for us,
my daughter, when we renounce our own will to bow before a divine law” (343). Although the
friar refers to the law, and even makes a Kantian injunction against “a freedom which is
lawlessness,” the logic here is that of the divine will and Divine Command Morality.
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Savonarola‟s ready conversions between divine law, formal social obligations and personal
politics testify to the fundamentally arbitrary quality at the heart of this law. Romola even comes
to recognize “a fanaticism” in Savonarola that startles her (421). Savonarola presents a more
impressive figure than the Dodsons or Grandcourt, and, unlike them, seems to seek, and, in some
limited way, accomplish real good in a Florence that is clearly beset with problems. His political
ambitions complicate his character, but his demand for submission to apparently arbitrary norms
and external wills – and his ability to resolve Romola‟s struggles of moral deliberation into a
matter of submission – prevent us from taking Savonarola as a moral model.
Towards the end of the Grounding, Kant says that “Reason … restlessly seeks the
unconditionally necessary” (62). In speaking of moral concerns in both Eliot and Kant, I think it
is essentially important for us to keep in mind the restless quality of philosophical and literary
activity for these two writers. We can and have good reason to speak of duty as an essential
motive force running through the works of Eliot and Kant – the works examined in this paper,
but also those that follow – and a concept that exists in particular philosophical and literary
contexts and possesses structural relations to other concepts (autonomy, reflection, respect, etc.)
that cohere to form a more general and compelling image of moral motivation and possibility.
But duty is also a problem or question, a warp that gathers philosophical and literary discourse
without permitting a final or complete account. Dinah‟s moral vocation, Maggie‟s tragic duty
and Romola‟s ministerial moral life all possess common threads – and echo, for instance, in
Deronda‟s vocation or Dorothea‟s less violent tragedy – but cannot be equated, being particular
“experiments in life” under different conditions and in different contexts. Likewise, the moral
faith arrived at after the self-destructions of pure reason is not quite the same as the moral faith
arrived at after the structural conflicts and constructions of practical reason – nor is it quite
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identical with what moral faith means after aesthetic and teleological judgment exist as realms of
critical science and morality is symbolized by beauty. For both Eliot and Kant, duty derives its
imperative power not from theological warrant or external sanction, but from its capacity to
manifest a critical human dignity unbounded by anything save recognition of the same dignity in
other agents, and the responsibility attendant upon that recognition. Duty is thus radically
indeterminate, refusing the determinations of subjective inclination, natural influence, historical
tradition, etc. But duty also necessarily involves practical engagement with other sensible, finite
beings in a world in which non-trivial moral stakes exist.

120

Works Cited

121

Ashton, Rosemary. George Eliot: A Life. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1996. Print.
_____. G. H. Lewes: A Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Print.
_____. The German Idea: Four English writers and the reception of German Thought 18001860. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Print.
Anger, Suzie. “George Eliot and Philosophy.” The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot, ed.
George Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 76-97. Print.
Baker, William. The George Eliot- George Henry Lewes Library: An Annotated Catalogue.
London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977. Print.
Bird, Graham, ed. A Companion to Kant. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 2006. Print.
Bodenheimer, Rosemarie. The Real Life of Mary Ann Evans: George Eliot, Her Letters and
Fiction. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994. Print.
Bonaparte, Felicia. “Daniel Deronda: Theology in a Secular Age.” Religion and Literature 25.3
(Autumn 1993): 17-44. Print.
Cassirer, Ernst. Kant’s Life and Thought. Trans. James Haden. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1981. Print.
Collins, K. K. “G. H. Lewes Revised: George Eliot and the Moral Sense” Victorian Studies,
21.4 (Summer 1978): 463-92. Print.
Dodd, Valerie. George Eliot: An Intellectual Life. Hong Kong: Macmillan Press, 1990. Print.
_____. “A George Eliot Notebook” Studies in Bibliography 34 (1981): 258-262. Print.
Eliot, George. Adam Bede. Ed. Carol Martin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.
_____. Essays of George Eliot. Ed. Thomas Pinney. New York: Columbia University Press,
1963. Print.

122

_____. Impressions of Theophrastus Such. Ed. Nancy Henry. Iowa City: University of Iowa
Press, 1994. Print.
_____. Romola. Ed. Andrew Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. Print.
_____. Scenes of a Clerical Life. Ed. Thomas A. Noble. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1988. Print.
_____. Selected Critical Writings. Ed. Rosemary Ashton. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992. Print.
_____. The George Eliot Letters. 9 vols. Ed. Gordon S. Haight. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1954-78. Print. (GEL in in-text citations)
_____. The Mill on the Floss. Ed. Gordon Haight. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Print.
Eliot, George, and Thomas Pinney. “More Leaves from George Eliot‟s Notebook.” The
Huntington Library Quarterly, 29.4 (August 1996): 353-376. Print.
Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianity. Trans. George Eliot. New York: Harper &
Row, 1957. Print.
Fleishman, Avrom. George Eliot's Intellectual Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010. Print.
Ganz, Melissa J. “Binding the Will: George Eliot and the Practice of Promising.” ELH 75.3
(Fall 2008): 565-602. Print.
Greiner, Rae. “Sympathy Time: Adam Smith, George Eliot, and the Realist Novel.” Narrative
17.3 (Oct 2009): 291-311. Print.
Guth, Deborah. George Eliot and Schiller: Intertextuality and cross-cultural discourse.
Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2003. Print.
123

Haight, Gordon S. George Eliot: A Biography. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. Print.
Henberg, M.C. “George Eliot‟s Moral Realism.” Philosophy and Literature 3.1 (1979): 20-38.
Print.
Herman, Barbara. The Practice of Moral Judgment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1993. Print.
Hill, Susan E. “Constructing Morality: The Theological and Literary Significance of Translation
for George Eliot.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 65.3 (Autumn 1997),
635-653. Print.
Hill Jr., Thomas E., ed. The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2009. Print.
Hogan, Desmond. “Kant‟s Copernican Turn and the Rationalist Tradition.” The Cambridge
Companion to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. ed. Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010. Print.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Eric Steinberg.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1993. Print.
_____. An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Ed. Charles W. Hendel. Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1957. Print.
Idziak, Janine Marie. Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings. New
York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1979. Print.
Jacobus, Mary. “The Question of Language: Men of Maxims and The Mill on the Floss.”
Critical Inquiry 8.2 (Winter 1981): 207-222. Print.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Co., 2002. Print.
124

_____. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Werner Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.,
1996. Print.
_____. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. James W. Ellington. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Co., 1993. Print.
_____. Kant’s Cosmogony: As in his Essay on the Retardation of the Rotation of the Earth and
his Natural History and Theory of the Heaven. Trans. and Ed. W. Hastie. New York:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970.
_____. The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press., 1996. Print.
_____. The One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God. Trans. Gordon
Treash. New York: Abaris Books, Inc. 1979. Print.
_____. Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770. Trans. and ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Print. Cambridge Edition of the Works of
Immanuel Kant 1.
Kuehn, Manfred. Kant: A Biography. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Print.
Knoepflmacher, U.C. “George Eliot, Feuerbach and the Question of Criticism.” Victorian
Studies, 7.3 (March 1964): 306-9. Rpt. in George Eliot: A Collection of Critical Essays,
ed. George R. Creeger. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970.
_____. Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel: George Eliot, Walter Pater, and Samuel
Butler. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1965. Print.
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Discourse on Metaphysics / Correspondence with Arnauld /
Monadology. Trans. George R. Montgomery. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1973. Print.
Locke, John. Works. 3 vol, 5th ed. London: Birt, Browne, Longman et al, 1751. Print.
125

Lewes, George Henry. The Biographical History of Philosophy. 2 vols. London: Charles Knight
& Co., 1845-6. Print.
_____. The Biographical History of Philosophy, library edition. 2 vols. New York: D. Appleton
& Co., 1857. Print.
_____. The History of Philosophy: From Thales to Comte. 2 vols. 4th ed. London: Longmans,
Green & Co., 1871. Print.
_____. The Life of Goethe. 2nd ed. London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1864. Print.
_____. Problems of Life and Mind: first series: The Foundations of a Creed, vol. 1. London:
Trübner &Co. 1874. Print.
_____. Problems of Life and Mind: second series: The Physical Basis of the Mind. London:
Trübner &Co., 1877. Print.
Levine, George. “Daniel Deronda: A New Epistemology.” Knowing the Past: Victorian
Literature and Culture. Ed. Suzy Anger. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. 52-73.
Print.
_____. “Determinism and Responsibility in the Works of George Eliot.” PMLA 77.3 (June
1962): 268-279. Print.
_____. “Introduction: George Eliot and the art of realism.” The Cambridge Companion to
George Eliot, ed. George Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 1-19.
Print.
Levy, Eric P. “Property Morality in The Mill on the Floss.” Victorians Institute Journal 31
(2003): 173-186. Print.

126

Loesberg, Jonathan. “Aesthetics, Ethics and Unreadable Acts in George Eliot.” Knowing the
Past: Victorian Literature and Culture. Ed. Suzy Anger. Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2001. 121-147. Print.
_____. “Cultural Studies, Victorian Studies, and Formalism” Victorian Literature and Culture 27
(1999): 537-544. Print.
Lynn, Andrew. “„Mr. Gilfil‟s Love Story‟ and the Critique of Kantianism.” The Victorian
Newsletter 95 (Spring 1999): 24-26. Print.
Mansell Jr., Darrell. “A Note on Hegel and George Eliot,” Victorian Newsletter 27 (1965): 1215. Print.
Martin, Bruce K. “Rescue and Marriage in Adam Bede.” SEL 1500-1900 12.4 (Autumn 1972):
745-763. Print.
McCobb, Anthony. George Eliot’s Knowledge of German Life and Letters. Salzburg : Institut
für Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Universität Salzburg, 1982. Print.
Miller, Andrew H. “Bruising, Laceration, and Lifelong Maiming; or, how we encourage
Research.” ELH 70.1 (Spring 2003): 301-18. Print.
Miller, J. Hillis. The Ethics of Reading. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. Print.
_____. “The Two Rhetorics: George Eliot‟s Bestiary.” The Mill on the Floss and Silas Marner.
Eds. Nahem Yousaf and Andrew Maunder. New York: Palgrave, 2002. Print.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Nietzsche Reader. Eds. Keith Ansell Pearson and Duncan Large.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. Print.
_____. The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking, 1980. Print.
Norton, Robert E. “The Aesthetic Education of Humanity: George Eliot‟s Romola and Schiller‟s
Theory of Tragedy.” Journal of Aesthetic Education 25.4 (Winter 1991): 3-20. Print.
127

Paris, Bernard J. “George Eliot‟s Religion of Humanity.” English Literary History, 29
(December, 1962) 418-43. Rpt. in George Eliot: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed.
George R. Creeger. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970. Print.
Pyle, Forest. “A Novel Sympathy: The Imagination of Community in George Eliot.” NOVEL: A
Forum on Fiction 27.1 (Autumn 1993): 5-23. Print.
Redinger, Ruby. George Eliot: The Emergent Self. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975. Print.
Simcox, Edith. “George Eliot.” The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review. Ed. James
Knowles, Vol 9 July-June 1881. 778-801. London: C. Kegan Paul & co. Google Books.
Web. 2 Dec. 2009
Stolpa, Jennifer M. “Dinah and the Debate over Vocation in Adam Bede” George Eliot – George
Henry Lewes Studies 42-3 (Sept 2002): 30-49. Print.
Strauss, David Friedrich. The Life of Jesus Critically Examined. Trans. George Eliot, ed. Peter
C. Hodgson. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972. Print.
Qualls, Barry. “George Eliot and religion.” The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot, ed.
George Levine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 119-137. Print.
Reath, Andrew. “Kant‟s Critical Account of Freedom.” A Companion to Kant. Ed. Graham
Bird. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing 2006. 275-90. Print.
Wainwright, William. Religion and Morality. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2005. Print.
Wartofsky, Max. Feuerbach. New York: Cambridge University Press 1977. Print.
Wood, Allen. Kantian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Print.
_____. Kant’s Moral Religion. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970. Print.

128

Vita
Andrew Lallier was born in Durham, North Carolina and attended the University of
North Carolina – Chapel Hill, receiving a B.A. in English and German Literature. He then
attended the University of Tennessee – Knoxville, receiving an M.A. in English literature.
Andrew began his Ph.D. at the University of Tennessee – Knoxville in the fall of 2011.

129

